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Violence, Governance, and Uncertainty
An Introduction to Citizens’ Lived Experiences
of the Ugandan State
Around midnight in June 2014, in a village in northern Uganda, an unarmed
37-year-old man was shot in the back as he fled from a police officer. He died
hours before he was found, lying face down in a compound a few hundred metres
from his home. That night, he had been guarding his community as part of a local
vigilante group. A year previously, the village had experienced a surge in violent
crime. The police and district-level authorities did not have the capacity to secure
the village; instead, they had called on the community to form a vigilante group
for their own protection. The vigilantes patrolled with rudimentary weapons,
including machetes, sticks, and ropes to restrain suspects. They began to organize
themselves, implementing code words and rules of conduct, enforcing a curfew,
and collecting taxes from community members. But their work was controversial:
they failed to catch criminals and were accused of drinking on the job as well as
beating and extorting community members. The morning after the shooting,
community members learned that a resident of the village had falsely reported
to the police that the vigilantes were armed with guns and robbing passers-by.
Community members speculated that the resident had lied to prompt the police to
arrest the vigilantes, which would lift the curfew and its penalties. Instead, the
police arrived and shot into the dark, killing one vigilante and maiming another.
William Odera, the brother of the deceased vigilante, sought justice.¹ He
wanted retribution for his brother’s death and compensation to support the
slain man’s children. He decided to open a police investigation into the murder.
But when Odera went to the police, they replied that the shooting was caused by a
miscommunication within the village and so he should resolve his complaint ‘at
home’. A government official sided with the police, arguing that the vigilantes
were in fact armed robbers, and thus their demise was warranted. Odera expressed
frustration—it is well known in Uganda that to solve such a problem ‘at home’
¹ All names have been changed to protect the identity of respondents. Names of specific villages
have been changed or generalized to reflect the municipality level or higher. Where necessary to protect
the identity of the respondent, I have omitted interview locations or dates. Unless otherwise noted,
respondents are male; with the caveat that I have also obscured the gender of respondents if it might
reveal their identity (for example, in the cases of former government officials).
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would require Odera’s family to attack the family of the youth who had made the
false report.
Instead, Odera gathered witness statements and took them to police headquar-
ters, first in Gulu Town and later in Kampala. While facing the aftermath of
arbitrary state violence and impunity, Odera did not disengage from the state.
Instead, he turned to it for justice—even though the state’s agents were responsible
for the death of his brother. In response to his complaint, the state’s institutions
ground into action. Over the better part of a decade, Odera followed a lengthy
bureaucratic procedure for internal investigations of police behaviour, holding out
hope that it would deliver justice even while his efforts were met repeatedly with
obstacles. A mutual friend reflected on Odera’s actions:
Odera would not survive either choice [solving the matter at home or going to
the criminal justice system]. If he had retaliated that very night, he would do it,
fine—kill people, kill livestock, destroy property—to finish his own interests. But
then the government would come in and say, ‘We have the court of law, you
should have brought it to us.’Odera, on the other hand, said, ‘I cannot retaliate—
let me take the right path of law . . . It is their job to protect and not destroy the
community members.’ Would the government really accept that? Never. The
only possibility is to calm down Odera and at the end of the day they frustrate
him: ‘Your case file is lost, we don’t know where it is.’ They’re just trying to
confuse the case . . . So the man [who reported the vigilantes to the police] is a free
man now, he doesn’t have anything to answer, and Odera does not have any right
to retaliate. It has been three years. The government is frustrating Odera time and
again. (32-year-old male, phone interview, 5 March 2017)
Odera faced a predicament. He was caught between the exhortation to take the
matter into his own hands, and the continued relevance of the ‘right path of
law’. He responded to this contradiction by submitting to government induced
‘confusion’. He allowed himself to be ‘calmed down’ in response to the
numerous obstacles that ‘frustrated’ his interests. The police held off Odera’s
claims not through intimidation or direct refusal to help him, but rather by
engaging him in a lengthy bureaucratic process that kept him involved because
it could plausibly deliver justice—especially compared to the available
alternatives.
This case took place under the modern authoritarian regime in Museveni’s
Uganda. This authoritarian regime can be categorized as ‘modern’ in the sense
that it governs in large part by law, rather than unrestrained violence and
executive decrees. For instance, to allow Museveni to remain president for over
35 years, the constitutional provisions for presidential term limits, and later age
limit, had to be removed. These changes were made not by fiat, but by acts of
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parliament that were challenged and upheld in court.² On one hand, such an
approach has benefits. In Museveni’s Uganda, it has allowed the ruling regime to
frame itself as a fledgling democracy, deserving of foreign aid and investment. On
the other hand, it carries risks. Ordinary citizens can use the resultant civic spaces
and democratic institutions—however limited—to organize and make claims on
the regime. For example, Ugandans seeking to challenge Museveni have done so
through civic protest, electoral campaigns, the press, the courts, and Parliament.
Live opposition means that the regime is always engaged in a balancing act. As a
result, these modern authoritarian regimes have been widely described as inher-
ently unstable and prone to conflict. Scholars continue to debate how these
regimes govern, given that they weaken their own institutions in pursuit of
unchecked executive control (c.f. Levitsky and Way 2002; Schedler 2006;
Scheppele 2018).
To contribute to this ongoing debate, this book identifies a new form of modern
authoritarianism—arbitrary governance—that focuses more on weakening com-
petition than on maximizing control. Such arbitrary states allow for pockets of
civic organization and pathways for citizens to make claims on the state; however,
they make these spaces fragile by intervening in them violently and unpredictably.
Such interventions—in which state authorities assert their right to control a
situation, activity, people, or territory—supersede or displace other authorities
operating there. The effect is to make the role of local public authorities³ contin-
gent and reconfigurable in relation to the regime. Arbitrary states can therefore
paradoxically encourage non-state and local actors to use violence to control
people, resources, and territory, while limiting the capacity of such actors to
consolidate power. The state’s ability to reinforce its interventions with over-
whelming and unaccountable violence makes it difficult for citizens and local
authorities to calculate and assess the risks of possible intervention, which causes
them to self-police. I call this mode of governance institutionalized arbitrariness. It
helps to explain how today’s authoritarian rulers can project power even as their
pursuit of an unchecked executive threatens their own institutional capacity. I use
the terms institutionalized arbitrariness and arbitrary governance throughout this
² The extent to which these amendments were procedurally proper was challenged in Uganda’s
Constitutional Court; in the end, the amendment was upheld by a 4–3 vote. Opposition Members of
Parliament (MPs) charged that ‘the amendment is invalid because it was passed during parliamentary
sessions marred by brawls and plain-clothes security operatives assaulting and dragging MPs out of the
chamber. They also argue that Mr Museveni wants to be president for life and the amendment violates
a basic democratic principle, that power belongs to the people. His allies say the amendment removes
age discrimination, and was passed after widespread public consultation’ (BBC News 2018). The
process might be characterized as plausibly compliant with a procedural vision of the rule of law. See
Chapter 3 for more details.
³ The term ‘public authority’ refers to actors who hold ‘legitimate authority’ and provide public
goods, such as security and justice. The term focuses attention on practices of authority, viewing it as an
‘emergent property, always in production’; as well as on the dynamics of competition, conflict, and
contestation that contribute to its production (Hoffmann and Kirk 2013, 2, 6).
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book, with institutionalized arbitrariness emphasizing the regime’s governing
strategy, and arbitrary governance emphasizing citizens’ perceptions of that
strategy.
Based on a study of the micro-dynamics of violence and governance in
Uganda,⁴ such as the activities of vigilante groups like the one described in the
first pages, this book makes three main contributions to studies of modern
authoritarian rule. First, it identifies a new type of authoritarian regime that is
more concerned with undermining threats to its authority than with monopoliz-
ing violence. In contrast to scholarship that sees governance as a quest for ever
increasing control, institutionalized arbitrariness relies on unpredictable asser-
tions and denials of authority that fragment and weaken civil society and local
public authorities. Second, this book describes the mechanisms by which such
regimes work, presenting them in a four-part framework. I use this framework to
analyse how arbitrary governance shapes state–society relations by fracturing civil
society, limiting the space for political claim making, and causing citizens to self-
police. Third, the book uses sub-national variation in Uganda to probe key
alternative explanations for citizens’ perceptions of arbitrary governance, includ-
ing conflict-affectedness and political relationship to the ruling regime. It finds
that these alternative explanations do not account for arbitrary governance, and
yields a typology of arbitrary governance that illustrates how the same factors in
different combinations similarly fragment civil society and cause citizens to self-
police. The remainder of this chapter draws on the case of Odera and his deceased
brother to elaborate institutionalized arbitrariness in the context of new global
trends in authoritarian rule. It then describes the research question and method-
ology, before previewing the book’s major contributions and outlining its
organization.
1. Arbitrary Governance and Social Control
in Authoritarian States
In recent years, scholars of authoritarianism have noted a trend in which institu-
tions designed to implement the rule of law and democratic governance have been
hollowed out to facilitate the ruler’s ability to exercise arbitrary power. They point
to the rise of authoritarian and populist tendencies in countries like Hungary and
Poland, Venezuela and Brazil, India and Myanmar, and the United States (US).
Even as those who study authoritarianism grapple with how to analyse these
⁴ This study traces the local-level workings of state power to investigate who can use violence, how,
and with what effect. Many scholars examine the micro-dynamics of violence to locate the sources of
coercive power that underpin state authority and the state–society contract (e.g., Barkey 1994; Blok
1975; Kalyvas 2006; Volkov 2002). This book seeks to build on that tradition.
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observations, scholars of sub-Saharan African politics have studied the disjunct
between state institutions and executive power for decades. Both sets of scholars
study regimes characterized by the ruler’s use of arbitrary power, democratic-
looking institutions, and resultant political unpredictability.
Since the wave of democratization on the African sub-continent in the 1990s,
scholars of the post-colonial African state have increasingly noted that today’s
African rulers diverge in character from those of the early post-independence
period. Rather than espousing pan-African and revolutionary ideologies, today’s
African statesmen adopt the rhetoric of democratic institutionalists, calling for
universal suffrage, the rule of law, checks and balances, and transparency and
accountability (Cheeseman 2015). At the same time scholarly depictions of the
post-colonial African state as a shadow state (Reno 1995) governed by politics ‘of
disorder’ (Chabal and Daloz 1999) or ‘of the belly’ (Bayart 1993) seem to retain
relevance. They also bear an uncanny resemblance to some forms and operations
of arbitrary power increasingly identified in the twenty-first century and framed as
‘right wing’ and ‘populist’ in the global North, from the US to Poland (Norris and
Inglehart 2019; Scheppele 2018). These ‘hybrid’ regimes—neither democratic nor
authoritarian—somehow balance democratic institutions and repressive tenden-
cies to project power over their populations, without buckling under the pressure
of it all. To help answer this puzzle, this book combines hundreds of interviews
conducted in Museveni’s Uganda with the rich literature on the post-colonial
African state to understand how such authoritarian rulers project arbitrary power
and how it plays out in the daily lives of ordinary citizens. It is grounded in and
focused on scholarship theorizing the African state, while contributing to a
broader debate about contemporary forms of authoritarianism.
This book identifies unpredictability as a key tool that helps today’s authori-
tarians maintain a balance between democratic institutions and arbitrary power.
These arbitrary states cultivate an institutional environment structured to accom-
modate numerous authorities with overlapping and contestable jurisdictional
remits. The result is a governance landscape of fragmented and competing sources
of power. To maintain its authority, the regime intervenes with overwhelming and
unaccountable violence at unpredictable moments. In an environment so charac-
terized by unpredictable state intervention, ordinary citizens cannot manage or
ignore the possibility of state interference—but neither can they rely on it. Instead,
state authority is unpredictably present and absent. Rather than eliminate civic
organization, such an approach makes civic spaces fragile, undermines collective
action, and destabilizes those who would seek to challenge the state, allowing the
regime to remain the most powerful governing actor among many. This modern
form of authoritarianism produces chaos and competition outside the ruling
cadre. Nevertheless, arbitrary governance is able to accommodate—and even
relies upon—stable bureaucratic institutions at a local level. These bureaucratic
institutions are neither mere façades nor are they overrun by society. They often
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work—sometimes even in an impersonal way—to deliver services and project
state power. Functional bureaucracies distinguish this type of governance from
both neopatrimonialism, in which weak state institutions are colonized by per-
sonalist rule, and also from traditional understandings of authoritarianism, which
often assume that rulers will seek to eliminate institutions with autonomous
function in order to maximize their control (Fukuyama 2013).
Institutionalized arbitrariness is a mode of governance through which the
state produces a self-policing population that can be alternately demobilized and
remobilized. Though citizens may seek to subvert, challenge, or engage the state
on a daily basis, pervasive uncertainty dilutes their efforts. For instance, the
vigilante group that Odera’s brother joined sought to substitute for state police
in their village, but their authority evaporated when the police intervened and
shot at them. At the same time, the persistent possibility that state institutions
will function as they ought means that even when citizens become disenchanted
and suspicious, many continue to engage with the state’s formal governance
institutions. For example, for Odera, the government’s lengthy and complex
process kept him engaged, if also apprehensive, so that he remained ready to
jump into action if the case showed signs of movement. The possibility that he
would be arrested himself if he took the law into his own hands only made him
more invested in the state’s process. Institutionalized arbitrariness allows such
regimes to project power, cultivating a citizenry that generally abides by the law,
votes, and—more often than not—submits to state authority even when it lacks
regular presence, consistent coercive control, or the regular ability to provide
services. By illustrating the micro-dynamics of violent contestation between
local actors and state authorities, the case of Odera and his brother draws our
attention to the fundamental importance of disorganization and unpredictabil-
ity as key tools of authoritarian governance—the core thesis advanced in
this book.
The term ‘institutionalized arbitrariness’ highlights how the seemingly contra-
dictory notions of ‘institutionalization’ and ‘arbitrariness’ can be combined to
create productive tensions that enable the state to project authoritarian power over
a population and a territory. ‘Arbitrary’ refers to a ruler’s unchecked and
unaccountable power, exercised in such a way that those affected cannot predict
or understand how power is wielded and have no means of questioning or
challenging it. It is thus necessary to look not just at how rulers exercise discretion
in an arbitrary way, but also at the institutional apparatus through which power is
exercised, and potentially restrained or tempered, as well as how these institutions
shape citizens’ expectations about how power might be used in the future (Krygier
2016, 203–4). Arbitrariness is institutionalized in that it has become a regular part
of how such authoritarian regimes function. The resultant predictable unpredict-
ability shapes the behaviour of ordinary citizens and offers important insights into
modern authoritarianism.
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When writing analytically about violence, it can be difficult to acknowledge its
personal costs. The death of Odera’s brother and its aftermath offer a small
reminder of the long-term effects for friends and family, communities and
clans, of what might otherwise seem to be merely an impersonal instantiation of
state violence. This book does not aim to make a normative claim about what
constitutes ‘good’ governance. However, the cases described herein illustrate
questions of justice, morality, and dignity confronted by people living in modern
authoritarian states. Though this book focuses primarily on physical and material
aspects of security, it does so with the conviction that this has far-reaching and
deep-seated social, cultural, and interpersonal implications.
2. Research Questions and Motivation
This study began as a comparative inquiry into vigilante governance in contexts of
limited statehood.⁵ I originally planned to ask where vigilante groups exist and
why, what form they take, and what determines group cohesion and longevity.
This inquiry was based on the hypothesis that vigilante groups arise to fill a
security and governance gap. My questions were intended to isolate the micro-
dynamics of violence and governance and document grass-roots processes of the
consolidation of power in the absence of the state. I believed that the functioning
of vigilante groups would reveal the process by which violence is incrementally
institutionalized at a local level and offer insights into the micro-processes of state
formation. I expected that, unlike the aspiring rulers in Charles Tilly’s model of
European state formation, Uganda’s twenty-first-century vigilantes would be
savvy about state authority and how to use it to their advantage. As a result,
I hypothesized that they would strategically adopt the symbols, rhetoric, and
forms of a modern state to strengthen their position without making the pre-
sumed linear and sequential transition to a formal and bureaucratized institution
(Hagmann and Péclard 2010; Lund 2006b). I anticipated that vigilantes would
thus produce and enact bureaucratic institutional forms, while in practice relying
on personalized relationships to conduct business. What I found was much more
interesting.
I began my field research in northern Uganda in 2014. In this recently post-
conflict environment, political order was fragmented and contested, offering
opportunities for new forms of authority to emerge and consolidate control.
Gulu Town—the main urban centre in northern Uganda, located approximately
100 kilometres from South Sudan—had been the epicentre of a brutal and violent
⁵ The concept of ‘limited statehood’ refers to countries with ineffective state institutions, that lack
the capacity to implement central decisions and monopolize force, but that still are able to govern, for
example relying on partnerships with private or non-state actors (Risse 2011).
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conflict from 1986 to 2006, during which the Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA) rebels
fought Uganda’s government, victimizing the civilian population. The conflict is
often framed in ethnic terms, with the Acholi LRA rebels emerging to challenge
the new regime of Yoweri Museveni, who had violently seized power in 1986,
thereby displacing several decades of northern rule. Nearly ten years after the
informal end of the LRA war, the conflict-affected northern region still faced the
highest poverty rate in the country⁶ and had the lowest levels of infrastructure
development, with limited access to markets and services (World Bank 2016).
Northerners—and residents of Gulu in particular—opposed the ruling National
Resistance Movement (NRM) regime on regional and ethnic grounds (Branch
2011). As a study location, Gulu offered a rich environment to observe entrepre-
neurial politics in the struggle to establish new public orders in the aftermath of
war. In particular, local vigilante groups were common. Such groups have been
shown to use violence to make governance claims at a local level. They would thus
be a valuable lens to examine the dynamics I wished to study (see Abrahams 1987;
Buur 2006; Pratten and Sen 2008). I reasoned that tensions between the centre and
the periphery would actively be unfolding and thus ripe for observation and
documentation.
During my first month in Uganda in February 2014, I conducted 18 interviews
with 23 respondents using a combination of convenience and snowball sampling.
I also discussed my research agenda with several scholars working in the area.⁷My
exploratory study showed that my original questions would be difficult to
answer—and that those answers might reveal very little about governance and
state authority. The vigilante groups active in the area were hard to categorize in
terms of their history, form, function, use of violence, and even participants. For
instance, asking when a group was founded elicited different answers from
different respondents. Upon further investigation, I discovered that most groups
had been formed and dissolved repeatedly; their membership and mandate shifted
over time. Low-level crime and insecurity paired with a long history of civilian
militias meant that, over many years, either a ‘new’ vigilante group was formed or
an ‘old’ one was resurrected. The form of these groups, too, was fluid: such groups
were ‘non-state’ in that their members received none of the benefits afforded to
formal state employees, yet they reported to and received orders from local
councillors.⁸ At times they received payment from informal systems of local
⁶ In 2013, the northern region had a poverty rate of 43.7 per cent, compared with 24.5 per cent in the
eastern region, 8.7 per cent in the western region, and 4.7 per cent in the central region. The annual
percentage reduction in the north was also the lowest of the four regions at 3.1 per cent (World Bank
2016, 5).
⁷ I owe many thanks to scholars including Tim Allen, Teddy Atim, Ronald Atkinson, Adam Branch,
Julian Hopwood, Holly Porter, and Alex deWaal for early insights and encouragement in the field.
⁸ Local councillors, or LC1s, are most local administrative position in Uganda. The Local Council
(LC) structure was established as a part of the NRM’s early strategy to build grass-roots support across
the country. Today, they have a tiered structure representing the village, parish, sub-county,
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taxation. Further study revealed that numerous different actors, from locally
elected authorities to the police and even sometimes the military, could call on
these vigilantes for manpower. As volunteers, vigilantes often left for paid work;
others were arrested or fell out of favour with the community and thus were
banned from security activities.
It became apparent that any issue related to violence and the state—such as who
can use violence to enforce laws, what level of violence is acceptable, and what
activities merit punishment—encompassed multiple contradictory dimensions.
Such contradictions frequently figure in ethnographies of vigilantes, gangs, self-
help groups, militias, and the like. Scholars emphasize the twilight or boundary
nature of such groups (Lund 2006b) and the fluidity of individual roles in the
group and group roles in the community (Bøås and Dunn 2017; Göpfert 2012;
Shah 2008). These observations pushed me to ask new questions oriented around
the ‘how’ and ‘why’ of governance. Instead of trying to explain away the uncer-
tainty and ambiguity that characterized security and governance in my field site,
I opted to make it the focus of my research. Why is the relationship between
violence and governance ambiguous in northern Uganda? What does that tell us
about how the Ugandan state governs ordinary citizens?My endeavour became an
inductive theory-building project on governance in authoritarian regimes.
Questions of ‘how’ and ‘why’ inevitably raise the question of intent—are these
processes purposeful or merely incidental? Whether or not arbitrary governance is
intentional is extremely difficult to ascertain. To do so decisively would require
intimate knowledge of the thinking of authoritarian rulers and their associates, not
just at the present moment, but throughout their rule. Such an inquiry is outside
the scope of this book.⁹ Still, the preponderance of the evidence marshalled here
suggests two conclusions. First, arbitrary governance shapes the behaviour of
ordinary citizens, and is thus critical to the functioning of these regimes regardless
of the ruler’s intentions. Second, as elaborated in Chapter 2 and Chapter 8,
arbitrary governance is a shared characteristic of several authoritarian regimes
municipality, and district. They comprise a council of ten representatives, one of whom is the
chairman. Today, the LC chairman functions as a kind of village-level leader. A full explanation of
the local council system and its historic ties to the NRM state is provided in Chapter 3.
⁹ Answering the question of intent via a ‘smoking gun’might be achievable through other methods,
such as elite ethnography. In the case of Uganda, such a study would be challenging in the current
political environment. However, even if possible, such approaches face methodological challenges, as
what respondents recount can be shaped by current interests and concerns, and in politically charged
environments can sometimes only be accessed by making allegiances with particular interlocutors,
which may bias findings (Malejacq and Mukhopadhyay 2016). Instead, this study collected hundreds of
in-depth interviews, not as records of the truth, but to identify experiential patterns in the views of
respondents (Fernández-Kelly 2015, 14). It is thus a view from below, augmented with approximately a
dozen elite interviews with former members of Museveni’s government to triangulate data and help
interpret the validity of findings.
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that manipulate the relationship between arbitrary power and the rule of law,
despite their different political and historical trajectories.
The findings suggest institutional intent. It is not that individual authorities
design their own actions to be unpredictable, but rather that the structure of the
system produces uncertainty among different authorities. Unpredictability derives
from uncertainty about which authority will be relevant and what rules she (or
more likely he) will apply. One might then ask if arbitrary governance is the result
of historically contingent factors that the state accepts and leverages, versus a
mode of governance that it actively produces. I chart a middle course between
these two interpretations. Arbitrary governance is indeed tied to historical factors,
such as the post-colonial nature of the state, limited resources, and the global
political aid economy since the Cold War. At the same time, the regime has
regularly made choices that reinforce rather than counter unpredictability and
arbitrariness—for example, pursuing institutional fragmentation, raising citizen
militias, and relying on the security services to police the domestic population
with excessive and unaccountable violence. Intent therefore is not a grand strat-
egy, but rather is reflected in the structural design and maintenance of the system.
These details are treated in Chapter 3 and Chapter 8, while questions of intent are
taken up at the end of Chapter 2 and in Chapter 7.
3. Researching the Arbitrary State
Uganda—once characterized as an emerging democracy and lauded for its seem-
ingly democratic reforms addressing fiscal policy, decentralization, and gender
quotas—is now widely recognized as a ‘hybrid’ state, in which democratic insti-
tutions and practices are manipulated to further centralize authoritarian control
(Tripp 2010). The hybrid state combines aspects of democracy and authoritar-
ianism, with (almost) regular elections, (formal) separation of powers, and
(mostly) free speech. Institutionalized arbitrariness emerges from a paradox that
characterizes such states and that Uganda illustrates well: governing institutions
are highly fragmented and relate to each other stochastically—even while citizens
widely perceive the state as a coherent entity with significant regulatory control
over violence.
Conceptualizing ‘the state’ based on empirical evidence in Uganda only high-
lights this paradox. The state is not monolithic; it consists of diverse actors,
institutions, and practices, each with varying interests, that can act alternately in
a public or private capacity. To respond to the definitional challenge associated
with ‘the state’, some scholars focus on what the state does and how, rather than
on a deductive notion of what it is (Bierschenk and de Sardan 2014; Mitchell
1991). My inquiry is similarly concerned with practices of governance, and
specifically on the institutionalization of violence. At the same time, my research
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revealed that rejecting the notion of state institutions in favour of practices of
statehood would create its own challenges. In Uganda, citizens’ conceptualization
of the state shapes how they understand themselves as subjects. Their imaginary of
the state encompasses the opaque workings of central power, citizens’ belief in the
existence and importance of these levers of power, and citizens’ expectations that
something akin to governing is happening in the Statehouse. Moreover, Uganda’s
ruling regime has worked hard to make government, state, and party synonymous.
The image of ‘the state’ is fundamental to this story—the individuals, institutions,
and ideas that comprise the state are typically closely tied to power. I therefore
use the terms ‘ruling regime’ and ‘state’ in a limited sense to refer to those
individuals who control Uganda’s formal and public state institutions as citizens
imagine them.
The majority of my research took place in and around Gulu Town in northern
Uganda between 2014 and 2016. Gulu constituted a ‘most-likely’ case in which to
observe unpredictable and arbitrary state intervention.¹⁰ Because residents of
Gulu have been staunchly opposed to the NRM regime and the area is highly
conflict-affected, it is likely that the state appears unreliable and unpredictably
present, making it an ideal location to disentangle the mechanisms of institution-
alized arbitrariness. Over 10 months of field research with Gulu as the primary
site, I conducted 303 unstructured and semi-structured interviews with approxi-
mately as many respondents. From these, I developed a framework to analyse
arbitrary governance, and in 2018, I returned to Uganda to apply that framework
over six weeks and 76 interviews in three additional locations in Uganda.
Interviews were on average an hour in length, although they varied based on the
topic of conversation and practical considerations, ranging from the respondent’s
comfort level to inclement weather. For many interviews, I employed Ugandan
researchers to help locate respondents and translate when necessary.
I supplemented these interviews with informal conversations as well as observa-
tions of security trainings, political events, daily life, and dispute resolution in
municipal or village-level courts and by local mediation. Overall, my interview
respondents represent a broad cross-section of society, weighted towards those
involved in informal and local security provision—that is, poor young men.
3.1 A Framework and Typology for Studying
Arbitrary Governance
From my study of local security and the micro-dynamics of violence in Gulu,
I developed a framework to analyse arbitrary governance. The framework,
¹⁰ ‘Most-likely’ or ‘least-likely’ cases are ‘cases that ought, or ought not, to invalidate or confirm
theories, if any cases can be expected to do so’ (Eckstein 1992, 158).
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elaborated in Chapter 2, is comprised of four oppositions that characterize state
capacity: (1) the use of lawful versus exceptional violence; (2) the state’s defined
jurisdictional claim versus lack thereof; (3) state presence versus absence; and (4)
state fragmentation versus consolidation. Existing scholarship often assumes that
each of these oppositions has an internally stable or stabilizing relationship. Take
the third opposition of state presence versus absence as an example: a given state
might be present in some places and absent in others; or it might be partially
present; or effectively absent (O’Donnell 1999). However, regimes that employ
strategies of institutionalized arbitrariness manipulate these oppositions, unpre-
dictably and repeatedly collapsing and reinstating them, such that the oppositions
become unstable. In the same places and time periods, the state might alternately
appear present or absent; partially present; and—less common but importantly—
create doubt about the very meaning of any difference between state absence and
presence.¹¹ Destabilizing these oppositions produces four ‘factors’ that together
constitute institutionalized arbitrariness. Table 1.1 lists each opposition and the
factor that is produced when the opposition is destabilized.
Combined, the destabilization of these oppositions produces an environment of
seemingly arbitrary intervention that makes the government ever present in
citizens’ imaginations, despite its general material absence in terms of daily
security provision or law enforcement. The resultant system promotes societal
fragmentation and political demobilization.
The destabilization of these four oppositions is reflected in the experience of
Odera and his brother. The case shows how the regime at times allows the exercise
of overwhelming violence outside the law (as when the police shot the vigilantes in
the dead of night), and at other times reasserts the claim of lawful violence (as
when the government official defined the police shooting as a lawful response to
criminal activity). The capacity to arbitrarily deploy extralegal violence limits
citizens’ abilities to reasonably ignore or manage interactions with the state. By
Table 1.1 The oppositions and factors of institutionalized arbitrariness
Destabilized opposition Factor in institutionalized arbitrariness
1 The use of lawful versus
exceptional violence
Citizens’ perceptions of the state’s capacity for
overwhelming and unaccountable violence
2 The state’s defined jurisdictional
claim versus lack thereof
Citizens’ perceptions of a fluid state jurisdiction
3 State presence versus state
absence
Citizens’ perceptions of potential state presence
4 State fragmentation versus state
consolidation
Citizens’ experience of a coherent and
consolidated state
¹¹ This may be difficult to imagine in the abstract, and is elaborated with numerous examples in
Chapter 2, as well as Chapters 4–6.
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unpredictably claiming and denying jurisdictional authority, state authorities
destabilize citizen claim making and undermine other non-state authorities. In
this case, the vigilante group was unable to consolidate its position in the com-
munity because the police’s violent intervention undercut the vigilantes’mandate.
In the aftermath of his brother’s death, Odera waited for years for the police to
respond to his case, confident that the higher authorities knew about his situation
and would eventually respond. The perception that the state could be present at
any time and is informed about local problems makes government non-
intervention appear to be as much a choice as intervention.
Much of the literature on state formation assumes that all states fundamentally
seek to consolidate control over territory—and that claiming jurisdictional
authority, increasing state presence, and regulating the use of violence are key to
this process. In contrast, my analysis shows that it is actually by rendering
jurisdictions, state presence, and uses of violence unstable and fluid that some
modern authoritarian rulers are able to project power.
3.2 Alternative Explanations
To probe the validity of the four-factor framework that emerged inductively from
my research in Gulu, I returned to Uganda in 2018 to examine alternative
explanations for arbitrary governance. I selected three additional locations that
varied on key alternative explanations for citizens’ perceptions of an arbitrary
state: conflict-affectedness and relationship to the ruling regime (see Table 1.2).¹²
Conflict-affectedness could produce a perception of state arbitrariness through
citizens’ memories of war and its violent unpredictability, as well as through the
Table 1.2 Case selection to probe alternative explanations for the perception of
arbitrary state governance
Highly conflict-affected Less conflict-affected
Pro-opposition Most-likely case: Gulu Mixed case: Soroti
Pro-regime Mixed case: Moroto Least-likely case: Mbarara
¹² All four study locations are medium-sized towns with relatively developed infrastructure, includ-
ing potable water, schools, hospitals, and security services such as the police. Each is also fairly
homogenous in terms of ethnic identity, with only one case—Mbarara—where many respondents
share the same ethnic identity as the president. In each location, I interviewed several respondents with
non-majority ethnic identities and I also inquired specifically into the role that ethnicity plays in
politics. Though it is clearly a foundational cleavage in Ugandan society and politics, ethnicity did not
emerge as a salient factor in civilian perceptions of arbitrary governance.
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social, economic, and political devastation that violent conflict often causes.
Similarly, citizens’ reported experiences of an arbitrary government could reflect
anti-government sentiment and the challenges of embedding central state institu-
tions in politically hostile locales. This would mean that arbitrariness is evidence
of uneven implementation, not a governing strategy. Sub-national variation in
conflict-affectedness and political support for the regime allowed me to probe
whether arbitrary governance characterizes Uganda’s ruling regime or is simply a
locally held perception induced by a history of violent conflict or anti-government
sentiment.
I found that though the implementation and effects of arbitrary governance
varied depending on contextual factors, citizens experienced the state as arbitrary
in all four places. Moreover, the same four factors were present, though they
manifested in different ways. Exploring these variations produced a typology of
institutionalized arbitrariness, summarized in Table 1.3 and detailed in Chapter 7.
The typology helps explore how different legacies of conflict and varying levels of
political support for the regime shape citizens’ perceptions of arbitrary state
power.
Each type of arbitrary governance causes citizens to self-police by destabilizing
citizens’ expectations of local authorities and the central state. Together, the
findings suggest that governance through unpredictability is not merely a result
of happenstance, the state’s low capacity, or outside researchers’ difficulty in
understanding a society that is unfamiliar or illegible to them. Rather, institution-
alized arbitrariness constitutes an approach to authoritarianism today—one that is
based more on fragmenting alternatives to state power than on exercising iron-
fisted control.
4. Organization of the Book
This book proceeds as follows: Chapter 2 elaborates institutionalized arbitrariness,
drawing on a wide range of scholarly work to develop the framework and establish
its external applicability. It highlights the contributions that institutionalized
arbitrariness makes to the study of modern authoritarianism, as well as of state
formation and consolidation. Chapter 3 traces the emergence of a system of
arbitrary governance in Museveni’s Uganda and describes the historical and
Table 1.3 Varieties of institutionalized arbitrariness
Highly conflict-affected Less conflict-affected
Pro-opposition Atomization Contested assemblage
Pro-regime Violence at scale Discipline
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institutional factors that make it a modern authoritarian regime. The chapter
illustrates how Museveni’s regime is both personalist and institutionalized, and
highlights key moments that have shaped citizens’ perceptions of Museveni and
his regime.
Chapters 4 to 6 individually explore three of the four factors of institutionalized
arbitrariness and how each is produced: (1) the state’s capacity for overwhelming
and unaccountable violence, produced by a fluid relationship between exceptional
and lawful violence; (2) a fluid state jurisdiction, produced by state authorities
unpredictably claiming and denying their authority; and (3) potential state pres-
ence, produced by a fluid divide between state presence and absence. Together, the
chapters underscore the fourth factor in institutionalized arbitrariness: a frag-
mented institutional environment co-existing with the perception of a coherent
and consolidated state. Each chapter highlights the presence of multiple and
competing authorities as well as the seemingly contradictory, yet commonly
held perception that the ruling regime maintains at least marginal control over
state and society across the country. Together, these four factors produce institu-
tionalized arbitrariness, which focuses more on fragmenting alternatives to state
power than on fully consolidating authority and violence.
Chapter 4 focuses on the Uganda Police Force as a lens to examine how the
Ugandan state produces and sustains the perception among citizens that it has
access to overwhelming violence. The chapter shows how the Ugandan state
strategically links and delinks its governing institutions to overwhelming violence,
making the deployment of violence unpredictable in both its intensity and
accountability. The result is an ambiguous relationship between lawful and excep-
tional violence that keeps citizens fearful of the state, on one hand, and marginally
engaged, on the other. Chapter 5 examines local vigilantes and the micro-
dynamics of violence, focusing on the nature of the ambiguous space between
state and society. It shows that this space is hostile to the putative authority of
non-state entities, in large part due to the state’s unpredictable jurisdictional
claims. Chapter 6 addresses the question of state presence, tackling the puzzle of
how a largely absent state can appear to citizens to be present. The chapter
examines how Uganda’s ruling regime manipulates the relationship between its
presence and absence to keep citizens in an ambiguous position as potential agents
and subjects of the state.
Chapter 7 uses sub-national variation to probe alternative explanations for
arbitrary governance. Evidence from the cases shows that violent conflict and
political leanings shape the ways in which institutionalized arbitrariness mani-
fests, exaggerating certain components and attenuating others. Such differences
result in ‘varieties’ of institutionalized arbitrariness that, taken together, bolster
the book’s argument that it is a distinct type of authoritarian rule. The resultant
typology of four varieties of institutionalized arbitrariness, each corresponding to
a different study location, illustrates some of the different outcomes produced by
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changing combinations of state violence, fluid state jurisdiction, unpredictable
state presence, and institutional fragmentation. Lastly, the chapter uses these
variations to examine some limitations of the theory, including questions about
the regime’s intent and citizens’ agency.
Chapter 8 returns to questions of external validity and the theoretical contri-
butions of arbitrary governance. It probes the broader applicability of institution-
alized arbitrariness by surveying three regimes that display similar characteristics
to Uganda’s NRM: the Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary Democratic Front; the
Rwandan Patriotic Front; and the Zimbabwe African National Union (Patriotic
Front). Drawing on scholarship on these regimes, I find aspects of arbitrary
governance in all three cases, though its precise manifestation is shaped by
contextual factors, notably the strength and independence of state institutions.
Next, I discuss the theoretical and empirical implications of arbitrary governance
in today’s world of increasingly transnational movements and fragmented sub-
national power. The book concludes with a reflection on avenues for future
research, including how international aid and improvements in surveillance
technologies shape arbitrary governance, and the resultant dynamics between
state and society in this type of modern authoritarian regime.
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2
Arbitrary Governance and Modern
Authoritarianism
How do modern authoritarian rulers project power? Scholars have noted that
today’s authoritarian rulers have added new tactics to their playbooks. In addition
to coercion, patronage, and delegation, these rulers often adopt democratic insti-
tutions and use rule of law-compliant reforms to maintain control (c.f. Lührmann
and Lindberg 2019; Schedler 2006; Scheppele 2018). For example, rulers might
make legal reforms to censor the media, as Recep Tayyip Erdoğan did in Turkey;
to selectively allocate parliamentary seats in order to marginalize political oppos-
ition, as Rafael Correa did in Ecuador; and to modify the electoral calendar in
order to hamper political rivals, as Abdoulaye Wade did in Senegal (Bermeo
2016). In this book, I use the term ‘modern authoritarian’ to refer to regimes
that use rule of law-compliant reforms to undermine checks on executive power.¹
I describe in more detail how this term relates to existing scholarship later in this
chapter. Modern authoritarian regimes are characterized by a tension between
authoritarian rule and democratic institutions. Though authoritarian rulers
weaken democratic institutions, the continued presence of these institutions offers
repeated opportunities for challenges from the political opposition. As a result,
these regimes have been described as structurally unstable (Levitsky and Way
2002).
Over the past three decades, political science scholarship on modern authori-
tarian regimes has mushroomed (Ezrow 2018). However, it has rarely engaged
with scholarship on post-colonial neopatrimonial states which grapple with many
of the same phenomena. I engage these literatures with original field research to
help explain how such seemingly unstable regimes are able to control their
populace. Until now, scholars have generally attributed the success of modern
authoritarian regimes to a careful balancing act between coercion and patronage
on one hand and democratic institutions on the other (Geddes et al. 2018). In such
systems, democratic institutions can allow rulers to assess and respond to public
opinion (Gandhi 2008), to gain domestic or international legitimacy (Levitsky and
¹ Uganda’s ruling regime has made every effort to elide government, state, and party, and thus when
referring to the Ugandan case, I use the terms ‘state’ and ‘ruling regime’ interchangeably to describe an
apparatus that encompasses the government, the ruling party, and the state’s administrative institu-
tions.
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Way 2002), or to diffuse political opposition (Brownlee 2009). Scholarship on
post-colonial and neopatrimonial states draws attention to the importance of
indirect rule, where control relies on accommodating elites who bring with
them the support of their constituents (Bayart 1993; Mamdani 1996; Van de
Walle 2007).
I offer a third explanation. Instead of delegating authority, modern authoritar-
ian regimes can stabilize control and project power directly into the lives of
ordinary citizens through unpredictable assertions of authority that undermine
the autonomy of those who would otherwise challenge it. As described in
Chapter 1, this type of governance, which I call institutionalized arbitrariness,
rests on an institutional arrangement that fosters competing low-level security and
governance actors who, together, create a governing environment characterized
by unpredictability for ordinary citizens and local authorities. This unpredictabil-
ity pervades the public space, fragmenting civic organization and weakening
alternatives to state authority.
Unpredictability is a motif of Museveni’s Uganda. In my research, Ugandans
broadly described the state as unpredictable and volatile, with effects they char-
acterized as disorienting and depoliticizing. A common refrain among respond-
ents across the country was that when it comes to the government, ‘things have to
be confusing’. Some argued that this was because the government sought to create
a confused population that could not identify shared goals to act on politically.
Other scholars of Uganda have noted similar phenomena, describing this state as
using ‘arbitrariness and unpredictability’ to restrict media workers (Tripp 2004,
12); as creating ‘seemingly deliberate confusion’ around civil militias (Janmyr
2014, 212); as ‘produc[ing] “security” and “insecurity” simultaneously in a con-
stant aporetic relationship’, and as fostering ‘ambiguity or double-faced meaning
of things’ (Verma 2012, 57).² The Ugandan state has even been compared to ‘the
dry season rains—something occasional and potentially destructive’ (B. Jones
2009, 3). Others have noted the president’s ‘tendency to keep things around him
as disorganized as possible to avoid the formation of any ordered arrangement
that might possibly be turned against his own, personal raw power’ (Carbone
2008, 29). Despite the emphasis these scholars place on fragmentation, arbitrary
and unpredictable state power, and resultant uncertainty, they stop short of
examining these as components of a broader system of governance.
² Cecilie Lanken Verma approaches uncertainty in northern Uganda through the emic notion of
lakite, or ‘somehow’. She writes, ‘Lakite was a notion I only gradually came to notice, due to its modest
translation into the adverb “somehow” in English, but, as it turned out, when used in Acholi in the form
of an adjective, it carried a much profounder meaning as the expression of uncertainty, even to the
extent of the extreme. Lakite indicated everything considered “tricky”, often dangerous, and which
would cease understanding. It was related to secrecy in the way that it was seen to contain something
hidden, something not to be grasped, an ambiguity or double-faced meaning of things, expressed as the
way in which the government or certain people would “show different faces all the time” or hide their
true intentions “behind the face” ’ (2012, 10–11).
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Analogous phenomena can be seen in authoritarian settings globally. The
Chinese government, for example, has blocked online political organization not
through censorship but by flooding social media platforms with random and
seemingly innocuous messaging to create so much noise that no single message
can gain traction (King et al. 2017). In Lebanon, Nora Stel has studied how the
state manages refugee populations by keeping their status informal and limiting or
ignoring authoritative knowledge about them—their numbers, encampment situ-
ation, and their representative structures—such that they cannot claim political
rights (Stel 2020). And in American prisons, officials have been shown to inten-
tionally disorient inmates to make them more manageable, for example by
enforcing changing and often contradictory rules to make prisoners feel like
they are in the twilight zone (Doolittle 2017).
Each of these strategies of unpredictable governance are contextually specific,
relying on particular institutional and elite power arrangements. However, they
share the principle of governing not by crushing opposition outright, but instead
by destabilizing, fragmenting, and diluting it. This makes civic spaces fragile and
splinters collective action such that, to ordinary citizens, the ruling regime appears
to be the most coherent and strongest governing entity. Political unpredictability
thus allows such regimes to project power directly to the grass roots, causing local
authorities and ordinary citizens to self-police.
Institutionalized arbitrariness is distinct from other forms of authoritarianism
in two key ways. First, it uses uncertainty to produce a plausible-enough percep-
tion that the regime has a stable hold on power, especially compared to other
actors. Institutionalized arbitrariness makes other actors look weak or irrelevant.
As a result, citizens see the ruling regime as the only viable option and view
collective action as impractical or even futile. The regime can thereby outsource
many governance and security responsibilities while limiting principal–agent
problems associated with indirect rule. Second, like modern modes of authoritar-
ianism that hollow out state institutions, or strategies like ‘coup proofing’ that seek
to prevent coups by fragmenting potential loci of power, arbitrary governance
explains how regimes sustain an incongruence between state institutions and the
organization of violence. However, arbitrary states are distinct because they do not
seek, a priori, to weaken state institutions. Instead, they can tolerate functional—
and even relatively strong—state institutions by multiplying them and creating
confusion among them.
This chapter develops the theoretical foundations of institutionalized arbitrari-
ness as an explanation for how modern authoritarian regimes project power. It
first offers a brief summary of the expectations set out in research on state
formation and consolidation in order to identify what remains to be explained
in modern authoritarian regimes. It then turns to scholarship on modern auth-
oritarianism and neopatrimonialism. These fields of study, rarely put in conver-
sation with one another, offer complementary views about how and why state
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institutions are decoupled from enforcement power. Together, they provide new
insight into the projection of arbitrary power in authoritarian states. The chapter
then details how institutionalized arbitrariness contributes to these literatures. It
elaborates a four-part framework to identify and analyse the functioning of
arbitrary governance and gives examples of the four factors in a variety of
contexts, in Africa and beyond. The chapter concludes with an examination and
rebuttal of three alternative explanations for observed unpredictability in the
relationship between citizens and the state: corruption (arbitrary governance is
really just the product of the cumulative acts of self-interested individuals);
illegibility (arbitrary governance is really just a hidden order); and happenstance
(arbitrary governance is not intentional, and therefore not a mode of governance).
1. Arbitrary Power and State Formation
Today’s dictators and authoritarians are far more sophisticated, savvy,
and nimble than they once were . . .Modern authoritarians have suc-
cessfully honed new techniques, methods, and formulas for preserv-
ing power, refashioning dictatorship for the modern age.
(Dobson 2012, 4–5)
Today’s authoritarian rulers have adapted to survive democracy’s advance. The
resultant modern authoritarian regimes raise questions about what we thought we
knew about state formation. These regimes do not follow a teleological process in
which the struggle for control and resource extraction produces state institutions
that regulate and restrain arbitrary power in pursuit of efficiency, as detailed by
scholars like Charles Tilly and later adopted by new institutionalists, like Douglass
North, John Wallis, and Barry Weingast. Instead, they simultaneously exhibit the
institutional forms of modern democracies and an executive that wields arbitrary
power with seemingly few de facto constraints. As noted by Nic Cheeseman and
Jonathan Fisher:
Legally, authoritarian states usually subscribe to the separation of powers: the
preeminence of the rule of law, and respect for freedom of expression and
organization. In practice, though, they are characterized by over-mighty presi-
dents who maintain excessive control over all branches of government, enforce
the arbitrary suspension or uneven application of laws, and implement unpre-
dictable crackdowns on perceived opponents—sometimes within the confines of
the law, sometimes outside it. (Cheeseman and Fisher 2019, xxv)
This section elaborates how modern forms of authoritarianism contradict expect-
ations described in widely accepted theories of state formation and consolidation.
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It then addresses two stylized strands of research, each of which could be under-
stood as critiquing the prevailing views on state formation: first, recent political
science scholarship on modern authoritarian regimes, and second, a long-
standing literature on the post-colonial neopatrimonial state, derived mainly
from studies of African states.³
1.1 State Building and Consolidation: The Bias
toward Identifying Political Order
State-building theories are broadly oriented around identifying political order.
FromMaxWeber’s treatises on the rational bureaucratic state to the seminal work
by Charles Tilly and James Scott, much political science scholarship on the
modern state focuses on how rulers strive to organize and institutionalize violence
to maximize efficient resource extraction. These theories focus on formal govern-
ing institutions as technologies through which arbitrary power is contained,
managed, and deployed in the modern state. Such theories therefore understand
the rational bureaucratic state, in which governing institutions have a monopoly
or near monopoly on the use of force, as a by-product of a synergistic relationship
between ruler and subjects.
Analytically, this literature assumes the existence of institutional teleologies:
from fragile to stable, personal to impersonal, and unpredictable to predictable
(Tilly 1992). To the extent that it has a normative strain, this research sees
institutionalization as a good that should be pursued in policy interventions
(North et al. 2009). Such state formation theories have also informed studies of
politically fragile and non-democratic states, which are presumed to have encoun-
tered obstacles to this ordering process despite the apparent efforts of political
elites. Scholarship in this area examines barriers to state formation posed by the
international order and juridical sovereignty (Jackson and Rosberg 1982); by
international legal sovereignty and a derivative domestic authority (Englebert
2009); by post-colonial border drawing (Herbst 2014); by the enduring political
and economic legacies of colonialism (Acemoglu et al. 2001; Acemoglu and
Robinson 2012; Mamdani 1996; Nunn 2008; Young 1998); and by the historic
and contemporary international economic order (Amsden 2003; Wade 2004),
among other factors.
Studies of informal or non-state governing entities similarly emphasize political
ordering processes—like those described in key theories of state formation—but
they focus on processes that take place outside the state governing apparatus.
³ Much of the scholarship on neopatrimonialism focuses on African states; however, scholars have
also applied neopatrimonialism beyond Africa to countries worldwide (for example, see Bach and
Gazibo 2013).
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These studies conceive of such non-state authorities and institutions in much the
same way as do those that focus on state institutions as formal ‘rules of the game’
that regulate behaviour. Both presume that iterative processes of domination and
submission by rational actors will eventually produce a de facto contract between
authorities and their constituents (Bratton 2007; North 1990; Raeymaekers et al.
2008). A recent literature on rebel governance has extended these same lessons—
applying the logic of political order making to the supposed disorder of rebel
group operations—and in this way likening their approaches to those of statesmen
(Arjona 2016; Arjona et al. 2015; Mampilly 2011; Mukhopadhyay 2014; Péclard
and Mechoulan 2015).⁴ These and other studies fundamentally focus on political
ordering and barriers to it, understanding unpredictability, contingency, and
political disorder as remainders or noise that can be minimized by identifying
the correct explanatory model.⁵ Instead, this book focuses on unpredictability and
disorder as distinct approaches to governance that require further explanation.
1.2 Modern Authoritarianism: Contending
with State Institutions
Scholars have critiqued both the analytic and normative stances found in litera-
ture on state formation and consolidation. In addition to elaborating cases in
which highly arbitrary, violent, or repressive systems have been institutionalized
(Arjona et al. 2015), research has identified cases in which institutions have been
decoupled from the deployment of arbitrary power—whether to mask such power
or to facilitate it. As Larry Diamond notes, modern dictators have innovated in
order to operate in the ambiguous space between authoritarianism and democracy
by manipulating the division of powers, extolling democracy and human rights,
and fostering civil liberties, even while restricting political organization and
centralizing power such that their states ‘have the form of electoral democracy
but fail to meet the substantive test, or do so only ambiguously’ (Diamond
2015, 166).
Today’s authoritarian rulers find power in cultivating an unsettled and dynamic
relationship among institutional ‘types’ which allows for sometimes grafting rules
from one institutional repertoire to another and, at other times, for preserving
purely bureaucratic or patrimonial institutional environments. For example,
⁴ Earlier versions of such an argument examined how criminal organizations, such as the mafia or
gangs, use similar strategies of ordering and organizing the populace under their control to maximize
efficient and sustainable resource extraction (Bardhan 1997; Blok 1975; Venkatesh 2008).
⁵ In his study of the econometric modelling of conflict, Christopher Cramer notes that ‘uncertainty’
functions as a kind of ‘adhesive’ holding these models together. ‘Imprecision and inconsistency in the
application of this variable . . . suggests that it is something of a residual used to patch up the holes in a
model and stop it from collapsing’ (Cramer 2002, 1848).
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leaders from Hungary and Russia to Ecuador and Venezuela have centralized
executive control by making legal reforms that appear legitimate because they
were copied from liberal democracies (Scheppele 2018). However, by selectively
adopting laws from diverse sources, such leaders cobble together an illiberal
bricolage that effectively undermines checks and balances on arbitrary executive
action (Krygier 2016). Such moves appear to be liberalizing, while having the
effect of further concentrating power in the executive. For example, Viktor Orbán
in Hungary and Erdoğan in Turkey adopted measures to expand the jurisdiction
of their courts, effectively flooding the courts with minor cases and rendering
them unable to function (Scheppele 2018, 551). Another widespread strategy,
justified in democratic terms as bringing government closer to the people, imple-
ments policies of decentralization in order to fragment the opposition and recen-
tralize power under the ruling regime, as has been documented across Africa, in
countries including Ethiopia, Kenya, Nigeria, Zimbabwe, Malawi, Senegal, and
South Africa (Green 2008; Fessha and Kirkby 2008; Lewis 2014). Other scholars
have studied how authoritarian rulers shape the electoral landscape—for example
by using elections as a ‘safety valve for regulating societal discontent and confining
the opposition’ (Brownlee 2009, 519) or by fostering the formation of tame
political parties to channel political opposition and stabilize the regime (see
March 2009 on Putin’s Russia).
These, and similar phenomena, have been diversely described as hybrid regimes
(Diamond 2015), competitive authoritarian regimes (Levitsky and Way 2010),
and electoral authoritarian regimes (Schedler 2013).⁶ The broad concern is to
understand how states can simultaneously exhibit the characteristics of developed
democracies (such as multiparty elections) and authoritarian regimes (such as
restrictions on public expression), and to disentangle how these seemingly con-
flicting features interact to produce ‘in-between’ states (Van de Walle 2002). In
such regimes, ‘elections and other “democratic” institutions are largely facades, yet
they may provide some space for political opposition, independent media, and
social organizations that do not seriously criticize or challenge the regime’
(Diamond 2015, 169). In such cases, democratic institutions are used to mask,
or even legitimate, the reality of authoritarian domination. ‘In-between’ regimes
make the political playing field itself uneven, so that the same democratic rules
create unexpected and unfair results (Levitsky and Way 2002). As Aili Mari Tripp
notes, these regimes ‘embody divergent impulses: they promote civil rights
and political liberties, and yet they unpredictably curtail those same rights and
liberties’ so that such states are neither truly democratic nor authoritarian (Tripp
2010, 1). Arbitrary power and political unpredictability are characteristic of such
non-democracies.
⁶ See also review essays by Matthijs Bogaards (2009) and Yonatan Morse (2012).
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Scholarship on hybrid governance and modern authoritarian regimes suggests
that institutionalization is not normatively good in its own right. Instead, scholars
turn our attention from formal state institutions to power and the real politics of
its institutionalization. Much of this scholarship can be understood as describing
situations in which arbitrary power and state institutions are paired and
decoupled in new and unexpected ways that allow such regimes to appear to
have the liberal institutions of a democratic state, while enabling the weakly
fettered exercise of executive power. At the same time, scholars often focus on
how unique combinations of state institutions and arbitrary power allow rulers to
claim ever more control—a phenomenon I call the productive work of arbitrary
power.
Institutionalized arbitrariness offers two contributions to scholarship on mod-
ern authoritarianism. First, it contributes to the literature on hybrid regimes by
offering a dynamic model that sees the repeated pairing and decoupling of
violence to state institutions as unpredictable, stochastic, and ongoing, and exam-
ines the governance effects of this process. It explores how repeated processes of
alternately channelling arbitrary power through state institutions (such that it
both enforces the rule of law and is subject to it) and decoupling it from them
(such that it does neither) enables regimes to project power over local authorities
and ordinary citizens. Such an approach understands political disordering as a
discrete political phenomenon on a par with ordering—one that shapes the
actions of authorities and the experience of citizens in such regimes. Second,
along with assertions of arbitrary power, it shows that it is necessary to examine
instances in which such rulers use new institutional arrangements to deny or
withdraw their authority—what I call the negative work of modern authoritarian-
ism. Simultaneously asserting and denying authority by combining productive
and negative work dissolves background conditions for producing political
meaning and creates political subjects governed by uncertainty about their position
vis-à-vis the state.
1.3 Post-Colonial and Neopatrimonial States:
A Hidden Political Order
While recent scholarship on authoritarianism—much of it based on cases from
the global North—grapples with how to understand arbitrary power without
assuming its necessary institutionalization, a second strand of literature on post-
colonial and African states has been doing so for decades. This second strand of
literature seeks to explain how and why formal state institutions often appear
decoupled from arbitrary power. This literature emphasizes an empirical and
historically conditioned disjuncture between state institutions and the organiza-
tion of violence. Within the resulting gap, it argues that rulers exercise arbitrary
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power that is constrained by the rules, norms, and expectations that arise from
interpersonal social relations, which are identified as the real site of politics.
Because of their personal nature, social relations can be difficult to uncover and
may remain hidden from the view of outsiders. As a result, scholars have noted
that these systems can be mistaken as chaotic or ungoverned, when in reality they
rely on unique and context-specific governance arrangements among formal and
informal actors and institutions. This literature therefore asks scholars to focus on
potentially hidden background relations, institutions, and organizations to find
political order (Chabal and Daloz 1999). In these studies, institutionalization itself
cannot be judged as normatively good or bad—rather it is the content of these
background social relations that must be evaluated on a case-by-case basis.
In this second strand of literature, scholars use terms such as ‘hybridity’ (Tripp
2010) and ‘multiplicity’ (Goodfellow and Lindemann 2013) to describe ‘boundary’
(Lund 2006) or ‘shadow’ (Reno 1995) institutions that characterize non-western
arrangements among formal and informal governance institutions. Such scholar-
ship captures a series of complex and messy relationships between unstable and
unsustainable conceptual binaries, such as public and private organizations;
formal institutions and informal associations; and state and non-state actors. It
variously describes ways in which a state’s organization of violence does not match
its governing institutions. These theories see patrimonial (informal) institutions as
holding the real levers of power (Chabal and Daloz 1999), or see patrimonial and
bureaucratic (formal) institutions as sharing them (Bach and Gazibo 2013;
Cheeseman 2018a; Tripp 2010). Violence might be fragmented and dispersed,
for example in ‘security assemblages’ (Abrahamsen and Williams 2010), or per-
sonalized, for instance behind powerful warlords (Reno 1998; 2011). In these
explanations, state institutions are just one of many places where politics play
out—and often one of relative insignificance.
Understanding state form as largely determined by colonial institutions, much
of the literature on neopatrimonial African states sees decolonization as a moment
of contradiction. This literature explains that colonialism destabilized and in some
instances obliterated indigenous authorities, while decolonialization drove a
wedge between governing institutions and governing authority. Newly independ-
ent African nations gained control over colonial governance institutions but lost
the corresponding organization of violence needed to translate them into effective
rule. Pierre Englebert summarizes the observation: ‘Leaders of historically non-
legitimate, incongruent, or mismatched states are indeed faced with a peculiar
challenge and are limited in the options available to them to address it . . . From
colonialism, they inherited the instruments of statehood but not the power that
came with it in colonial days’ (Englebert 2000, 11). As a result, some have
proposed that the state’s institutional form required an underlying organization
of violence (usually a Weberian monopoly on the legitimate use of force) that
simply was not present in post-colonial African states. According to some, these
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states became ‘vacuous and ineffectual . . . an empty shell’ (Chabal and Daloz 1999,
14). Weak state institutions fostered strongman rule or hybrid governance
arrangements in which individuals coupled formal state institutions with private
armies, militias, or gangs to extend control and maximize access to resources and
rents. Some have categorized this as indirect rule by the metropole, where
organized violence remains in the hands of an assemblage of powerful corporate
interests, international institutions, and former colonial powers (Ferguson 2005;
Mamdani 1996; Mbembe 2001). Others argue that state forms are more or less
surface shell games alongside evolving forms of local violence which are the real
sites of governance (Lombard 2013; Mukhopadhyay 2014; Reno 1998). For both
sets of scholars, the ‘mismatch’ between state-like forms of governing institutions
and privatized forms of violence is the fundamental pathology of post-colonial
African states, making them vulnerable to fragility and failure.
This mismatch between governing forms and governing violence has also been
used to explain fragmented, hybrid, multiple, or complex institutional environ-
ments. Such an explanation suggests that in the immediate post-colonial moment,
elites continued to draw on and manipulate pre-existing ideas about authority and
jurisdiction because they represented agreed-upon modes of exchange, in which
private exchange was based on reciprocity and public exchange was based on
bureaucracy. Scholars have argued that a combination of path-dependency, the
advantage of incumbency, and resultant widespread opportunities for elite pre-
dation have rendered the post-colonial state impotent (Bayart 1993; Jackson and
Rosberg 1982). This tradition has been taken by some to suggest that such states
are characterized by weak or even dysfunctional formal political institutions that
are entangled with informal and personalized institutions (critiqued by
Cheeseman 2018a).
Even scholarship that nominally focuses on political disorder tends to find and
reify some hidden order that is then used to explain the operations of power. In
their work on the African state and the ‘political instrumentalization of disorder’,
Patrick Chabal and Jean-Pascal Daloz describe a background political order based
on socio-cultural relationships that—once revealed—makes sense of the seeming
disorder of formal state institutions. They write: ‘[T]he disorder of which we speak
is in fact a different “order”, the outcome of different rationalities and causalities.
It appears as disorder only because most paradigms are based on a notion of a
form of social, economic, and, therefore, political development which reflects the
experience of Western societies’ (Chabal and Daloz 1999, 155). Chabal and Daloz
note the possibility of the very argument developed in this book—that some elites
benefit from the production and exploitation of what they call ‘political disorder’.
However, they abandon the notion of disorder tout court in favour of understand-
ing African governance in terms of a hidden order explained by the particularities
of African culture.
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In contrast, this book places an African case in conversation with existing
literature on modern authoritarianism in order to develop a comparative frame
for contemporary analyses of arbitrary power that avoids the othering of African
politics. Unlike the ‘hidden order’ described by Chabal and Daloz, institutional-
ized arbitrariness recognizes that a state’s approach to governance can be unpre-
dictable, and therefore indecipherable, for its citizens as well as for outsiders.
Arbitrary governance is not limited to African states and does not rely on uniquely
African political and social traditions. Internal illegibility is exactly what makes
institutionalized arbitrariness an effective approach to projecting arbitrary
power for any regime. Attributing political unpredictability to a hidden order
assumes a stable and discernible relationship between patrimonial and bureau-
cratic institutions. This assumption overlooks evidence that rulers alternately
and unpredictably reify and destabilize the imagined divisions among institu-
tional orders. Ignoring such phenomena leads us to neglect a key tool of modern
authoritarianism.
2. A New Category of Modern Authoritarianism:
Institutionalized Arbitrariness
Rather than imagining governance as complex, networked, and navigable only by
insiders, institutionalized arbitrariness describes a state that is illegible, unpredict-
able, and capricious for those inside as well as outside the system. Citizens—
subject to the state’s constantly changing jurisdictional claims, the incalculable
risk of overwhelming state violence, and the possibility but never certainty of state
presence—come to view the state as coherent and authoritative, even while
experiencing it as woefully fragmented and low capacity. The result is that state
authority is ever present in citizens’ imaginations despite the state’s limited
provision of traditionally recognized governance and security services, such as
access to courts, presence of police, and collection of taxes.
Even as low-level non-state governing authorities carry out certain functions
locally—for example, resolving disputes, organizing roadworks, andmanaging com-
munity vigilante activities—they lack sufficient political space to consolidate control
over their own jurisdictions and constituencies. They thus continue to function as
fragile and weakly institutionalized authorities, able neither to become autonomous
from the state, nor to make claims on state authorities or the ruling regime. The
unpredictable and dangerous Leviathan found in this type of modern authoritarian
regime creates pervasive uncertainty, precluding relationships of accountability
between citizens and public authorities—whether state or non-state.
When citizens cannot discern any pattern or regularity in how and when state
actors claim or deny authority, and cannot understand what rubric they will use to
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do so, they cannot establish shared expectations for state behaviour. Instead,
citizens are left to navigate a system of authorities whose roles and responsibilities
are constantly shifting and are thus difficult to predict. These dynamics have been
described in diverse contexts. For example, in Guinea Bissau, Henrik Vigh
describes how prolonged political turmoil forces citizens to replace their habits
with flexible routines that can be constantly re-evaluated in light of the changing
socio-political landscape, wherein players reconfigure their affiliations all the time
(Vigh 2006). In Pakistan, Laurent Gayer describes how residents of Karachi see
the city as ‘undecipherable’ and a ‘foreign land’ because of growing uncertainty
around the threat of violence. He recounts how this unpredictability produces a
general sense of malaise. ‘As every group in the city denies involvement in violent
or illegal activities, the identity of the perpetrators and their rationales are any-
body’s guess. This opacity sustains a form of “epistemological uncertainty”—a doubt
about what one knows about one’s social relations and environment—that obfuscates
norms and relationships’ (Gayer 2014, 248). The absence of shared expectations
means that when a state authority uses his or her power to redefine responsibility,
there is no meaningful ground upon which citizens can demand accountability.
Thus, the state’s unpredictable and harsh interventions constitute an approach to
governance that allows non-state entities to function at a low level, both in terms of
authority and capacity, while the state retains its position as the most powerful actor.
Institutionalized arbitrariness diverges from indirect rule managed by local
warlords. As described by William Reno in western Africa (1998) or Dipali
Mukhopadhyay (2014) in Afghanistan, such indirect rule entails sub-national
authorities consolidating resources and violence to govern a discrete geographic
space. This is not possible when mandates are continually redefined or reconfig-
ured. Institutionalized arbitrariness also differs from theories of neopatrimonial-
ism, according to which citizens have personal relations with individual big men
and unpredictability comes from the temperament and interests of this patron
(Chabal and Daloz 1999; Erdmann and Engel 2007). Instead, in the cases exam-
ined here, unpredictability and arbitrary power have been institutionalized into
the state, dissolving the efficacy of background social relations and undermining
even hidden logics of governance. In this way, institutionalized arbitrariness
destabilizes local authorities in relation to the central state. Such an environment
fosters the projection of state power even while the state regularly outsources key
governance tasks, including security and policing. While institutionalized arbi-
trariness helps explain a phenomenon similar to that of Scheppele’s ‘legalistic
autocrats’, who use rule of law to centralize authoritarian control, it goes a step
further, explaining the mechanisms by which arbitrary power is projected. This
book counters a view of political ordering as the predominant governing strategy
and stabilization as the prevailing logic of state form. It thus illustrates how
political unpredictability and instability work together to produce a new state
form—one that favours modern authoritarianism.
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Governments that use unpredictability as a strategy of rule may distribute it
differently—whether via differential treatment of sectors (the economy versus the
security sector) or times (night time versus daytime, war versus peace), or by
targeting certain groups of people (illegal immigrants or refugees; the poor; racial,
religious, or ethnic minorities) or particular places (the inner city; the hinterlands;
borderlands). In Uganda, unpredictable state intervention is particularly salient
in the security and governance sectors, which themselves are defined by the use
of violence, whether material or performative, through actions, speech, images,
and symbols.
The unpredictability and potential violence of state intervention has two
contradictory functions. First, given that state actors often do not intervene to
resolve disputes for which they are nominally responsible, non-state actors fre-
quently step in to manage local security and governance issues, using violence to
police, judge, and discipline behaviour. Second, state actors’ occasional and often
violent interventions unpredictably undermine the nascent authority of these
non-state actors. Such unpredictable interventions—whether in the form of arrest,
detention, fines, or torture—constrain the ability of non-state actors to consolidate
scalable alternatives to state power. In this view, hopes for the organic emergence
of a state–society contract are aspirational at best. At worst, they can misdirect
attention toward indicators of a social contract—like citizens’ use of state
services—that can exist even in the absence of citizens’ ability to organize polit-
ically and make collective claims on the regime for representation or resources. In
other countries, unpredictability might manifest in other sectors, such as com-
merce and trade, civil society, law, or culture; several examples are noted in the
introduction and later in this chapter.
From the perspective of authoritarian rulers, one of the strengths of arbitrary
governance is the damage it does to the social fabric. As Gayer shows in his study
on violence in Karachi, unpredictability creates suspicion and mistrust, driving
people into ever more localized and familiar enclaves (Gayer 2014). Mistrust helps
explain why such an approach to governance is so effective at inhibiting collective
action among citizens and local-level officials. However, citizens are not passive.
In fact, entrepreneurial individuals continue to attempt to make claims on polit-
ical authorities, as Odera’s case in Chapter 1 illustrates. The following empirical
chapters offer further illustrations of how individuals and groups use their agency
to try to make such claims, and explore the ways in which mainly state authorities
undermine these claims. For example, Chapter 4 examines a case in which parti-
cipants in a spontaneous local protest demanded that police and state authorities
take responsibility for a citizen who had died in police custody. In this case, the
police violently suppressed the protesters and offered nothing to the family or
the community. Chapter 5 addresses societal agency from a different angle. It
considers how vigilantes are caught between ‘the state’, which asks them to uphold
the law, and ‘society’, which asks them to uphold local normative orders. Finally,
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Chapter 6 explores how individual agency is in some ways key to the regime’s
successful management of its flagship community policing programme called
Crime Preventers, particularly in the months surrounding the 2016 elections.
Crime Preventers accepted labour as unpaid militias for the regime because they
believed it might help them achieve their personal aspirations. Thus, while citizens
exercise agency to resist arbitrary governance, their individual and collective
agency also contributes to its effectiveness.
Much of what occurs in Uganda’s security and governance sectors resembles
familiar modes of governance—patrimonialism, nepotism, kleptocracy, and bur-
eaucracy, to name a few. However, while they remain present, the rationalities of
these modes of governance are rendered unpredictable by the possibility that the
state could redirect, subordinate, or override them at any moment. This unpre-
dictability is not a by-product of disorganization, ineptitude, poverty, or other
shortcomings stereotypically characteristic of ‘fragile’ or ‘low-capacity’ states—it is
key to how some of today’s modern authoritarian regimes project power.
2.1 Destabilizing Oppositions
Institutionalized arbitrariness results from reifying, mixing, and collapsing four
oppositions that describe state authority: (1) the use of exceptional violence versus
lawful violence; (2) the state’s defined jurisdictional claim versus lack thereof; (3)
state presence versus absence; and (4) state fragmentation versus state consolida-
tion. Figure 2.1 depicts the different potential relationships between one of these
oppositions: the state’s use of exceptional violence versus lawful violence.
Each opposition can be reified, as depicted at the far right of Figure 2.1, where
there is a clear distinction between lawful and exceptional violence. This might be
the case in rule of law-abiding contexts. Regimes may use both lawful violence and
exceptional violence, but there is a clear, recognizable difference between the two.
For example, a regime might impose a state of exception during a natural disaster
(Fassin and Vasquez 2005) or over refugee camps (Agamben 2000; Turner 2005).
Though the regime employs exceptional violence, the boundaries of this time
period or zone of exception are clearly demarcated.
Oppositions can also be fully collapsed, such that there is no meaningful
difference between them—they are for all intents and purposes indistinguishable,
as depicted at the far left of Figure 2.1. This would be the case in situations of
classic despotism, where all power and law emanate from the sovereign. The
sovereign is a despot not in the sense that he employs exceptional violence, but
rather in the sense that he embodies the state and with it each of the four
oppositions, such that there is no distinction between law versus exception and
state presence versus absence; there is no concept of an impersonal jurisdictional
claim, or a consolidated state (Foucault 2007).
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Between these two extremes, the oppositions may be mixed and combined in
new and innovative ways. Returning to the example of violence, scholars have
shown how exceptional violence can be integrated into bureaucratic practices
(Best 2017) or law can be used to regulate exceptional violence (Johns 2005). In
such situations, the relationship between exceptional and lawful violence is com-
plex, and though it may be difficult to tell the difference between them, it is still
theoretically possible. Each opposition can be understood as distinct, and as such
each can theoretically be stabilized or destabilized independently of the others.
However, in practice the relative stability of any opposition is often complemen-
tary, co-producing, and overlapping with the others. Chapters 4, 5, and 6 provide
detailed discussion and examples of these dynamics.
In regimes of institutionalized arbitrariness, I propose that state authority is
characterized by stochastic and unpredictable movement within these four oppo-
sitions, such that it is unpredictable where along the continuum one will be at any
given time. These oppositions are thus dynamic, characterized by constant change
and movement. At times, the distinction between the oppositions is muddied (in
mixed situations) and at other times it is clarified (in reified situations). This
movement makes the oppositions unstable and fragile, so that local authorities
and ordinary citizens cannot make good predictions about how (and indeed if)
state authority will manifest from one moment to the next.
2.2 Four Factors of Institutionalized Arbitrariness
By fostering institutional environments that facilitate unpredictable movement
between the extremes of these oppositions, rulers can create the conditions for






Fig. 2.1 Dynamic oppositions in institutionalized arbitrariness
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arbitrariness. These factors, which I identified inductively from my fieldwork
in Uganda, are citizens’ perceptions of: (1) the state’s capacity for overwhelming
and unaccountable violence; (2) a fluid state jurisdiction; (3) potential state
presence; and (4) non-hierarchical and fragmented governing institutions.
I describe them below.
Perception of overwhelming and unaccountable violence
Destabilizing the opposition between lawful and exceptional violence creates the
perception that the state has access to overwhelming and unaccountable
violence—that is, the capacity to suspend the law and use extra-legal violence to
define states of exception (Schmitt 2005). Such sovereign violence is deployed with
impunity and a will to govern. Where for Schmittians, sovereign violence is
characterized by the power to define the exception, here I focus on the ability to
continually redefine the exception. In this scenario, sovereign violence is not
simply law constituting (Agamben 1998, 40), but rather it is used unpredictably,
thereby making it difficult for anyone to assert when or how violence should be
categorized as lawful or exceptional. These ambiguous acts are manifest both in
civilian memories of state violence and in their current and ongoing experiences
with state agencies. Institutionalized arbitrariness depends on citizens’ beliefs that
any place, act, person, or moment can potentially be made exceptional at any time,
and thus be subject to violence that is overwhelming and unaccountable.
Continually redefining the exception is essential to this mode of governance.
The state’s unpredictable interventions make threats meaningful; the possibility
of exceptional violence makes them broadly pertinent.
Many states at times deploy exceptional violence unpredictably as a tool of
governance. Joost Fontein describes arbitrary and extreme state violence in rela-
tion to a government policy to enforce city planning regulations in Harare,
Zimbabwe. He writes about the ‘disjuncture between official pronouncements
about the need to “restore order” . . . and the contradictory experience of the
apparently arbitrary application and often extreme, sometimes violent, execution
of the operation . . . which for many seemed to operate outside the legitimate,
bureaucratic “state” ’ (Fontein 2009, 371). Fontein explains that tension between
the spectacle of arbitrary state power and the form of official appeals for bureau-
cratic planning produced ‘unexpected suddenness and brutality . . . experienced
regardless of whether its motives would ever be properly understood’, thus
resulting in an ‘expression of sovereignty’ that gave this approach governing
power (Fontein 2009, 372–3). Atreyee Sen details the unpredictable use of violence
in Calcutta prisons, arguing that ‘both prisoners and prison officials use sublime
violence, with unpredictability and incalculable potency hidden in its multiple
unforeseen strategies, to establish dominance over each other’ (Sen 2018, 940). Sen
shows how, in the prison, ‘this fantasy and intimacy of total control over others,
through an arbitrary exchange of cruelty and compassion . . . is not just an ironic
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effect or a tactical miscalculation, but an intrinsic part of the functioning of the
prison as a sovereign space’ (Sen 2018, 930, internal citations omitted).
Also relevant are theoretical propositions about zones of exception in which the
state uses exceptional violence in a contained spatio-juridical complex to discip-
line certain populations and to serve as a counterpoint to the lawful violence used
elsewhere (Agamben 2005; Hagmann and Korf 2012). To some extent, all gov-
erning systems distribute lawful and exceptional violence, whether spatially,
temporally, or among groups of people. However, for most scholars, exceptional
violence is tied to a political order and thus can become regularized in some ways.
It is a sort of known unknown that functions to govern people who are subjected
to it, by reducing some to ‘bare life’ and saving others from that fate, and by
reinforcing the perception of the state’s sovereign power.
By contrast, I argue that a state can fray the division between exceptionality and
normalcy such that zones of exception become both fluid and unpredictable, while
retaining the ability to be meaningfully separated. The state unpredictably deploys
exceptionality (the use of arbitrary violence to govern a matter), making any
situation potentially exceptional in the minds of citizens and destabilizing existing
governing logics. In Uganda, the state produces the perception of sovereign
violence when it allows exceptional violence and lawful violence to bleed together,
so that the distinction between them appears fluid sometimes and rigid at other
times. Citizens living under this regime cannot predict whether they will find
themselves in a state of normalcy or exception, as the state uses law and policy to
justify deploying unaccountable and extreme violence. On one hand, normalcy
and exception are made fluid by, for example, rumours of state-orchestrated
disappearances, extrajudicial killing, or detention paired with legal rhetoric legit-
imating such violence. On the other hand, rigid boundaries between normalcy and
exception are re-established when procedural justice is occasionally afforded to
complainants and the accused, through the successes of human rights non-
governmental organizations (NGOs), and more broadly through the proper
functioning of law and order. These oscillations occur against the backdrop of a
violent political history from colonial intervention to today, as well as violent
insurrections and their suppression across the country. While there is significant
spatial, temporal, and individual variation in exposure to and experiences of state
violence, this shared history and the nation-wide implementation of these strat-
egies produce a powerful public perception that a regime can deploy overwhelm-
ing and unaccountable force.
Fluid state jurisdiction
A second factor of institutionalized arbitrariness is the state’s ability to destabilize
and make fluid jurisdictional boundaries—‘jurisdictions’ being the things over
which the state can and must have authority (in general terms, ‘public’ things)
versus the things over which the state need not or should not have authority (in
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general terms, ‘private’ things). Jurisdictional boundaries are socially constructed,
and thus inherently dynamic, contested, negotiable, permeable, and, as a result,
potentially fluid in every regime (Olsen 1983). However, as distinct from this
general truth, a system of arbitrary governance requires citizens’ shared expect-
ations of state jurisdiction to be weak enough that, if and when state actors
arbitrarily redraw jurisdictional boundaries, this does not meet with entrenched
collective resistance. In such a scenario, the state’s repeated and irregular redef-
initions of jurisdictional boundaries, backed by violent force or threats thereof,
renders state jurisdiction fluid. This fluidity further amplifies the regime’s ability
to manipulate its right and responsibility to intervene in or to ignore situations.
Moreover, by continually and irregularly redefining public and private spheres,
the state renders its jurisdictional claims inconsistent, undermining the establish-
ment of precedent. Though the division between public and private is fragile, the
spheres retain their meaning such that the regime still can determine that a
person, place, or event falls into the state’s public sphere and thus is subject to
formal state law—or alternatively can relegate that person, place, or event to the
private sphere, from which one cannot make claims on the state.
The complex and manipulable relationship between different jurisdictional
spheres is less thoroughly treated in the scholarly literature than one might
hope (Tapscott 2017a), but is nonetheless documented across many institutionally
plural and fragmented environments. Aili Mari Tripp describes jurisdictional
relationships in a detailed article on authority in Jinja District, Uganda, discussing
‘public and private spheres . . . nestled within other public and private spheres’. She
explains that ‘it is impossible to draw hard and fast demarcations between the two
spheres because embedded within every public and every private sphere are other
public and private spheres’ (Tripp 2014, 38). The article describes how various
authorities—which might be generally categorized as ‘public’ state representatives
or ‘private’ traditional leaders—act on both public and private spaces. Tripp’s
work shows how authorities seek to change their jurisdictional claims, at times
asserting control over a new ‘public’ comprising a different or broader category of
people, places, or things than they had claimed before. Keebet von Benda-
Beckmann emphasizes the political implications of changing jurisdictional claims,
focusing on the authorities charged with different jurisdictional ‘fora’ that appear
in literature on forum shopping. She writes, ‘the forums involved use disputes for
their own, mainly local political ends. These institutions and their individual
functionaries usually have interests different from those of the parties, and they
use the processing of disputes to pursue those interests . . . [these authorities try] to
acquire and manipulate disputes from which they expect to gain political advan-
tage, or to fend off disputes which they fear will threaten their interests’ (Benda-
Beckmann 1981, 117). Alisha Holland identifies a similar practice of ‘forbearance’
in Latin America: this ‘intentional and revocable nonenforcement of law’ can be
used to change distributional outcomes, in particular for political ends (Holland
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2016, 232). Lauren Benton explains how colonial powers and the colonized used
‘jurisdictional politics’ in which actors sought to exploit the confusion and contra-
dictions inherent in plural legal environments, producing a kind of ‘patterned’
fluidity that reinforced colonial authority (Benton 1999).
Under regimes that practise institutionalized arbitrariness, by contrast, jurisdic-
tional claims remain unpredictably fluid and changeable, preventing subjects from
developing reliable expectations about if or how the state might intervene. In
Uganda, such fluidity is exemplified when state authorities at times outsource
state power and at other times seize it back. For example, it is not uncommon for
high-ranking government officials to condone extra-judicial violence sometimes,
while punishing it at other times. In an interview, a district-level politician explained
that security was particularly good in his area because he encouraged mob violence.
This festive season we didn’t lose any cattle. I think it is the first Christmas ever!
We sensitised in security at the community level. ‘If you are caught, they should
kill you!’ Thieves now run to other districts.
[How many of those meetings did you have?] We had several in every sub-
county. The cattle thieves are known. We told them, ‘They should kill you.’
[Who should?] The mob justice! They [the criminals] fear it. [They think]
‘Now with the chairman’s support they [the mob] will finish us.’ And they have
killed them! They killed one—no two! This person [thief] would come, kill your
calf, just slaughter it and run off. They got him and they worked on him
thoroughly [beat him to death]. (LC5 Chairman, 17 January 2018)
At the same time, police officers and citizens alike frequently note that only the
police are allowed to handle violent crimes. Scholars have identified similarly fluid
jurisdictional claims in other sectors in Uganda. For example, Anne Mette Kjær
describes a ‘grey zone’ in Ugandan land law, via which the regime keeps imple-
mentation of legal reforms flexible enough to be open to interpretation and thus
manipulation (Kjær 2017), while Thomas Goodfellow describes how Uganda’s
ruling regime has opted not to regulate Kampala’s informal transportation sector
so it can garner political support from unregistered motorcycle taxi drivers
(Goodfellow 2015).
Thus, at times, public officials give civilians the authority to use violence to
police and punish; at other times, officials mete out harsh punishments for those
very same acts, framing them not as crime prevention, but instead as violations of
the law. At other times still, this fluidity is replaced with clear assertions that
law determines jurisdictional claims (for example, that all criminal violations can
only be handled by the police). This is one example of how state authorities
manipulate state jurisdiction, strategically claiming and denying authority, and
thereby undermining citizens’ abilities to form expectations and make meaningful
claims on the state.
OUP CORRECTED AUTOPAGE PROOFS – FINAL, 17/5/2021, SPi
     35
Potential state presence
The third factor of institutionalized arbitrariness is citizens’ perceptions of
potential state presence—whether through rumour, perceived state surveillance,
or unexpected appearances by state authorities. For arbitrary governance to
work, citizens must believe the state could be present at any moment.
Otherwise, if citizens or local leaders understand that the state is reliably absent,
alternative sources of authority could consolidate power unencumbered. In
Uganda, the state appears potentially present because the distinction between
state and society is fluid and unstable. At times, citizens are framed as part of the
state or even as embodying it so there is no difference between state and society.
This is partially facilitated by the no-party legacy of the NRM regime, which
labelled all Ugandans as part of the regime, and furthered by constitutional
provisions that all Ugandans can be called upon to take up arms to defend the
state. At other times, citizens are framed as outside the state. Most often, the line
between state and society is blurred so that it is difficult to tell which is which.
Because any citizen can be framed as the state, the state can potentially be
anywhere.
The potentiality of state presence is rests in part on a widespread perception of
state surveillance. This perception then further reinforces citizens’ belief that the
state might be present. Information—or intelligence—is widely recognized as a
key building block of governing power. James Scott, in his seminal work Seeing
Like a State (1998), shows how making populations ‘legible’ to state institutions is
constitutive of successful rule, allowing authorities to extract and redistribute
resources and undermine meaningful threats effectively and efficiently. Other
scholars have incorporated this insight into models of political control. Stathis
Kalyvas, for example, describes a positive linear relationship between information
and selective violence (Kalyvas 2006). The gathering of intelligence itself works to
discipline populations. Under regimes of institutionalized arbitrariness, actual
information gathering and analysis is less essential than its perception, which
gives citizens the impression that the state is informed of their activities and
potentially present. For example, in his work on conscripts in Eritrea, David
Bozzini describes how check points induce ‘the perception of the existence of a
highly authoritarian police state that is effectively omniscient despite . . . experiences
of the low-tech surveillance’ (Bozzini 2011, 94).
In Uganda, the ever present possibility of state surveillance makes citizens’
perceptions of potential state presence particularly pronounced. Respondents
describe a sprawling security apparatus, with secret operatives ‘deep down’ in
the villages, working as the eyes and ears of the state, reporting directly to the
president (Verma 2012, 87; Zeller 2013, 210). Still others refer to Uganda’s village-
level elected government officials as state informants (B. Jones 2009, 65, 85; also
see Branch 2011, 69; Finnström 2008, 94–7; Mamdani 1995). This perception is
reinforced by the history of LCs as organizations to ‘secure efficient civilian
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support’ for the army during the NRM’s Bush War (Tidemand 1994, 139). The
regime has supplemented this system of human surveillance with investments in
spyware: in September 2015, Privacy International published a series of docu-
ments confirming that the government purchased intrusion malware in 2011 to
facilitate spying on opposition politicians, media, and establishment insiders in
hotels, key government institutions, people’s homes, and other meeting spaces,
with the explicit goal of blackmailing targets (Privacy International 2015). Several
politicians reported instances when they were followed and arrested; journalists
described anonymous phone calls threatening them for covering certain stories,
despite publishing without a by-line. At the same time, there are instances when it
appears that the Ugandan state is absent or lacks intelligence—leaving open the
possibility to organize autonomously from the state on one hand, and the need to
do so on the other, but only at one’s own risk. While it is extremely difficult to
assess the actual extent and capacity of surveillance in Uganda, citizens’ wide-
spread perception of it is an important component of arbitrary governance.
Non-hierarchical and fragmented governing institutions
The final factor of institutionalized arbitrariness is a non-hierarchical and frag-
mented governance environment, in which actors have ill-defined, overlapping, or
contested mandates. The existence of multiple and competing providers for any
given service (security, justice, administration) means that, while each provider
may consistently employ pre-determined ‘rules of the game’ (North 1990), their
combined efforts lead to unpredictable outcomes. Moreover, actors have ill-
defined mandates, allowing them to both claim and deny authority unpredictably,
and the hierarchy among various security and administrative systems is unclear.
Public authorities ranging from vigilantes to local councillors lack clearly defined
mandates, as they are all subject to state actors’ perpetually shifting jurisdictional
claims. Thus, they must compete among themselves for limited resources, striving
to define their own role and build legitimacy in the community, while constantly
facing the active possibility that the central state will intervene in their nascent
zone of authority.
Many scholars have noted the importance of institutional fragmentation—or
fostering competition among potential opponents—as a strategy of governance.
Sowing distrust among putative leaders to foreclose or undermine their cooper-
ation with each other has long been a tactic of warfare and governance. This
approach, if implemented successfully, can have the added benefit of reinforcing
the power of the leader as the sole consolidated authority. As Karen Barkey
explains in her seminal study of the Ottoman Empire,
Ottoman prebendal elites were unable to oppose the state seriously. Even though
the state precipitated internal competition within their ranks and aggravated the
conditions of their livelihood, because of their initial dependence and loyalty they
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continued to search for solutions from within the state. Ottoman elites in the
early seventeenth century did not look for solutions to the ills they experienced
by rebelling against the state and challenging the structure of the state and
society. If they rebelled, they did so to demand that they be incorporated into
the state’s privilege structure once again. This was true for both established elites
of the provincial system and the newly recognized, strategically important bandit
leaders. (Barkey 1994, 55–6)
Barkey explains that the Ottoman state, by creating divisions within elite groups,
was able to become and remain the main source of power into which ambitious
elites sought to be integrated. Literature on coup proofing draws on the same logic,
arguing that leaders create multiple parallel institutions, particularly in areas of
security and surveillance, in order to prevent any one agency from gaining a
foothold on power. Milan Svolik documents how such practices were common in
Baathist Iraq, al-Asad’s Syria, Qaddafi’s Libya, Nasser’s Egypt, and Soviet Russia
(Svolik 2012, 132).
Uganda’s governance environment is, by all accounts, highly fragmented.
Government administration is comprised of a number of layered systems and is
fragmented both centrally and locally (Mwenda 2007). A 2017 government report
noted massive fragmentation within government agencies as well as duplications
of function; it offered the example of funding for agricultural inputs, which was
reportedly spread among 17 ministries, departments, and agencies (ISO report
2017, 40, on file with author). Additionally, in Acholi, traditional or local author-
ities like clans, religious leaders, and rwot kweri or rwot mo⁷ represent alternative
governance structures derived from historic legacies of local, national, and inter-
national orders. These overlapping systems inject unpredictability into the gov-
ernance environment, as numerous authorities could potentially claim
jurisdiction over a person, place, or event, thereby asserting different rules and
rationalities to shape processes or outcomes.
Fragmentation is particularly evident in the security sector, as Chapter 4 elab-
orates. Andrew Mwenda, listing over a dozen formal security organizations
including a host of non-statutory units, details a ‘veritable alphabet soup’ of
security organizations that are intended to fragment the security sector and
prevent coherence among armed men (Mwenda 2007, 32). Mwenda notes:
By instigating the emergence of many hostile informal factions in the military,
and by promoting the proliferation of both formal and informal security outfits,
Museveni has turned the strategy of fragmentation to his own purposes in this
⁷ Rwot kweri is often translated as ‘chief of the hoe’ and is a male leader of a farmer’s group; rwot mo
is an anointed chief of lineage in Acholi (Paine 2014). There are a variety of other rwots (or ‘kings’) in
Acholi; however, these two kinds were the most commonly cited in my interviews.
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sector of the state as well as in its more sedate organs . . . Moreover, [proliferating
armed units] allow him to sap the power of the formal security organizations
even as he boosts his capacity to use deniable force against his opponents without
having to worry about official state sanction. (Mwenda 2007, 32–3)
At the same time, Uganda’s legacy as a ‘no-party state’ (see Chapter 3) paints an
image of all Ugandans as part of a cohesive national entity that supersedes these
numerous divisions. Public opinion also supports the perception that the ruling
regime is coherent and cohesive, with its leader Museveni holding ultimate power
in the country.
3. Counterarguments
Several alternative explanations could account for what I have described as
institutionalized arbitrariness. These fall into three categories: corruption, illegi-
bility, and happenstance. Each counterargument can explain some aspects of the
unpredictability that citizens experience in interactions with state authorities, but
not all of them. In so far as these counterarguments occur, they are compatible
with—and even contribute to—a strategy of arbitrary governance. I return to the
question of intentionality in Chapter 7 and use the empirical evidence presented
in the intervening chapters to assess its strength and plausibility.
3.1 It’s Just Corruption
Corruption is a logical explanation for inconsistent and apparently unpredictable
state intervention. As the use of public office for private gain, corruption can be
systemic or individualized, grand or petty. Here, I address two understandings of
corruption: systemic and individualized. Some have proposed that systemic cor-
ruption can be seen as a type of patrimonial authority. Scholars who focus on
‘everyday corruption’ note that it involves ‘largely clandestine or concealed prac-
tices’ that reflect a ‘generalized informal functioning’ of the state (or ‘generalized
dysfunction’) guided ‘by a series of tacit codes and practical norms’ (Blundo and
Olivier de Sardan 2013, 4–8). In this and other studies, corruption constitutes a
hidden order that is difficult for outsiders to discern; it is connected to practices of
neopatrimonialism that blur public and private interests (Gazibo 2013) and, in
some cases, can result in greater efficiency (Bardhan 1997). Because these norms
are unwritten, they must be socially negotiated and are thus arbitrary to a certain
degree. This definition sees corruption as a different and illegible order, and thus is
addressed as part of the next counterargument.
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A second possible understanding of corruption—individualized corruption—is
more ad hoc: individual ‘bad apples’ use their public office for private gain in ways
that are potentially unpredictable for ordinary citizens. Individualized corruption
can also introduce unpredictability into governing systems since it is unknown if,
when, and how officials will solicit or accept corruption. For example, Louisa
Lombard writes about how the ‘lack of supervision over governing actors, whether
officially attached to the state organizational chart or not, has been understood as
giving rise to a violence-bolstered form of corruption’ that makes roadblock
encounters contingent, capricious, and unpredictable for travellers (Lombard
2013, 159).
Both systemic and individualized forms of corruption are common in Uganda.
In 2016, Transparency International ranked Uganda 151 out of 176 countries on
its corruption perceptions index; its ranking worsened annually between 2012 and
2018 (Transparency International 2018). The Uganda Police Force is particularly
known for corruption, ranked as the ‘most bribery prone institution’ in East Africa
two years running, with almost 50 per cent of respondents reporting paying a
bribe during interactions with the police, and 55 per cent reporting that the bribe
was necessary to receive services (Transparency International 2014). In my
research, respondents—young and old, male and female, educated and lay—
agreed that one could not get help from the police without paying for it.
Additionally, local norms encourage facilitating security and governance actors
with a small payment (often called ‘motivation’) for taking up (or colloquially,
‘wasting’) their time with a given matter. This corruption counterargument can
also be extended to include other types of self-interested behaviour. For example,
people acting to strengthen their own power base might not follow a predictable
set of rules—instead, they assess each situation and claim or deny their authority
as a reflection of their self-interest.
Individualized acts of corruption could partially explain uneven and inconsist-
ent application of state authority.⁸ However, this counterargument is compatible
with the notion of arbitrary governance for two reasons. First, this explanation
focuses on individuals, thereby obscuring the structural effects of these corrupt
acts. Even if corruption contributes to citizens’ perceptions of an arbitrary state,
the reality remains that countless discrete interventions by state authorities, taken
together, lack a discernible shared logic, and produce a continually shifting
boundary that functions to destabilize and fragment alternative sources of author-
ity and prevent new ones from emerging.
Second, one of the major impediments to tackling corruption is political will.
Governments that demonstrate political will have shown a capacity to crack down
⁸ If all individuals exhibited the same corrupt tendencies (as in a culture of corruption), that should
actually result in a predictable governance system for citizens. Such an argument, though substantively
about corruption, is better addressed in Section 3.2.
OUP CORRECTED AUTOPAGE PROOFS – FINAL, 17/5/2021, SPi
40  
on corruption, while those that do not show political will allow corruption to
thrive (Brinkerhoff 2000). Under Museveni’s rule, Uganda has instituted several
reforms, including establishing an ombudsman (the inspector general of govern-
ment) in 1988, creating an anti-corruption department, and adopting a ‘zero
tolerance on corruption’ policy in 2006. Yet, it is commonly understood that
corruption, particularly in the form of bribery, is an integral aspect of Uganda’s
police system. William Muhumuza (2016) argues that the NRM became less
committed to fighting corruption when the country became multiparty.
Moreover, he notes that in Uganda, ‘corruption tends to be institutionalized and
used as a tool to consolidate and retain political power’ (2016, 65), suggesting that
we should think about corruption systemically.⁹
3.2 It’s Just (Il)legible
Many authors propose that what looks like chaos actually has an underlying order
that is simply unfamiliar and illegible to western-trained academics, who too often
consider foreign governing orders ‘deviant’ or ‘failed’. They suggest that there is a
logic at play that accounts for what I view as unpredictability—the reason it looks
unpredictable is that the underlying logic is too complicated or hidden for an
outsider to discern. Were this the case, abiding by the rules of the system ought to
result in predictable rewards, and breaking the rules of the system ought to also
result in predictable costs. However, evidence suggests otherwise—for instance,
while the system in many ways looks like a neopatrimonial regime in its rules, it
does not abide by the same logic when the rules are broken. For example, in
Uganda, the police often fail to intervene in issues of security. In such cases, youth
vigilantes may arrest suspects within the village and deliver them to the police
post. At that time, exchanges often take place—bribes are paid, favours called in,
deals cut, as might be expected in a neopatrimonial system. However, sometimes
the police do intervene, arriving on the scene to arrest, detain, and bring charges
against suspects. Citizens experience these interventions as arbitrary and unpre-
dictable because they do not conform to the neopatrimonial rules of the game.
⁹ Muhumuza further notes that one way the government has undermined the efficiency of anti-
corruption measures is through ‘the duplication of mandates between anti-corruption institutions . . .
For example, the IG [Inspectorate of Government], the CIID [Criminal Investigations and Intelligence
Directorate] and the DPP [Directorate of Public Prosecutions] have all the same roles to investigate and
prosecute corrupt public officials. Similarly the role of the District PAC [Public Accounts Committee]
is duplicated and watered down by the existence of the Parliamentary LGPAC [Local Governments
Public Accounts Committee], which has the same functions as that of the District PAC . . . [They] take
actions which are sometimes contradictory and/or conflicting. This creates confusion, especially where
the affected person is cleared by the District PAC but queried by the Parliamentary LGPAC. Such
duplications waste resources and breed institutional conflict as regards the relationship and boundary
of the mandates of the two committees’ (2016, 70). In sum, as in the security sector, the government
uses fragmentation and non-hierarchical arrangements to produce uncertainty.
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A further clarification helps distil how arbitrary governance is different from
theories of governing order that are couched in complexity. Arbitrary governance
does not refer to an absence of governing ‘logics’—or norms about how to
determine rights and responsibilities—as might be found in a governance vacuum
or a state of anarchy. Instead, arbitrary governance occurs in the presence of
multiple governing orders that exist in an institutional environment structured to
enable and benefit from their irregular relationships with one another. Co-existing
logics are reminiscent of legally plural environments in which citizens forum--
shop—only instead of being able to assess which forum is most likely to offer the
best outcome, it is difficult to determine which authority will hear the case. Actors
and entities unpredictably assert and deny their authority over both constituents
and each other, such that ordinary citizens are moved among different fora
unwillingly, or even rejected from them entirely (also see Benda-Beckmann
1981). For example, in one case I studied, a man sought compensation for
property damage caused by mob violence. He went to the police, local elected
officials, churches of different faiths, clan authorities, and even foreign
researchers—all of whom denied jurisdictional authority over his case (also see
Allen 2015). Any of these actors might have intervened, and each would have used
a different logic to determine justice and reciprocity. Paired with the unpredictable
possibility of state intervention, these governing logics lose their ability to foster a
reliable relationship of accountability between authorities and their constituents.
Thus, the existence of many competing logics under the umbrella of a more
powerful state authority shapes citizens’ perceptions of managed unpredictability,
which functions as a mode of governance.
As further evidence that citizens find the governing environment illegible,
I turn to my qualitative findings. In interviews, many ordinary civilians reported
that they have difficulty navigating the state’s governing system. Common refrains
among my respondents included ‘government things have to be complicated’ or
‘with government policy, nothing should be straightforward’. One district-level
politician for the NRM ruling party explained that the NRM had infiltrated
opposition parties: ‘If you get three [members of an opposition party], one is
NRM. He’s just confusing them’ (District-level politician, 17 September 2015).
A participant in the Crime Preventers programme explained that he and other
crime preventers understood their role as contributing to confusion among voters
on election day:
When someone has come [to the polling station] and maybe you don’t get his
name, send him to another polling station—[tell him] ‘you first go and check
there in a good manner, don’t be rude. Maybe your name is not here, because
there is some mistake from the Headquarter. For us, we don’t know. We are just
guarding.’ That one is going to make a lot of confusion. People will be very many.
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You will be confused. They are going to stop [voting] at 4pm exactly. They will
confuse you ’til four. And we [crime preventers] will say ‘sorry, sorry, sorry,
sorry’. (Crime preventer, Gulu, 9 February 2016)
These examples, and others which will be elaborated throughout the book, suggest
that uncertainty and confusion are fundamental to citizens’ experiences of the NRM
state. If a logic of neopatrimonialism truly determined interactions, as many have
suggested, ordinary citizens should not feel confused by state authorities. Alternative
logics, including neopatrimonialism, may still determine individual experiences or
even dictate most interactions with a given authority. However, institutionalized
arbitrariness fundamentally alters the nature of neopatrimonialism, given that the
state can unexpectedly overturn it, or any other logic, at any time.
3.3 It’s Just Happenstance
The final counterargument asks if the regime’s unpredictability really is strategic,
or whether it is simply an historically contingent outcome of decades of governing
in a weak or fragile state. According to this critique, even if citizens experience the
state as arbitrary and unpredictable, this experience is at most an institutional
effect rather than an intentional mode of governance. There are two related
responses to this. The first is a limitation of claims—institutionalized arbitrariness
does not suggest that local-level disorder is micro-targeted at individuals or
communities, nor is it a grand strategy of the regime. Instead, it posits that
unpredictability is the result of an institutional environment that the ruling regime
has developed over decades of strategic decisions to foster multiple and competing
authorities. The result produces disorder with governing power. Theories of coup
proofing similarly emphasize a divide-and-rule strategy in which the regime
creates parallel military structures and security agencies that serve as checks on
each other such that no single faction can gain too much power (Rwengabo 2012).
Civilian experiences of arbitrary governance might be understood as a necessary
effect of such a thorough implementation of coup proofing. Thus, while the
regime’s primary goal might not be unpredictability, it is part and parcel of such
an approach and serves to fragment civil society to the benefit of the ruling regime.
Second, empirical evidence shows that citizens often perceive unpredictability as
an intentional strategy of governance. Scholars have shown that citizens, seeking
to interpret erratic enforcement of state policy or law, impute strategic intention to
the state (Bozzini 2015; Fontein 2009).
Such perceptions were also the case in Uganda. In all four study locations, a
wide cross-section of Ugandans adamantly expressed the belief that the ruling
regime intentionally fostered local-level confusion. Many respondents argued that
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the highest levels of state authority produce ambiguity for the purposes of
controlling the population. One NRM politician explained:
I think all these [policies and interventions] are intentional—the government has
political interest over these people here. But the extent to which this country is
handling the issue of security, it makes everybody feel . . . [that the] government
understands what it’s doing. Museveni has convinced people that he’s still in
charge of security and he understands it all.
(District-level politician, Gulu, 17 September 2015)
A journalist working in Mbarara gave an elaborate description of how he
perceives the system and its intentionality, citing the creation and maintenance
of various institutions with unclear and overlapping mandates as evidence for
his claims.
[In your opinion, why are there so many fragmented and competing institutions in
Uganda?] They are meant to check on one another. They should work in unison.
But in third world countries as you know, they don’t allow systems to work . . . I
think it is intended.
[You said ‘they’ don’t allow systems to work – who is they?] It is intended by the
leaders of these nations to do like that. It benefits them . . . [Leaders] will use all
those available avenues to frustrate those who are not connected. It is tailored
that way.
[But how can you know that it is intentional?] I want to again put it clear . . .
[E]ven at the ministerial level, there is that confusion . . . There is a multiplicity of
agencies that serve the same purpose . . . The multiplicity of things is meant to
create confusion in the heads of the public. [For example,] the IGP [Inspector
General of Police] is deployed [and told,] ‘You stop Besigye [a key opposition
candidate] from doing this [campaigning].’ Before he reaches [the rally site] in
Mbarara, the military is there to open the way for him. He’s guarded by police
with a lead car. It’s total confusion. (Journalist, Mbarara, 19 January 2018)
Many elites and ordinary citizens believe that the government has the capacity to
implement order should it so choose. These respondents broadly concurred that
vagaries in policy and enforcement were intentional. A female lawyer working at
an internationally funded human rights organization explained:
Nothing happens without the permission and approval of the government. The
state does not do anything without planning, whether the resources are there or
not . . . If the state can make IDs for everyone above 16, why can’t they make IDs
for crime preventers? Nothing is an act of God. [The government] sits down and
plans everything. (Female lawyer, Gulu, 21 September 2015)
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Respondents from various levels of the government, both in the ruling party
and in opposition parties, suggest that the highest levels have intentionally
developed a flexible system that allows the state to justify select and unpredictable
presence. There may be no definitive evidence that the regime intentionally
produces an environment of unpredictability to govern its populace; however,
there is substantial circumstantial evidence that, at the very least, the ruling regime
is aware of, desires, and sustains that outcome. The benefits for the ruling regime,
elaborated in the following chapters, are multiple. They include outsourcing day-
to-day security and governance tasks while limiting the risk that these nascent
authorities will consolidate meaningful autonomous power; allowing for pockets
of civic organization that make the regime appear more democratic than it
actually is, while rendering them so fragile that they are inhospitable to opposition
politics; limiting citizens’ expectations for state accountability; and producing
citizens and local-level officials who self-police. Thus, in response to those who
are concerned that arbitrary governance misrecognizes what is actually no more
than a ‘weak’ state struggling to survive, I would point out how the Ugandan state
manages the complex and intricate balance between maintaining the appearance
of fragility or weakness, while at the same time successfully projecting control over
their territories and populace (see also Fisher 2014b on the paradox of states that
appear both strong and fragile).
The book thus describes arbitrary governance as strategic. The ruling regime
projects its power through alternate and unclear use of lawful versus exceptional
violence, unpredictable assertions and denials of state jurisdiction, use of surveil-
lance, and institutional fragmentation, which together produce arbitrary governance.
4. Conclusion
Against the backdrop of classic theories of state formation, which presume that
rulership means institutionalizing arbitrary power and putting human affairs in
order, scholars have come to see unpredictable phenomena as snags in the institu-
tional fabric to be tugged smooth, or as mathematical remainders to be accounted
for with a more accurate model. A theory of arbitrary governance instead takes
uncertainty as its focus, describing how unpredictability is intrinsic to certain
governing strategies. In such a system, the state is neither centralized nor decen-
tralized, and rules neither directly nor indirectly. Instead, the regime maintains
control of its populace primarily by fostering an institutional environment that
injects multiple kinds of uncertainty into civilian interactions with state authorities.
This uncertainty allows the state to legitimize inconsistent behaviour, specifically
with regard to its (non-)intervention. Sometimes state authorities intervene, for
example to determine the outcome of a disagreement; at other times, they decline to
do so—by, for example, refusing to use state power to enforce an edict.
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Institutionalized arbitrariness builds on the scholarship of the politics of dis-
order, unpredictability, and liminality found in studies of modern authoritarian-
ism and the post-colonial African state. First, it shows that modern
authoritarianism relies on dynamic processes of asserting and denying authority
to govern subjects through unpredictability as much as through fear. Second, it
shows how this process undermines other social orders, weakening alternative
sources of authority. The four-part framework identifies the mechanisms by
which arbitrary governance works—and reveals the processes by which unpre-
dictability can be institutionalized to sustainably project authoritarian power.
Rather than being the result of individual actions or systemic failures, arbitrary
governance is institutionally produced and maintained.
Institutionalized arbitrariness describes a system in which fragmented and
competing authorities and vague or contradictory rules about their jurisdictions
and powers ensure that citizens can experience the state’s (non-)interventions as
arbitrary. Discrete authorities may act in accordance with a given set of norms and
expectations, but because authorities can and do both claim and deny authority in
various jurisdictions without accountability, the result is an overarching system in
which one set of expectations can be superseded by another at a moment’s notice.
Despite the likelihood that no individual authority is strategically employing the
principles of arbitrary behaviour, the system’s structure fosters arbitrary out-
comes. This strategy of unpredictable intervention prevents citizens from devel-
oping stable and enforceable expectations for security and governance actors, and,
as a result, benefits the ruling regime in ways that it intentionally reinforces
through formal and informal policy actions. The result is an efficient mode of
governance wherein multiple and competing local authorities handle much of the
day-to-day business of governance, while the state retains its position as the most
powerful authority in the imaginations of its subjects.





On 11 April 2011, Ugandans streamed onto the streets to protest hyperinflation of
food and gas prices. Government security forces deployed pepper spray, tear gas,
water cannons, and live ammunition to quell the unrest, until ‘Kampala and other
urban areas looked like a war zone’ (Branch and Mampilly 2015, 131). Many trace
the economic turmoil to the government’s political strategy to win the February
elections, which had relied on pouring millions of dollars of ‘presidential dona-
tions’ into the economy to entice voter support. The infusion of funds had the
undesired effect of depressing the value of the Ugandan shilling. Inflation rates hit
14 per cent by April, their highest in nearly a decade (Twinoburyo 2011). In May,
when throngs of opposition supporters met their political leader, Kizza Besigye,
many thought it might mark a turning point in Ugandan politics. But the moment
fizzled—Besigye gave a speech, the protesters dispersed, and ‘political exhaustion’
took over (Branch and Mampilly 2015, 114). The government charged political
activists with treason and sedition and imprisoned them for months without bail
(Lukwago 2011). Food prices continued to rise, and inflation hit 30 per cent by
October (Young 2011).
The 2011 protests, known as ‘Walk to Work’, illustrate a key challenge faced by
today’s modern authoritarian regimes. At times, these regimes must mobilize their
population collectively, for example, to vote; but they also need tools to demobilize
their population, for example, to diffuse public protests against the regime.
Uganda has often been described as a neopatrimonial state, employing repression
and patrimonialism to manage its polity through its political elites. However,
unlike neopatrimonial states which typically disengage from the populace and use
intermediaries to manage dissent, the NRM has exercised direct control over
protests and mass action, especially from the 2000s onwards. The result is not a
hollow state propped up by foreign aid. Rather, the regime uses state institutions
to engage both elites and ordinary Ugandans, penetrating society and producing
political subjects that can be alternately mobilized and demobilized.
With a focus on the years between 1986 and 2016, this chapter explains
institutional and historical factors that allowed Uganda’s NRM regime to perme-
ate society and produce a population that largely polices itself, through what
I have identified as institutionalized arbitrariness. Drawing on the insights of
historical institutionalists such as Charles Tilly, it focuses on institutions as a
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lens through which to identify how structure privileges some interests over others,
generating distinct national trajectories (Hall and Taylor 1996, 937–8).
I emphasize the importance of tracing institutional continuities and changes—
especially through transitions in political power—while being careful not to
simplify such moments into narratives of either pure rupture or revisionist
continuity (Tilly 1984).
Three institutional trajectories of the Ugandan state help contextualize institu-
tionalized arbitrariness. The first is the bifurcated nature of the state at independ-
ence, when colonial-era state institutions were split from the informal workings of
post-colonial political power. This bifurcation produced structural foundations
prone to political instability. The second trajectory concerns the double nature of
the NRM regime as simultaneously a political and military movement. The third is
the role of external aid in propping up and advancing this fragile system.
Throughout, the chapter highlights the tensions between institutionalization and
personalization that lay the groundwork for this type of modern authoritarian
regime. It also places Museveni’s Uganda in regional and global context in order to
identify external factors that both reinforced the NRM and checked its power. It
begins with a brief overview of this 30 plus-year history.
Political histories of Uganda frequently open in 1986—the year Museveni and
his rebel outfit seized Kampala after five years of guerrilla warfare, and the same
year when opposition to Museveni and his southern rule instigated insurgencies in
the north, west, and east of the country. Of its 24 years as an independent country,
Uganda had spent 14 of them under the ethnically polarizing leadership of Milton
Obote from 1966 to 1971 and from 1980 to 1985, and eight more under the
despotic rule of Idi Amin from 1971 to 1979. In 1986, Museveni captured a
country torn by ethnic and regional antagonisms, with state institutions and an
economy that had largely been gutted during Amin’s rule. Museveni introduced
democratic policy reforms that rejuvenated Uganda’s national image and secured
decades of support from foreign donors. However, his reforms also helped the
regime remove checks on presidential power and militarize the country, such that
the NRM is increasingly described as a hybrid regime, where democratic spaces
have been shrinking over decades (Abrahamsen and Bareebe 2016; Khisa 2019;
Tripp 2010).
Museveni’s rule is characterized by a merging of party machinery, state insti-
tutions, and the military. The military has been the backbone of the regime, most
obviously because the NRM came to power as a rebel outfit, but also because it has
faced insurgencies across the country and used military force to quell them. The
regime has used ongoing violent conflict to frame itself both as vulnerable to rebel
movements (and thus in need of foreign humanitarian and military aid) and a
strong ally of the West in its fight against terrorism (Fisher 2014b). The country’s
political economy is also militarized. Resource extraction and distribution often
occur through the security sector. For example, military elites have ample
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opportunity to profit (both legally and not) from war economies, while ordinary
citizens can join state militias to access government patronage. Informal civilian
militias, maintained during times of both war and relative peace, enhance the
regime’s ability to reach into rural and remote areas of the country through the
security sector. These security structures are built into the fabric of local govern-
ment and contribute to the melding of the state with the ruling regime and the
military (Baker 2004; Oloka-Onyango 1990).
Over more than three decades, the NRM regime has developed a form of
authoritarian rule dressed in the trappings of democracy. The centralization and
legitimation of the regime occurred in the context of a post-colonial state, where
political power resided in patrimonial networks, rather than colonial-era state
institutions. Foreign injections of capital in the form of defence assistance and
development aid bolstered this system, creating a state that has unpredictability
and arbitrariness baked into its very governing structure. Rather than reflecting
state weakness, arbitrary governance has become a key way in which the regime
projects power across the country.
1. Centralizing Power in a Bifurcated State
When Museveni took power, he inherited a neopatrimonial and deeply personal-
ized state apparatus on its knees from decades of elite power struggles. Museveni
rose to the challenge, gradually consolidating and centralizing power. A few
aspects of his approach stand out as key to his success: first, merging state
institutions and the NRM party such that today they cannot be disentangled;
second, embracing an ambitious programme of decentralization designed to
fragment local political organization—effectively using de jure decentralization
to de facto centralize power; and third, militarizing the economy to bring
resources under the NRM’s control. These processes have produced a hybrid
regime that exhibits many institutional forms and practices associated with
democracies, while at times allowing for the unfettered exercise of executive
power.
1.1 The Legacies of Neopatrimonialism
Since Ugandan independence in 1962, every transition in central governing power
has been contested, and almost all have been accompanied by violent and often
ethnically inflected purges of the government, military, and business community.
The country has long been marred by regional and ethnic divides. In the colonial
era, the British used ethnicity to divide and rule: southerners, comprised of various
Bantu ethnicities, were caricatured as bureaucrats and dominated political power
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during colonization, while Nilotic northerners, and the Acholi in particular, were
framed as inherently martial and comprised the majority of the colonial army.
The continued prominence of regional and ethnic tensions points to the
underlying challenge of governing a country defined by a rift between state
institutions and ‘real’ politics rooted in local political and social organization.
The origins of this rift can be traced to decolonization when Ugandan elites took
over from the British colonizers. According to political scientist Mahmood
Mamdani, these Ugandan elites derived their political authority from informal
cultural practices rather than the bureaucratic authority of the recently post-
colonial state. This imbued the political sphere with ethnic divisions, producing
a state that was deracialized, in that white Europeans had left, but not democra-
tized, in that elites still wielded patrimonial power over the masses. Instead of
using democratic institutions, rulers continued to rely on ethnic alliances and
military force to control a fragmented country, resulting in neopatrimonial
politics as a form of indirect rule called the ‘bifurcated state’ (Mamdani 1996).
Uganda’s post-colonial political settlement was fundamentally shaped by a
failed power-sharing agreement between the King of Buganda—Uganda’s most
powerful southern kingdom—and Milton Obote, a northerner who served in the
colonial government and headed the Uganda People’s Congress political party. As
soon as the British left Uganda in 1962, Obote began undermining this agreement
by centralizing his control. His first step was to weaken the power of the king—or
Kabaka. Obote stacked the civil service and armed forces with his co-ethnics to
shift political power from the southern kingdoms to northern ethnic groups
(Branch 2011, 53–6). In 1966, with his military surrounding Parliament, Obote
forced through a new constitution that consolidated his executive power and
abolished the southern kingdoms. Months later, Obote’s army—under the lead-
ership of his army commander, Idi Amin—attacked the Kabaka’s palace, killed
hundreds of his supporters, placed Buganda under martial law, and forced the
young king into exile in London. Obote increasingly relied on the military to
control Uganda, leveraging ethnic cleavages to divide and rule.
Despite these efforts, within five years Obote lost control of the military and the
government. In 1971, Amin staged a coup backed by soldiers from his home
region of West Nile. Amin’s subsequent eight-year military dictatorship was
known for extreme violence against political opponents and the destruction of
Uganda’s political and economic institutions, through blatant corruption, law-
lessness, and violence. Amin murdered two-thirds of Obote’s army, targeting the
Acholi in particular, and replaced them with soldiers from West Nile and mer-
cenaries from South Sudan and the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC; then
Zaire) (Ravenhill 1974, 241; Kagoro 2015, 50). During my research, respondents
who could remember Amin’s rule described it as a time of deep uncertainty and
fear, when arbitrary violence and an undisciplined military prevailed. One man living
in Mbarara narrated: ‘Even if we were young, you have to remember Amin’s era.
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That’s when I was in primary school, when life was so difficult. People were
disappearing, there were no services, no salt, no sugar, no clothes. Everything had
become so hopeless’ (53-year-old male community member, Mbarara, 16 January
2018). Aili Mari Tripp describes Amin as an ‘old-style personal dictator who
ruled . . . with impunity . . . [and] eliminated potential dissent with such brutality
and ruthlessness that [he] earned international notoriety’ (Tripp 2010, 22).
Tanzanian President Julius Nyerere refused to share a platform with Amin, declar-
ing that doing so would be ‘tantamount to giving a blessing to [Amin’s] killings’
(Daily News 1975, cited in Roberts 2014, 693). Amin expelled people of Israeli,
British, and Asian origins from Uganda, scapegoating them for the country’s
economic problems. Property and businesses were confiscated, and citizens were
arrested or forced to resettle on community farms. The spoils were redistributed to
Amin’s military officers and politicians, who used the newfound wealth to manage
their constituents. Amin developed a programme to ‘Keep Uganda Clean’, which
focused on demolishing slums in Uganda’s urban centres and forcibly removing the
poor and unemployed. The programme invoked a rhetoric of purification to
whitewash the regime’s atrocities, including the murder and disappearance of its
perceived enemies. Historian Alicia Decker notes how, as the atrocities of the
regime became increasingly apparent, so too did the obsession with cleaning the
nation and eliminating any ‘dirty’ activities that might threaten the regime’s
stability (Decker 2010). But as economic collapse dried up sources of patronage,
factions emerged in the military and Amin’s rule became increasingly brittle.
In 1979, Tanzanian forces, along with Obote’s exiled supporters, ousted Amin.
A young Museveni was in their ranks. Not yet known on Uganda’s national scene,
Museveni had been preparing for politics from a young age, strategically aligning
himself with powerful elites and acquiring relevant skills. After joining the
University of Dar es Salaam in 1967, he formed a pan-Africanist student group,
built networks in liberation movement circles, and travelled to North Korea to
receive his first military training (Museveni 1997, 28–32). In 1970, after university,
Museveni returned to Kampala and joined Obote’s government as a research
assistant in the Foreign Service. In his autobiography, Museveni explains that
though he believed that Obote was ‘intent on exercising dictatorial powers over
the people of Uganda’, he decided to work with Obote while waiting for the right
moment to strike: ‘We had understood Obote’s schemes as early as 1966 and that
is why we set out to break this monopoly by acquiring the necessary military skills.
The appropriate time had not yet arrived, but it was drawing nearer’ (Museveni
1997, 32). While biding his time, Museveni fought with Tanzanian forces against
Amin and to reinstate Obote. Through these experiences, he gained military
acumen over eight years.
When Obote’s coalition overthrew Amin in 1979, Museveni made his move.
He competed against Obote in the 1980 presidential election. As a newcomer to
the political scene, Museveni received a mere 4 per cent of the vote. However, the
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election was widely regarded as a sham, won through voter suppression and ballot
box stuffing (Willis et al. 2017). Museveni took the resulting political turmoil over
the contested election as an opportunity to launch what would be a five-year
‘liberation struggle’ from the Luwero Triangle north of Kampala. After a coup
backed by the Acholi faction of the military in 1985 and the six month-long
presidency of the Acholi General Tito Okello, Museveni’s National Resistance
Army (NRA) captured Kampala.
1.2 A ‘No-Party’ System that Merged State and Party
Museveni’s NRM came to power proclaiming a new era of equality, democracy,
and security. In his inauguration speech, Museveni promised a government for all
Ugandans:
No one should think that what is happening today is a mere change of guard: it is
a fundamental change in the politics of our country. In Africa, we have seen so
many changes that change, as such, is nothing short of mere turmoil. We have
had one group getting rid of another one, only for it to turn out to be worse than
the group it displaced. Please do not count us in that group of people.
(President Yoweri Museveni, 1986 inauguration speech,
cited in Lindemann 2011, 387)
Museveni immediately began implementing political and economic reforms
packaged as liberal and democratic initiatives. However, in practice, such
reforms further centralized power and consolidated Museveni’s control, under-
mining as much as possible other autonomous centres of authority, whether
civil, economic, political, or traditional (Fisher 2014b; Freeland 2015; Makara
et al. 2009).
Among these strategies was an early policy of ‘no-party’ democracy, in which
the only mode of political organization would be Museveni’s NRM. All Ugandans
would de facto become part of the NRM, and political competition would be based
on individual merit, not party affiliation. Museveni justified this reform using
pseudo-Marxist language to argue that Uganda’s ‘peasant society’ lacked a class
basis for party competition. Party competition would only ‘exacerbate clientelism
in civil society and extend it to the countryside, thereby also activating and
reorganizing democratic politics around interethnic tensions’ (Mamdani 1996,
293). The no-party state effectively merged state institutions with the NRM;
opposition to the party became synonymous with opposition to the state itself.
Until 2003 there was no legal distinction between the state and the NRM as an
organization, and until 2006 it was directly financed by the Ugandan state
(Makara et al. 2009, 187). This gave the regime resources to co-opt both non-violent
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and violent dissenters, incorporate rebel groups into Uganda’s military, and offer
pay-outs and sinecures to political opponents.
1.3 Local Councils as a New Source of Infrastructural Power
In order to unseat Obote, Museveni had waged a five-year insurgency, popularly
known in Uganda as the Bush War. In addition to fighting Obote’s troops, the
Bush War entailed a protracted process of uprooting existing state structures in
rural areas and instating new ones that would be friendly to the NRM. Most
notably, Museveni’s rebels established a system of local government councils.
These local organizations, called ‘Resistance Councils’ until 1995 when they
were renamed ‘Local Councils’ (LCs), continue to serve as the basis for decentral-
ized government in Uganda today. During the Bush War, these councils offered a
structure to support Museveni’s rebel fighters. They delivered provisions, gathered
local intelligence, and held captured ground. The councils also offered an alter-
native to much resented chiefly power in Luwero, garnering local support for the
NRM and its army (Mamdani 1996, 208).
After taking power, the new NRM government implemented these councils
across the country. To facilitate their spread, the regime made them the conduit
for provisions, including sugar, salt, soap, and paraffin. To gain access to these
scarce, centrally distributed goods, villages had to establish councils and accept
their authority (Tidemand 1994, 96). In much of the north, the councils were
initially viewed with suspicion as tools of the new southern government (Branch
2011, 64, 69). Nonetheless, after the NRM took Kampala, these councils were
legally made the basis for Uganda’s decentralized government structure. The ten-
person councils would be elected by all adult residents and serve for terms of two
years, and include councils at the village (LC1), parish (LC2), sub-county (LC3),
municipality (LC4), and district levels (LC5) (E. Green 2008). The LC structure
has been lauded internationally as ‘one of the most far-reaching local government
reform programs in the developing world’ (Francis and James 2003, 325). This
structure allowed the NRM to reach rural areas, surveil local populations, and
distribute patronage.
From the beginning, the council system was characterized by a fundamental
tension: though the NRM government granted its councils certain legislative
powers and issued broad statements calling them ‘the government’, the NRM
and Museveni also referred to the ‘backwardness’ of the people, thereby legitim-
izing the central state’s direct interference in local affairs (Tidemand 1994, 164).
For years, the councils functioned without formal legal power, and were tasked
with broad responsibility for controlling crime and administering their areas.
Rather than develop clear rules for the councils, the system was designed with
numerous checks and balances to always appeal upward. At times, their design
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reinforced ambiguities. For example, ‘the state grant[ed] the RCs [resistance
councils] the right to monitor the bureaucracy but it require[d] in the same clause
that in case of malpractices RCs report to higher organs of the same bureaucracy’
(Tidemand 1994, 32, citing Ddungu 1989). This created conflicts between councils
and other public authorities such as magistrates, chiefs, and the police—some of
whom had held power since colonial intervention or earlier—who proved reluc-
tant to accept the authority of elected local politicians. The councils played various
roles inconsistently: at times they helped citizens circumvent these other author-
ities; at other times, they acted as a check on them; and sometimes they were even
subjected to those very authorities themselves (Tidemand 1994, 85–6). From the
beginning, the LC system both consolidated and fragmented state authority, and
exercised fluid jurisdictional claims.
These dynamics have been further entrenched over Museveni’s decades in
power, with the maintenance and creation of numerous systems of authority. In
addition to an elected council and district representative, each district has a
Resident District Commissioner (RDC), replacing the colonial-era District
Authority. RDCs are presidentially appointed, and tasked with security in the
district, among other key functions. A system of internal security officers (ISOs)
mirrors the LC structure, with an ISO at each level from the parish up to sub-
county, district, and region. Like RDCs, ISOs are appointed by the central
government. The police follow a similar tiered structure. These multiple and
overlapping security organizations provide checks and balances so that none has
the power to challenge the central state (Khisa 2013; Mwenda 2007). In practice,
power dynamics between district-level actors—the RDC, LC5, police chief, and
district-level ISO—vary by district, depending on the personalities, political con-
nections, and popularity of the leaders.
1.4 Managing Democratic and Decentralized State Institutions
LCs are democratically elected, placing them outside the direct control of the
NRM. However, the regime has counterbalanced LCs’ structural independence
with other measures to safeguard their political loyalty. These include limiting the
councils’ functions and resources, manipulating elections to ensure that LC
positions are dominated by the NRM party, and—as discussed—developing
parallel systems to check the power of the LC system. Decentralization encom-
passes the administrative, economic, judicial, and political spheres, while exclud-
ing matters of security, foreign affairs, and national projects, which remain highly
centralized (Green 2008). Local governments are generally reliant on conditional
grants from the central government (Lindemann 2011, 407).
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Massive redistricting has further limited the power of the LC system and
fragmented ethnic and regional political organization. From 1986 to 2019, the
number of districts in Uganda more than quadrupled from 33 to 134 (Figure 3.1).
District creation helps the regime centralize power via several avenues. New
districts create new political and administrative positions, many of which are
doled out centrally as a part of the regime’s patronage system. In 2011, Lindemann
estimated that there were more than 600,000 jobs created for local councillors and
local civil servants as a result of decentralization (Lindemann 2011, 407). Another
estimate placed the total number of political positions contested in 2016 at 1.7
million, five times the size of the civil service, including the military and approxi-
mately 4 per cent of the country’s population (Izama 2015). These numbers have
surely continued to grow as district creation has continued apace. The NRM also
devises new districts to fragment large, homogenous communities with internal
administrative divisions, thereby limiting the formation of interest groups and the
potential for coordination among them (Carbone 2008, 34). Redistricting has also
decreased the relative power of district-level officials, many of whom sit in newly
constructed district capitals with limited infrastructure and connectivity. They
also represent much smaller constituencies today than 30 years ago.
The NRM is further enmeshed with local administration through semi-official
and unofficial practices. For example, there is a widely held perception that even
village-level local councillors are beholden to the central government. Elections
for village-level LCs were not held between 2001 and 2018, nominally due to









1959 1964 1969 1974 1979 1984 1989 1994 1999 2004 2009 2014 2019



















Fig. 3.1 District creation in Uganda (1959–2019)
Note: The vertical line denotes when the NRM took power in Uganda in 1986.
Source: Green 2010; Otile 2019
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no-party system and the switch to multiparty elections—in other words, for nearly
two decades, local councillors were holdovers from the no-party era, when they
had been by default members of the NRM. Moreover, in the absence of elections,
‘political interference in council affairs by RDCs (district-level presidential
appointees) across the country [was] common’, including unilateral decisions to
replace ineffective council members in lieu of holding local elections (Lambright
2011, 26). When village-level council elections were held in 2018, they were
marred by irregularities that suggest significant efforts to maintain NRM domin-
ance in these positions.
In addition to building a weak yet resilient bureaucratic and administrative
governing structure that provides a direct line of communication between the
grassroots and the central state—and in this way, the president—the NRM has
also gone to great lengths to undermine and fragment alternative bases of political,
economic, or social power. In 1993, in a move to bolster political support from the
Baganda people, Museveni lifted the ban on kingdoms. At the same time, he
barred ‘cultural leaders’ from politics and began encouraging ethnic factions
within the kingdom to declare independence from it (Reid 2017, xxv). Since
then, violence has broken out between the military and cultural kingdoms on
multiple occasions. In 2009, government security services blocked the Kabaka
from travelling within the kingdom. Riots broke out in Kampala, with protesters
burning a police station and looting businesses. The security services responded
with force: Human Rights Watch reports that at least 40 civilians were killed
(Human Rights Watch 2012). In 2014 and 2016, conflicts broke out between the
Rwenzururu kingdom in western Uganda and the central government. Several
hundred civilians were killed, and hundreds more were arrested, detained, and
allegedly tortured at the hands of the security services (Human Rights Watch
2018). In northern Uganda, the traditional authority of the Ker Kwaro Acholi has
taken a different tact—rather than challenging the regime, it has sought to frame
itself as an ally of the government, serving as a conduit for national and foreign
development and post-conflict peacebuilding projects.¹
2. Institutionalized Arbitrariness in a Hybrid Regime
By centralizing power in a bifurcated state and solidifying the regime’s control
through coercion and incentives, Museveni and the NRM have produced a
‘hybrid’ regime, where autocracy prevails alongside democratic practices and
¹ Clare Paine notes that the NRM’s overall approach to traditional authorities has been a direct
response to its contentious relationship with the Buganda kingdom. It is within this framework that the
regime engaged with the Ker Kwaro Acholi, which she describes as a ‘commercialized’ institution that
sought to ‘position itself advantageously should traditional authorities be incorporated into the state
structure more formally, through regional tier or a federal system’ (Paine 2014, 198, 200).
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institutions. In some instances, rule of law-compliant reforms have actually served
to remove constraints on executive power. For example, in 2005, Uganda aban-
doned its no-party system to return to multipartyism, following the results of a
national referendum proposed by Parliament. Though the move appeared to be
democratizing, and followed all legal procedures, in practice it helped the NRM
further consolidate power in two ways. First, it allowed the regime to mitigate its
corrupt image by pushing out the worst offenders. Second, it helped the regime
manage dissent by threatening critics with removal from the party (and its
patronage machinery). The legislation was paired with the elimination of presi-
dential term limits, so that when Uganda became multiparty it also opened the
door to a president for life (Makara et al. 2009).
In 2018, a similar process took place, with the government seeking to both
repeal the presidential age limit and extend parliamentary term limits. MPs were
given generous sums to conduct nation-wide consultations, justifying—and
lubricating—the passage of the bill in parliament. This contentious reform
received critical media coverage. Opposition politicians appealed the bill to the
judiciary on constitutional grounds. The judiciary upheld the removal of the
presidential age limit, while denying the extension of term limits. Using legal
reform rather than executive fiat created obstacles—in parliament, the media, and
the judiciary—to the further centralization of presidential control. However, these
obstacles also helped legitimate the regime both by creating the appearance of
checks and balances and by allowing public criticism of the regime’s policies. Such
processes have helped create a veneer of legitimacy, allowing the regime to appear
more democratic than it actually was over decades.
Beyond the structural advantages that redistricting has created for the NRM
party, the cost of running for parliament, paired with elevated salaries for office
holders, has meant that many MPs needed to be re-elected to avoid bankruptcy
(Wilkins 2016). This has made them easily beholden to the regime. Intimidation
has also been rife. Opposition leader Kizza Besigye has been regularly attacked and
arrested while on the campaign trail. A former MP explained that the political
opposition faces ‘a mixture of tactics. There would be offers for bribery, positions,
and then threats to my life’ (former opposition MP, Kampala, 7 February 2018).
The former MP recalled how the government deployed the military in her
constituency during the 2016 elections:
Two days [before and after] nomination . . . the army was deployed permanently
in my constituency. They lived there. The deputy commander of the forces also
was permanently deployed there . . . we probably had more than 500 soldiers
permanently resident there. That alone would not have been sufficient [to
intimidate my supporters]. But they then meted out a lot of violence . . . the
army really wreaked havoc in my constituency. They beat people, some people
were killed. Army vehicles were moving in [my constituency] as if there was war.
OUP CORRECTED AUTOPAGE PROOFS – FINAL, 17/5/2021, SPi
    (–) 57
Then they took charge of the [vote-counting] process. Even if they intimidated
people, and beat and killed people, if they had left the EC [electoral commission]
to manage the votes, they wouldn’t have gotten me out . . . On polling day, the EC
was responsible for distributing materials. But when it came to recovering
materials, the army took over. So, the ballot boxes, the ballot papers, even the
tally centre. All of it was surrounded [by the military]. And we had soldiers
inside, pistol wielding people . . .My people could not manage it.
(Former Opposition MP, Kampala, 7 February 2018)
The regime has also employed technical and ad hoc interventions to influence
elections. For example, opposition leader Norbert Mao was prevented from
entering the 2016 parliamentary race because he was not registered to vote—
mandatory re-registration had occurred when he was out of the country for
medical care (Oyako 2015). In 2016, the government shut down mobile money
transfers and social media, nominally to prevent public unrest, and further
hampering the opposition’s ability to communicate with, pay, and mobilize its
polling agents (Khisa 2019).
Critical media coverage has been permitted in Uganda, but has taken place
against a backdrop of intimidation and manipulation. Media workers have been
charged with libel, sedition, and treason, miring them in costly and protracted
legal battles. Journalists at times report receiving anonymous calls telling them not
to investigate politically sensitive stories. The government has also implemented
costly licensing and registration fees on radio stations, particularly those that
reach rural populations, in practice excluding those who lack access to govern-
ment patronage. The Anti-Terrorism Act of 2002 stipulates that radio stations can
be closed if they host exiled political dissidents, and radio stations are required to
air any content that the government deems in the national interest. In 2018, the
government implemented a tax of 200 shillings per day for users to access social
media applications (approximately 0.06 US dollars²), which many speculated
was designed to restrict free speech and limit civic organization. Subscriptions
to services including Facebook, WhatsApp, and Twitter declined by more than
2.5 million people in the three months after the tax was imposed (Ratcliffe and
Okiror 2019).
Over the past two decades, the regime has also sought to stack the judiciary with
‘cadre judges’ who are friendly to the NRM’s agenda (Khisa 2019). For example, in
2006 and 2011, Besigye challenged the presidential election results, and—with
reports of tampering, bribery, and intimidation of judges—narrowly lost both
² Over the period of research, the exchange rate fluctuated from a high of approximately 2,500
Uganda shillings to 1 US dollar in February 2014 to a low of approximately 3,900 shillings to 1 US
dollar in March 2020. For consistency, I use an exchange rate of 3,000 shillings to 1 US dollar
throughout this book.
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appeals. The government frequently frames political opponents as rebels, trying
them for sedition or treason and draining their time and resources through
protracted legal battles (also see Chapter 4).
Museveni has proven to be a savvy and expedient politician, leveraging inter-
national norms and rhetoric to further strengthen his position. For example, in
2003 Museveni referred Uganda’s conflict with the LRA to the International
Criminal Court, making it the Court’s first case. Valerie Freeland notes that this
was, ‘a conflict within which it [the NRM government], too, committed large-scale
human rights violations . . . By inviting external scrutiny and manipulating the
investigative process, the Ugandan government received an internal seal of
approval for practices the ICC would normally punish’ (Freeland 2015, 293).
Bringing in the ICC helped revive the reputation of Uganda’s military internation-
ally and discourage Sudan from aiding the LRA insurgents (Freeland 2015). From
the elections to the legislature and the media to the justice system, the government
has manipulated regulations and incentives to strengthen its position while
narrowing the space for civic organization—all with the tacit support of foreign
donors.
2.1 Militarization of State Patronage
Over three decades of rule, Museveni has militarized state and society, modifying
patrimonial systems of distribution to further strengthen the regime’s hold on the
country. He has carefully maintained control over the military as an important
element of coercive power and resource distribution. As Roger Tangri and
Andrew Mwenda note, state security agencies have rarely been scrutinized:
Through lucrative deals involving massive overpayments, military procurement
has provided the financial wherewithal needed to fund the NRM’s political
patronage system (such as raising money for the president’s election campaign)
as well as for high ranking army officers and government officials to be awarded
personally for their loyalty to the incumbent regime.
(Tangri and Mwenda 2003, 551)
The NRM regime has long used its military network to collect and distribute
resources. For example, in 1989 the state established a parastatal called the
National Enterprises Corporation (NEC) with the stated goal of establishing an
economically self-sufficient army (Owana 2014; Reuss 2020). NEC won various
contracts with the government, including to fence and clean the airport, to
fumigate government offices, and to construct metal huts for the Ministry of
Finance, and engaged soldiers in activities as wide ranging as producing pharma-
ceuticals, textiles, and baked goods (Owana 2014).
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Rebel activity in Uganda also presented significant opportunities to orient
government spending around the military; the NRM took advantage of percep-
tions of instability and conflict to attract international assistance (Fisher 2014b).
During the LRA conflict, foreign donors invested in Uganda’s military to ensure
delivery of humanitarian aid in a war zone. As Adam Branch explains, this
provided the NRM government with an ‘internationally-grounded humanitarian
justification’ to orient government spending toward counterinsurgency infrastruc-
ture (Branch 2009, 487). Individual officers also used the war as an opportunity to
enrich themselves, which the government tacitly allowed (Mwenda 2010). Military
officers profited by providing protection for aid agencies delivering supplies to the
north, allying with business people to inflate the price of supplies, and fraudulently
collecting the salaries of dead and missing troops (Branch 2009, 487; Mwenda
2010, 48). By 2003, this problem was so severe that an estimated one-third to two-
thirds of military officers were actually ‘ghost soldiers’ (Mwenda 2010, 52).
Proxy wars—first with Sudan and later with the DRC—created new business
opportunities. In the DRC, Ugandan military officers took control of informal
trade routes, facilitating access to the DRC’s resources. Some have argued that
these ‘military shadow networks’ were closely linked to the inner circles of the
NRM, and that the wealth extracted from the DRC was used to support the regime,
financing the military and the state’s patrimonial machinery (Vlassenroot et al.
2012). For example, Museveni’s younger brother, Major General Caleb
Akandwanaho—better known as Salim Saleh—was implicated in numerous scan-
dals, including plundering the DRC’s resources, purchasing ‘junk’ helicopters and
defrauding the Ministry of Defence, mismanaging Uganda Airlines, and helping
fraudulently to acquire Uganda Commercial Bank (Asiimwe 2013, 135–6).
Museveni has put his ethnic compatriots and family members in key positions,
promoted soldiers based on loyalty, and informally shuffled officers to prevent them
from developing a following (Carbone 2008, 44–7).
Museveni has also redirected government programmes to benefit the regime’s
militarized neopatrimonial system. This is well illustrated by the regime’s
approach to Uganda’s massive agricultural extension service, called the National
Agricultural Advisory Services (NAADS). Initially developed as a private-sector
intervention, the programme received hundreds of millions of dollars from
foreign donors between 2001 and 2015. By 2009, the NAADS had been trans-
formed into a ‘loan’-giving enterprise that, as one World Bank staffer recalled,
distributed ‘political pay-off[s] in terms of support for the ruling elite’ (Kjær and
Joughin 2012, 328). In 2014, Museveni transferred the management of NAADS to
the military under his brother Saleh, in an initiative referred to as ‘Operation
Wealth Creation’ (Atibuni 2015). Museveni argued that NAADS had been corrupt
under civilian management³ and argued that employing veterans to implement
³ An external evaluation by Brookings suggests that although Museveni’s assessment may have been
accurate, it does not tell the whole story. While under civilian leadership, NAADS was used as a vehicle
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the ‘new NAADS’ would simultaneously create jobs for soldiers ‘crying of poverty’
and bring discipline to the programme (Musisi 2014). However, most soldiers lack
technical training in agriculture, which led to an assortment of new implementa-
tion challenges. Many now see the programme as a way to channel public
resources to party stalwarts and the military. The regime has pursued similar
strategies to incorporate other development programmes—for example, those
targeting youth and women—into its patronage machinery (Titeca 2014).
3. Legitimating Centralized Control through
Wars and Threats of War
3.1 The NRM as a Bulwark against Chaos
Since its inception, the NRM regime has manipulated perceptions of insecurity
and chaos to build legitimacy and popular support—at times at great cost to
civilian life. Museveni’s Bush War is often described as a ‘protracted people’s war’,
as defined by Mao Zedong. Museveni and his rebel army strategically established
bases and popular support in remote areas, drawing enemy forces into the interior
where they would be stretched thin and forced to resort to indiscriminate violence
against civilians. Pauline Bernard writes:
Museveni’s writings made clear the strategy of the guerrilla: to push the regular
army, by harassment, to reveal its real nature to the citizens. The corollary of this
is that the struggle will certainly cause a massive number of civilian casualties,
which will provoke the support of the masses. For him, the aim of such warfare
was to defend neither territory nor population, but rather to engage the state in a
paroxysm of violence and turn it over on the state. (Bernard 2017, 204)
The strategy worked: Obote responded to Museveni’s guerrilla war with a reign of
‘uncontrolled terror’ (Carbone 2008, 20). This ‘mass categorical violence’ was
intended to ‘weaken the military power of the rebels and to impose heavy costs
on the insurgents and their supporters’ (Straus 2015, 111). Compared with
Obote’s abusive and unrestrained troops, Museveni’s rebel army appeared discip-
lined, helping it gain civilian support (Carbone 2008, 20). The NRM continued to
capitalize on this narrative long after the end of its ‘people’s war’, building dozens
of memorials displaying human remains as evidence of the barbarity of Obote’s
army. These memorials have contributed to ‘scarecrow propaganda’ designed to
bolster a narrative of the NRM regime as protector and peace bearer, even though
its own tactics also contributed to the violence (Bernard 2017, 204).
for ‘well-to-do farmers’ to gain access to credit, rather than to increase yields. Thus, it is hardly
surprising that it failed on the metrics that Museveni used to condemn it (Okoboi et al. 2013, 16).
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In defending against numerous insurgencies that challenged the NRM’s early
legitimacy in the statehouse, the NRM regime extended its narrative as a force that
could either provide stability and security through its presence, or withdraw and
give way to violent chaos. Museveni’s regime has faced opposition groups
throughout the country, including the Allied Democratic Forces in the west, the
West Nile Bank Front and the Uganda National Rescue Front in the northwest,
and the Uganda People’s Army in the east (Lindemann 2011, 388). The early years
of NRM rule were consumed trying to contain these insurgencies and consolidate
power.⁴ The longest running of these conflicts, and the most infamous, was with
the LRA in the north.
3.2 Twenty Years of War: Combatting the Lord’s
Resistance Army and Pacifying the North
The government’s conflict with the LRA ebbed and flowed over 20 years. Sudanese
support for the LRA denied Museveni a quick win, and over time, it appeared that
the war in the north also had political expediencies for the Museveni regime,
attracting international aid and weakening the north as a site of political oppos-
ition (Fisher 2014b). Many Ugandans see the war through the lens of ethnically
inflected regional tensions between northerners and southerners. In Kampala,
Ugandans often blame the bellicose Acholi people who could not make peace
among themselves; in Gulu—the epicentre of the conflict and the largest urban
centre in the north—lay and educated alike recite a powerful narrative of aban-
donment and marginalization by Museveni and the NRM.
The LRA conflict began as Museveni’s army, the NRA, won Kampala and
pursued Acholi-dominated government forces as they fled north to regroup in
Sudan (Doom and Vlassenroot 1999, 9–10). The NRA launched what Branch
refers to as a ‘counterinsurgency without an insurgency’ (Branch 2011, 63),
terrorizing, torturing, and disappearing those suspected of supporting Okello or
Obote’s regimes, and looting and destroying villages. In this way, Branch argues,
the government catalysed the very resistance it had feared in the north.
After four years of fighting the LRA, the Ugandan government launched
Operation North in 1991. Operation North imposed a media blackout, initiated
massive screening operations to identify and torture rebel collaborators, and called
for the arrest (or summary execution or disappearance) of anyone who opposed
the government. During this period, the military—renamed from the NRA to the
Ugandan People’s Defence Force (UPDF) in 1995—meted out ‘killings, torture,
⁴ The regime was generally successful. Although the Allied Democratic Forces and LRA still operate
in neighbouring countries and have displaced hundreds of thousands of people (IRIN News 2010),
other insurgencies have successfully been quelled.
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looting, and rapes’ that targeted family members and even entire villages of
suspected rebels or rebel sympathizers (Branch 2011, 72). The government also
implemented a policy of mass forced displacement to isolate the rebels, cut off
civilians from lines of support, and render the population compliant (Lichtenheld
2019). By the mid-2000s, nearly everyone in the Acholi sub-region had been
forcibly displaced to camps.
After the formation of the camps, the UPDF [formerly the NRA] announced that
anyone found outside the camps would be considered a rebel and killed. While
the government euphemistically calls the camps ‘protected villages’, they are
more accurately identified as internment or concentration camps, given their
origins in forced displacement and the continued government violence used to
keep civilians from leaving. (Branch 2013, 480)
Residents of the camps were entirely dependent on humanitarian aid. Conditions
were squalid, resulting in an estimated excess mortality rate of approximately
1,000 deaths per week (Branch 2013, 481). Moreover, the Ugandan military
provided limited protection, offering the LRA rebels ample opportunities to loot
food supplies and kidnap children to bolster their ranks. In response, the govern-
ment recruited civilian militias, which were poorly trained and only marginally
effective. Massive displacement undermined social cohesion in Acholi society,
destroying livelihoods, reconfiguring gender relations, and uprooting everyday
practices (Allen and Vlassenroot 2010; Branch 2013; Mergelsberg 2012).
In 1994, the government and the LRA entered peace negotiations, which
collapsed when Museveni suddenly demanded that the rebels surrender uncon-
ditionally (Fisher 2014a). The LRA retreated to Sudan to regroup (de Waal 2004,
198). As the war continued, civilians remained caught between the government
and the rebels, with each group demanding complete loyalty. The rebels employed
new tactics designed to terrorize and catalyse fear, including amputating civilians’
lips, limbs, and ears to punish those they believed had betrayed them to the
regime.⁵ In particular, they sought to penalize those who joined the government’s
civilian militias. As the LRA’s forces dwindled and civilian support deteriorated,
the rebels relied increasingly on abduction as a mode of recruitment, targeting
youth because they were easier to kidnap and indoctrinate.⁶ Abducted youth were
⁵ Joseph Kony, the leader of the LRA, is quoted as saying: ‘If you pick up an arrow against us and we
ended up cutting off the hand you used, who is to blame? You report us with your mouth, and we cut
off your lips? Who is to blame? It is you! The Bible says that if your hand, eye or mouth is at fault, it
should be cut off ’ (Lacey 2005).
⁶ The LRA targeted abductees by age, but otherwise appeared to have no specific criteria—
abductions were found to be random according to indicators for wealth, education, and occupation
(Annan et al. 2011, 885).
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often forced to engage in extremely violent initiations, structured to ostracize
them from their communities and prevent them from trying to return home.
By the time a comprehensive peace agreement had been reached in 2006, the
north had been devastated. Homes and properties had been looted and destroyed,
leaving residents impoverished; social practices such as marriage and burials had
been suspended for years, destabilizing familial structures; an entire generation of
youth had been brought up in camps, where they had received irregular and poor
education; and civilians had experienced what Dolan describes as ‘social torture’,
including physical and psychological harms that left some unable to return to
ordinary life (Branch 2011; Dolan 2009; Finnström 2008; Porter 2017). In part due
to these excessive and sensational acts of violence, and their aftermath, northern
Uganda became a site of humanitarian intervention. Though the LRA’s leader,
Joseph Kony, never signed the 2006 peace agreement, the conflict came to an
informal end. Several years later, many of the organizations engaged in humani-
tarian aid and post-conflict reconstruction had moved on. Many displaced people
found themselves dispossessed of their land, and Gulu faced a swelling population,
ever higher levels of unemployment, and rising crime rates (Branch 2013).
Thus, in 1986, as Museveni’s rule began, the north entered two decades of civil
conflict. The conflict wreaked havoc on the economic, political, and social fabric of
communities in the north and east, decimating what had formerly been a centre of
political power in the country. The violence of the LRA war reinforced civilian
perceptions of the NRM as both aggressor and guardian—a narrative that con-
tinues to remind the public what can happen to ordinary people when big men
fight.
3.3 Civilian Militias in War and Peace
Not only in the north, but also throughout the country, the NRM government and
local communities experimented with various forms of citizen militias, both in
response to specific conflicts and as a general strategy of local security provision.
These militias include local defence units (often referred to as ‘LDUs’ and also
used as a generic name for auxiliary forces), home guards, and ‘arrow’ brigades—
so called because they were often poorly trained and poorly armed, relying on
rudimentary weapons like bows and arrows—along with training programmes
like chaka mchaka and crime preventers. During Museveni’s Bush War, the NRM
set up LDUs across the country in conjunction with Resistance Councils to help
solidify territorial control. LDUs played different roles across the country depend-
ing on the needs of Museveni’s NRA. During times of war, their roles could
include combat, capturing deserters, recruiting for Museveni’s army, and holding
territory (Rukooko 2005, 217). In times of peace, they helped gather intelligence,
police, and even support development programmes. Starting as early as 1988,
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LDUs were formed in the north to help combat rebel groups, particularly the LRA
(Branch 2011, 69). In this way, LCs and LDUs became integral components of the
state’s military apparatus in its efforts to pacify the north.
In 1991, the NRA intensified recruitment of civilian forces as a part of its anti-
insurgency campaign, Operation North. These militias were named for their
region of origin: the Arrow Brigades in Teso, Amuka (‘rhinoceros’) in Lango,
and the Elephant Brigade in Acholi (Branch 2011, 73). Rough estimates suggest
there may have been as many as 30,000 auxiliary forces in northern Uganda
during the conflict. Irregular wages paid by different ministries at different times
make it difficult to verify how many existed or how much the initiatives cost the
state. In 2008, the Minister of Defence called recruitment of civilian militias ‘not
so organized or easy’, explaining that the government ‘just called up people to
fight’ and did not keep records of their activities, or a registry of weapons
distributed to them (Janmyr 2014, 212–13). Civilian militias were also accused
of contributing to crime and violence as much as peace and security—a theme that
continues to repeat itself with Uganda’s auxiliary forces today.
These militias received little training. Though some civilians differentiated
between the militias, others saw them as one and the same. One man who had
served in the military and in LDUs explained:
The LDUs were more trained than the Home Guards. They [the LDUs] were
trained by the military and strong-hearted. But the Home Guards were just
recruited, given guns and monitored. They were fearful, because they didn’t get
enough training, and only knew how to shoot a gun. If you joined an LDU you
were more likely to get incorporated into the military. They [the Home Guards]
had a maroon colour uniform. The LDUs were light green, almost like a soldier.
You get promoted like that, from a maroon uniform to light green. Many [LDUs]
got integrated [into the UPDF]’. (Former LDU, Gulu, 30 September 2015)
Although most respondents affirm this loose hierarchy of irregular civilian mil-
itias, others describe arrow brigades, home guards, LDUs, and even non-wartime
civilian militias, like crime preventers, as interchangeable pro-government mil-
itias. Maja Janmyr reflects that ‘government authorities deliberately created a
climate of confusion when it came to the management and supervision of these
forces’ (Janmyr 2014, 219).
Confusion was not limited to distinctions among different militia groups. The
line between rebels and soldiers has also often been blurred. During the LRA war,
government soldiers reportedly dressed as rebels to loot resources; at other times,
LRA rebels worked guarding displaced persons’ camps to get on the government
payroll (Dolan 2009, 144–8). Government soldiers at times contributed to inse-
curity by harassing civilians, raping women, forcing people to conduct manual
labour, and generally extorting and humiliating the population (Dolan 2009).
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More generally, rebels have frequently been integrated into the military as part of
post-conflict settlements.
During insurgencies, civilian militias were generally framed as self-defence
initiatives that enabled the army to focus on active combat with rebel forces. In
practice, civilian forces were also sent into active combat, at times in neighbouring
countries (Janmyr 2014, 209–10). On various occasions during the LRA conflict,
the military abandoned civilian militias at the moment of confrontation, leaving
these poorly trained and poorly armed groups to defend themselves and their
communities. Government officials who had spearheaded the formation of these
civilian militias argued that it was now the people’s responsibility to fight the
remaining rebels; the NRA could ‘relax’ (Branch 2011, 73).
Though civilian militia members were often unpaid and received few direct
benefits, many were later absorbed into the military, where they could expect a
more regular salary, a uniform, and their own gun. Others continued to work
informally on and off, as they were called up. Former members of such groups,
even when inactive, constituted a pool of men ready to join the action if needed.
One colonel explained that the government relied on these auxiliary forces
because of financial constraints:
The president can raise any other force apart from regular force when he sees
the situation dictates. Such a person is subject to military law. You can call
them volunteers. [Home Guards] feed themselves at home. When they need to
provide security at a zonal level, the terrain is different, there may not be local
knowledge . . . That’s when LDUs come in . . . They are supposed to provide
zonal security and operate in larger areas. They get better and longer training.
They are composed of ex-service men, people who had the know-how. [The
government] did not have the budget to treat them as the army. But within the
budgetary constraint, you can still provide security under those arrangements.
Arrow, Amuka, Elephant . . . Those were names just to appreciate them.
(UPDF Colonel, Gulu, 29 September 2015)
Although participation was formally voluntary, many youth in northern Uganda
faced political and economic pressure to join LDUs, including accusations of
being rebel collaborators if they refused (Janmyr 2014, 211).
Militias also have been used for political ends. Groups such as the Kalangala
Action Plan, the Kiboko Squad, and the Black Mambas have intimidated and
harassed opposition politicians and their supporters during elections from 2001
on (Freedom House 2008; Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada 2003). One
citizen described the work of the Kiboko Squad in Kampala: ‘Plain clothed
operatives armed with clubs, batons and canes descended . . . and unleashed terror
beating up people indiscriminately . . . It was a pathetic spectre watching Dr
Besigye get beaten in broad-day light by stick-wielding goons as the police stood
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on watch’ (Gyezaho 2010). The police have claimed no knowledge of these
militias, despite being seen walking and talking with them in public places.
These groups are also often subsumed under the same category as LDUs—indeed,
the lines between these various militias are fuzzy at best.
3.4 The Government’s Eyes and Ears: A Project
of Human Surveillance
Across the board, respondents described a sprawling security apparatus, with
secret operatives ‘deep down’ in the villages, serving as the eyes and ears of the
state (also see Zeller 2013, 210). In addition to informal surveillance, there are also
numerous branches of formal state intelligence, including ISOs, external security
offices, and crime intelligence. The regime has also invested in some higher-tech
surveillance tools to spy on political opponents, including politicians, media, and
establishment insiders. An operation, code named Fungua Macho, meaning ‘open
your eyes’ in Swahili, sought to surveil targets in real time and collect private
information that could be used for blackmail (Privacy International 2015).
Politicians recited instances when they were tracked, intercepted, and arrested;
journalists described unidentified phone calls threatening them, even when they
published anonymously.
Nonetheless, the regime’s approaches to surveillance appear to be mainly low
tech, relying on reports from ordinary citizens and ad hoc informants. Routine
surveillance is oriented toward creating an environment of suspicion and fear that
causes people to self-police, more so than gathering and synthesizing data to target
deviant actors. An intelligence officer explained that plausible presence is key to
the success of Uganda’s approach to surveillance:
Even a senior intelligence officer will not tell you definitively where the security
starts and where it ends, who a security personnel is and who a security personnel
is not . . . in Uganda everybody can be a security operative if he so wishes. The
structure only exists on paper, but in the field we have no [fixed] structure.
(Kagoro 2015, 163)
Many respondents expressed similar views, highlighting the fluidity and perceived
omnipresence of the state’s surveillance systems. Informal surveillance actors
include those who participate in government programmes like crime preventers
and chaka mchaka. These government cadres (programme graduates) help inform
the regime about events in the most remote corners of the country (Verma 2012
and my own interviews). When asked whether secret operatives actually exist,
one sub-county official exclaimed, ‘Of course! They report to me!’ He further
elaborated:
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There are many people involved in security—there are the soldiers, the GISO
[Gombolola Internal Security Officer], the RDC [Resident District
Commissioner], the police, the crime preventers, the CMI [Chieftaincy of
Military Intelligence], the DISO [District Internal Security Officer] . . . so many
organs in the security line. They might send me to come get to know you, see
what you are doing. And you will talk to me, and then I report back. And they
will send someone behind me to watch me and make sure I am also not going
with you. And someone behind him . . . it’s a chain all the way up to him. Up to
the president. We might be talking now, and even at this moment he is hearing it
in his office. (Sub-county elected official, Pader, 17 September 2015)
According to respondents, the government’s project of human surveillance is
purposefully ad hoc and poorly defined in order to avoid capture.
An LC5 chairman linked surveillance to legacies of civil war, essential to
provide the government information on rebel movements. He said that today,
operatives continue to inform the government—not on rebels, but instead on
political opposition. Others view the local councillors themselves as state inform-
ers, framing LC chairmen as political operatives for the NRM. As Branch writes,
‘The RCs [resistance councils] and the LDUs effectively localized the state down to
the village level, and this diffuse security apparatus became, in the eyes of some,
the tool of the state, the NRM, the NRA, and the south, all at once’ (Branch 2011,
69). Others have described LCs as the regime’s eyes and ears (B. Jones 2009, 65, 85;
Finnström 2008, 94–7). Because local security initiatives typically report to the
village-level LC as well as the police, they are often seen as an extension of this
structure. In this way, the legacy of the NRM as a liberation movement continues
to shape the regime’s approach to security as part of a political agenda as much as
a public service.
3.5 The Work of the West: Aiding Regime Resilience
Despite increasingly authoritarian tendencies, the Museveni regime has main-
tained strong ties to the international community. Foreign funding has regularly
accounted for an estimated half of the state’s budget,⁷ and under Museveni,
Uganda has accrued as much as 20 billion US dollars in development assistance,
an unknown amount of classified military aid, and 4 billion US dollars in debt
relief (Epstein 2017). Museveni’s ability to attract foreign investment is attributed
not just to his promises to stabilize and democratize Uganda, but especially to his
⁷ Sjögren’s estimate is between 40 and 50 per cent (Sjögren 2013, 7), while Fisher notes that between
1992 and 2005, donors financed between 50 and 60 per cent of Uganda’s national budget (Fisher
2014b, 321).
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early willingness to implement neoliberal economic reforms, such as structural
adjustment and austerity measures. These interventions coincided with high rates
of economic growth and Uganda was quickly dubbed a ‘donor darling’ (Green
2010, 86). As the international community became increasingly invested in
Uganda as a development success in the heart of Africa, it turned a blind eye to
the absence of reforms in the political sphere.
Over the years, Museveni and his allies have strategically framed and reframed
Uganda as a site of intervention in response to changing donor interests in order
to maximize aid flows. The regime has demonstrated its ability to make the most
of a highly fragmented aid economy, with actors including United Nations
agencies, bilateral donors, private philanthropic organizations, and religious
groups offering grants for different and at times contradictory programmes. As
political scientist Anders Sjögren notes, Museveni’s regime has, broadly speaking,
been able to turn the many and sometimes competing interventions to its own
ends. For example, by implementing neoliberal economic reforms, the regime
elevated development NGOs while marginalizing unions and cooperatives. In this
way, it fragmented alternative bases of economic and political power and helped
consolidate the regime’s political base (Sjögren 2013, 242). Policies of privatiza-
tion, also recommended by the International Monetary Fund, created new oppor-
tunities for political elites and allies of the NRM to acquire state-owned assets at
favourable rates—both cementing loyalty to the regime and creating private
wealth that could be ploughed back into the NRM’s political operations (Tangri
and Mwenda 2008).
By the time donors began requesting civil society reforms in the mid-1990s, the
regime was in a position to strategically engage civil society actors who were close
to the NRM state (Sjögren 2013, 237). Stressing a division between development
and politics, the regime shielded key issues and institutions from popular partici-
pation. In 2006 and 2016, the government passed laws to increase its ability to
intervene in the NGO sector. The laws specify that any act deemed harmful to the
state’s ‘security, interest, or the dignity of its people’ is punishable by fines and up
to three years in prison, though they do not define what constitutes such an
offence (Goitom 2016, internal citations omitted). Because the sector is generally
loosely regulated, the reforms allow the NRM to selectively curtail NGO activities.
Critics suggest that these new laws have a chilling effect, particularly on civil
society organizations (Attiah 2015).
After the 9/11 terrorist attacks, the priorities of Uganda’s main donors—
especially the US, which has accounted for between 20 and 30 per cent of
Uganda’s official development assistance since 2008—shifted significantly to
focus on regime stability and fighting the War on Terror. Political scientist
Jonathan Fisher has documented how Uganda managed its international image
to maximize development and military assistance during the post-9/11 years,
narrating itself as simultaneously fragile and strong. On the one hand, the regime
OUP CORRECTED AUTOPAGE PROOFS – FINAL, 17/5/2021, SPi
    (–) 69
regularly characterized itself as prone to instability from ongoing insurgencies on
the peripheries of the country. On the other hand, it also framed itself as capable of
rebuilding and putting aid dollars to good use. This seemingly contradictory
approach facilitated the procurement of billions of dollars in international assist-
ance, much of which has been used to strengthen the military, enrich elites, and
bolster systems of patronage, while allowing the regime to avoid condemnation
for its own transgressions (Fisher 2014b, 317).
Uganda made an easy military ally for the US. The regime waged a proxy war
on Islamic Khartoum by offering safe haven to the rebel movement the Sudan
People’s Liberation Army throughout the 1990s. Uganda was one of the first
countries to join US president George W. Bush’s ‘coalition of the willing’ in the
War on Terror (Schifferes 2003) and the first to join the African Union Mission in
Somalia, to which it contributed more troops than any other member country.
Ugandan officials ‘emphasized that Somalia was the region’s frontline in the US-
led “global war on terrorism” ’ (Williams 2018, 175). These contributions in
support of American interests secured military training, financing, and equip-
ment, especially from the US, but also from the United Kingdom and France
(Williams 2018, 175). Museveni began to frame not just rebel groups like LRA but
also his political rivals as threats to the regime, calling them ‘terrorists’ and ‘Arab
fundamentalists’ who sought to undermine regional security. He secured further
military support from the US to catch and kill the LRA leader, Kony, who
Museveni now alleged was linked to al-Qaeda (Fisher 2014a). This mission
remained unachieved as of 2020, with Kony still at large. In addition to increased
military aid, the cooperation between Uganda and the US offered clear political
benefits for Museveni. Donors willingly overlooked Uganda’s ballooning military
budget, despite evidence that funds were being channelled into a project of regime
maintenance.
While much of the aid to Uganda has been legitimately directed toward the
regime’s goals, significant funds have also been diverted to private pockets
through illicit activities. For example, in 2005 and 2006, government ministers
were implicated in a scam that siphoned off millions of dollars from the Global
Fund to Fight Aids, Tuberculosis and Malaria and the Global Alliance for
Vaccines and Immunization. After Uganda’s 2006 elections, three of the impli-
cated ministers were temporarily removed from their positions, only to be
reappointed to new government positions. In 2011, the National Drug
Authority reported over 100 ‘ghost’ health centres that had been regularly ‘receiv-
ing’ medical supplies and equipment (Human Rights Watch 2013). In 2012, the
Office of the Prime Minister was implicated in the embezzlement of 12.7 million
US dollars that was designated to rebuild war-torn northern Uganda and the
impoverished Karamoja region.
Corruption in the military—particularly in procurement—has also been rife, as
elaborated earlier in this chapter. Because military budgets are classified, there has
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been ample opportunity to hide pay-outs. Helen Epstein reports that a draft of a
2004 World Bank report found that Museveni diverted 23 per cent of all discre-
tionary funding to classified military budgets—a detail that she writes was omitted
from the final published report (Epstein 2017). Other ways in which money has
been fraudulently redirected include loan forgiveness, ghost entities, manipulation
of tax enforcement, and rigged legal suits against the government for pay-outs
(Tangri and Mwenda 2008).
In addition to corruption and embezzlement that have helped the NRM
consolidate an elite coalition, funds are also siphoned into the regime’s militarized
neopatrimonial political economy to trickle down to local communities. At
election time, the regime has used gifts to mobilize the population to vote—such
as generous donations to village savings and loan groups or grants for public
works. It has also used promise of largess to demobilize segments of the popula-
tion, for example, via the Crime Preventer programme, which offered small gifts
and one-off payments to tens of thousands of young men to ‘work’ providing
security on election day (see Chapter 6). Despite widespread corruption, those
who embezzle are always at risk of select enforcement of anti-corruption laws,
though prosecutions are almost exclusively made at a technocratic level.⁸ For
example, in 2016, presidential candidate Amama Mbabazi faced smear campaigns
for his role in the 2012 embezzlement scandal.
4. Uganda’s Fragile and Resilient Infrastructural Power
This brief history of Museveni’s Uganda depicts a regime that has striven to
consolidate control over a bifurcated state, torn by cycles of political violence
that themselves are undergirded by ethnicized and regionalized tensions.
Museveni has pursued a strategy of regime survival guided by strategic pragma-
tism. Over the past three decades, Museveni and his NRM have artfully merged
party and state. This state–party hybrid has been militarized and operates along-
side numerous competing authorities with poorly defined and often overlapping
mandates. The creation of multiple and parallel security and governance struc-
tures has made it difficult to attribute authority or responsibility to any individual
or institution. Civilian security actors have continued to operate at the boundary
between state and society, carrying the burden of local security without the
attendant benefits accorded to formal state security actors. These processes have
been funded, both directly and indirectly, by massive amounts of foreign aid,
enabling the Ugandan state to use incentives and coercion in equal measure.
⁸ In 2013, Human Rights Watch reported that in Uganda only one minister was ever convicted of a
corruption-related offence and this was overturned on appeal (Human Rights Watch 2013).
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This environment has produced confusion: it is difficult to decipher who is
working for whom, and the stakes of any given action are unclear. Moreover, the
NRM regime is understood as both a bulwark against the political, economic, and
social crises of the past, and an actor with the potential to create its own chaos, as
illustrated by numerous well-documented and well-publicized instances of arbi-
trary, unrestrained, and unaccountable state violence, both during wartime and
relative peace. During my research, even in the north of the country, there was a
popular narrative that the NRM brought peace and stability to Uganda. It appears
that Museveni arrived at this fragile form of governance through decades of
tactical decisions that fragmented alternative loci of power to ensure the main-
tenance of his regime. This approach to governance has surprisingly resiliencies.
An image of the regime as capricious and powerful reaches into even remote and
rural locales, causing citizens to uphold and reinforce the power of the NRM even
in its absence.
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4
Violence, Sovereignty, and the Uganda
Police Force
In 2014, the Uganda Police Force celebrated its centennial under the banner ‘From
Colonial Policing to Community Policing’. Kale Kayihura, then the inspector
general of police (IGP), declared: ‘There are visible achievements, and more,
recently transformation of the Police institution, and policing as a system, away
from the repressive type of police introduced by the colonial regime to a pro-
people, accountable, disciplined institution, with modern capabilities to deal with
modern day crime and security threats’ (Okuda 2014). A newspaper article
covering the event went on to note:
The celebrations come at the peak of bitter criticism of police’s record; the Force
celebrates with bruises on their public image with reports by human rights
watchdogs and Inspectorate of Government pinning the institution for wanton
corruption and gross human rights violation . . . The police has also come under
attack for the brutality meted out especially on citizens with dissenting political
views. (Okuda 2014)
Particularly under the leadership of Kayihura, who headed the police from 2005 to
2018, the Uganda Police Force became increasingly militarized and politicized.
Kayihura had fought alongside Museveni to overthrow the Obote regime in the
1980s, and was sometimes referred to as Museveni’s ‘blue-eyed boy’ (Kagoro 2015,
172). Under his tenure, the police oversaw the roll-out and implementation of the
Crime Preventer programme, shepherded political candidates from rally to rally,
and dispersed opposition political gatherings with roadblocks, tear gas, and
ammunition.
Yet the story of the Uganda Police is not a black-and-white narrative of
predation, corruption, and violence. In a survey conducted in the Acholi sub-
region of northern Uganda in 2015, 86.5 per cent of respondents reported that
police were present in their community, while 76 per cent of those said that police
sometimes or always provided the security that their household needed.¹ Those
who reported experiencing a violent crime also said they reported to the police
¹ Author’s analysis of the Secure Livelihoods Research Consortium 2015 Uganda survey.
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more than any other public authority. These numbers may not instil overwhelm-
ing confidence, especially when compared to measures of trust in other authorities
such as the LC1, traditional authorities, and vigilante groups. However, they
indicate a complex story—one in which the police simultaneously represent
corruption and power, malpractice and access to justice.
This chapter focuses on the Uganda Police and its role in how Uganda’s NRM
regime destabilizes and restabilizes the distinction between lawful and exceptional
violence. This produces citizens’ perceptions that the state has capacity to deploy
unaccountable and overwhelming violence—the first factor of institutionalized
arbitrariness. Sometimes the distinction between lawful and exceptional violence
is defined and pronounced. When it is, some citizens experience due process and
the rule of law, while others might be subject to acts of exceptional violence like
disappearance, torture, and arbitrary detention. At other times, the regime
threatens to collapse the distinction between lawful and exceptional violence.
For example, the regime frequently raises the spectre of civil war, intimating the
immanent return of violent conflict and the creation of anarchy in which anyone
could claim authority to use violence. Additionally, the distinction between those
who have authority to use violence and those who do not is sometimes erased by
invocations of constitutional provisions that require all able-bodied citizens to
undergo military training and comprise a reserve force prepared to defend the
nation. More often, lawful and exceptional violence are mixed together in novel
and unpredictable ways, such that citizens are unsure which one they are experi-
encing. This occurs, for instance, when the regime uses law to veil the use of
overwhelming and unaccountable force.
Political theory recognizes the state’s capacity for exceptional violence as
foundational to governance and state formation. I use the term exceptional
violence to refer to violence that can suspend the legal order in a certain place,
at a certain time, or for certain people (Agamben 1998; Schmitt 2005). This is akin
to what Sharon Hutchinson terms ‘governing violence’—or ‘the demonstrated
power to kill with impunity [and] to declare such acts void of all social, moral, and
spiritual consequences for their perpetrators’ (Hutchinson 1998, 58). In a state of
exception, the sovereign can use violence with impunity, unrestrained by law, and
without moral consequence. It is from this place of exception that legal order can
be established, distinguishing lawful violence (which enforces the legal order)
from exceptional violence (which suspends the legal order). The state’s capacity
for exceptional violence anchors ordinary political life and social order.
The concept of exception has been used to explain the role of violence in liminal
spaces, such as refugee camps (Agamben 2000; Turner 2005), prisons (Sen 2018),
checkpoints (Tawil-Souri 2011), and borders (R. Jones 2009), or at abnormal
times, such as during natural disasters (Fassin and Vasquez 2005) or times defined
by new security threats (Scheppele 2004). Others have noted amalgams of excep-
tional and lawful violence. Fleur Johns examines how exceptional acts of violence
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at Guantanamo Bay detention camp are actually highly regulated practices occur-
ring in well-defined legal spaces; rather than being radically separated from law,
they are enmeshed in administrative rules and procedure (Johns 2005).
Exceptionality can also become the norm. Tobias Hagmann and Benedikt Korf
show that Ethiopia’s Ogaden border region has been governed as an exceptional
space since at least imperial rule, where law is conflated with lawlessness
(Hagmann and Korf 2012). In her study of the 2008 US financial crisis,
Jacqueline Best describes how exceptionalism is integrated into bureaucratic
practices in political economy, showing that radical suspension of the law is not
restricted to liminal or securitized spaces (Best 2017). As these collective works
illustrate, lawful and exceptional violence can be combined in various complex
arrangements to govern diverse aspects of life.
Policing often combines lawful and exceptional violence, frequently reflecting
historical inheritance. For instance, colonial police in sub-Saharan Africa were
established not to protect native populations, but to control them—and they were
often given complete discretion to do so (Oloka-Onyango 1990). Similarly, in
Latin America, many police were tasked with suppressing organized labour to
keep wages low to preserve domestic and foreign business interests (Macaulay
2012, 167). Latin American police forces were heavily militarized with support
from foreign donors, particularly the US, in a bid to police narcotics, further
facilitating unaccountable and lethal policing practices. Across many African
states, contemporary police forces remain accountable to the executive—not
civil society—continuing the legacy of colonial policing practices (Hills 2007).
Much like in other cases, in Uganda the colonial police enforced laws with
criminal and quasi-military sanctions, often employing direct and unfettered
violence. The police continued this trajectory after independence, serving as a
tool of societal repression and often going beyond their formally conferred man-
date (Oloka-Onyango 1990). In its early days, the NRM sought to professionalize
the police, accepting assistance from foreign donors as diverse as the United
Kingdom, Egypt, and North Korea (Musiime 2012). In the 1990s, the United
Kingdom’s Department for International Development spent 4 million pounds
to restore the capacity of the Uganda police after Amin’s rule (Raleigh et al. 1998).
Many projects sought to ‘modernize’ police training, introducing concepts like
community policing, human rights, and gender into curricula (Munanura 2007,
79). Between 2007 and 2013, the Dutch embassy contributed half a million euros to
fight police corruption (Wagner et al. 2019), and organizations including Irish Aid
and the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees donated equipment and
sponsored human rights training (Arim 2005; Irish Aid 2013). Despite domestic
and international efforts to professionalize Uganda’s police force, the NRM—like
its predecessors—soon reverted to a politicized security apparatus.
The regime’s continued reliance on the police to repress dissent has been shown
to undermine public support for the police. For instance, Travis Curtice’s research
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has found that when the Uganda police deploy extra-legal violence it creates fear
among the public (Curtice 2019b). My work shows how, when the police combine
extra-legal and legal violence in inconsistent and irregular ways, it causes citizens
to self-police in particular in terms of political mobilization and claim-making,
thereby contributing to the regime’s hold on power.
The Uganda Police Force offers a rich case for examining how dynamism in the
imagined opposition between lawful and exceptional violence contributes to
arbitrary governance. Instances of exceptional violence remind citizens of the
chaos that the state could unleash—or allow others to unleash if it suddenly
withdrew—as well as the lawful violence that state institutions deploy to discipline
citizens as modern subjects. The regime’s liberation narrative frames political
opposition and rebel groups alike as existential threats to the state, invoking a
state of exception. At the same time, this narrative is used to warn citizens of the
state’s fragility and proximity to civil war, thereby threatening the collapse of a
meaningful division between lawful and exceptional violence. As a result, the
possibility of unaccountable state violence infuses interactions with state author-
ities, particularly in matters of security and governance. This threat supports a
commonly held perception that the regime has the capacity to create and elimin-
ate extra-legal spaces, and to intervene in or ignore localized violent conflict. This
strategy of arbitrary and unpredictable deployment of overwhelming violence—as
both sword and shield—means that even a regime that is unable to fully police its
territory can project its power over time and space.
The remainder of this chapter looks at the relationship between violence and
the state in Uganda, showing how the regime’s liberation narrative, militarization,
and fragmentation contribute to destabilizing the distinction between lawful and
exceptional violence. It then examines a violent confrontation between the police
and community in a town in northern Uganda, and uses this to further analyse
how fluidity in the opposition between lawful and exceptional violence contributes
to arbitrary governance.
1. Politics, Violence, and the State
Three decades after Museveni and his rebel army marched into Kampala to seize
power, the NRM continues to invoke its origins as a vanguardist liberation
movement in order to legitimate its rule. During the Bush War, which would
eventually bring Museveni to power, the NRM’s military wing claimed to free
Ugandans from the tyranny of past regimes. To do so, it initiated and perpetuated a
war that itself claimed the lives of hundreds of thousands of civilians. Museveni’s
rebels were also accused of committing their own acts of violence against civilians,
and some alleged that they adopted the guise of their opponents to do so (Dolan
2009; also see Chapter 3). The liberation narrative, combined with ongoing conflict
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and militarization, continues to foreground the violent capacity of the NRM and
frame its security services as simultaneously a source of safety and danger.
After taking power, the NRM continued to fight rebel groups that it has
narrated as threatening the very existence of the state. In northern Uganda, the
conflict between the LRA andMuseveni’s NRM regime allowed the government to
repeatedly demonstrate its capacity to both protect citizens from violence and
expose them to it. Internationally, the regime leveraged the conflict to gain favour
and paint itself as a bulwark against what Museveni once called ‘Satan’s Resistance
Army’ (Finnström 2010, 74). In the northeast of the country, the government’s
forcible disarmament campaign of the Karamojong still looms large in civilian
imaginations, with men young and old recalling torture at the hands of govern-
ment soldiers. In the west, the government has long fought the Allied Democratic
Forces (ADF), which it has framed as ‘a terrorist group that poses an existential
threat to the country’. This framing has enabled the regime to ‘rationalize arrests
and acts of torture, to assign blame for unsolved murders and to slander oppos-
ition politicians’ (Titeca and Fahey 2016, 1194–5).
NRM elites have intimated that a transition in power would return the country
to civil war. For example, during electoral campaigns the NRM has regularly
published photographs of war memorials that feature the skulls of some of the
estimated 300,000 Ugandans killed by the Obote regime in the 1980s, when it was
fighting Museveni and his rebel outfit (Bernard 2017). In 2016, an NRM official
defended the advertisements in response to public outcry: ‘The use of these war
skulls should not scare anybody since it is a historical fact. We are only reminding
the country that poor choice in the coming election can take the country back to
war’ (Wandera and Kolyangha 2016). The campaign advertisement, as well as the
NRM official’s response, historicizes civilian experiences of state violence, empha-
sizes the government’s capacity to both prevent and perpetrate violence, and
highlights the integral role of the security forces in maintaining order. Using a
similar logic, the regime frequently frames members of the opposition as terror-
ists, rebels, or traitors—categories of people against whom excessive violence is
warranted, and whose aims fundamentally threaten the very existence of the state.
My respondents widely shared the view that military might is necessary to
maintain power and hold the country together. A young man, who had served as a
military contractor with Americans in Iraq, elaborated this viewpoint:
To lead Ugandans, you must be a soldier. People are traumatised. They need a
military to defend the government and maintain order . . . Obama was an ex-
soldier. Obote—he wasn’t a soldier. How can you control someone who can
control you? . . . It is important to have ambition and be focused—if you’re too
relaxed, then I can now be the president. In order to control the whole nation, it
is not easy. It is not easy to punish law-breakers.
(Young man, Anaka, 24 September 2015)
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The narrative connecting militarism with power was so strong for this young man
that he was confident that Barack Obama must have had this qualification to be
president of the US. The NRM encourages such assessments, warning Ugandans
that if Museveni is forced from power conflict ‘could easily re-unfold’ (Kagoro
2015, 94). One man, in his mid-40s, explained his support for the NRM:
I joined the NRM a long time ago . . . In 1987, people were dying a lot. Many
people were dragged to Luzira [Prison] . . . They took me and many people very
far into the bush, but I didn’t die. I became mentally disturbed due to being hit on
the head. I stayed long without help from the government. So I say, let this
government not be changed while we’re still alive. When Amin was chased, so
many people were killed—if you came from Madi [in West Nile], then they just
killed you. It’s retaliation. I don’t want anything [to change in government] until
I die. I don’t want my child to pay for my funeral.
(Male community member, Gulu, 28 September 2015)
The respondent recounts how historically, chaos and war have accompanied
transitions in state power. These are fundamentally constitutional moments,
when the settlement between lawful and exceptional violence is renegotiated.
Another respondent, a senior member of the police force, explained:
[Museveni has] taken 30 years, [we] know what the backbone [of the state] is . . .
If another group got another chance [to rule the country], it would also exter-
minate another group. It’s as dangerous as an earthquake. It could crack. They
are using strong glue—the forces—the military and the police. That is what keeps
it glued together. Every dog would bite.
(Senior member of police force, Soroti, 29 January 2018)
One district-level politician further reflected that this violent political history
has permeated the imaginations of Ugandans:
Museveni in his own ways of doing things—the time he has been around, the war
he fought in this country and so on . . . he has infiltrated the minds of the people
here such that you cannot start a system which will avoid him completely
for now. (District-level politician, Gulu, 17 September 2015)
According to Afrobarometer’s 2015 survey, almost 40 per cent of respondents in
the north agreed or strongly agreed that there should be no constitutional limit on
how long the president should serve—nearly as high as the 42 per cent in western
Uganda where Museveni is from.² This level of acceptance for the regime is high in
² In comparison, about 20 per cent in the central region, 16 per cent in Kampala, and 25 per cent in
the east agreed or strongly agreed with the proposition.
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a region known as anti-NRM. These numbers tentatively support the view that
prolonged violent conflict during and after regime transition have pacified the
population.
1.1 Amplifying Violent Potential through the Militarization
of State and Society
Uganda’s police force must be understood in relation to the security sector more
broadly, especially because of their interlocking and overlapping mandates. The
military and the police have been described as ‘functionally fused’ due to rotating
personnel, shared training, and overlapping mandates (Kagoro 2015, 171). Over
nearly two decades, Museveni appointed soldiers to head the police force, notably
General Kale Kayihura, who served from 2005 until 2018. Kayihura joined
Museveni’s Bush War in 1982 and was widely seen as Museveni’s right-hand man.
A political analyst in Kampala explained that while Kayihura led the police, it was
difficult to knowwhether policy decisions came fromKayihura orMuseveni because
the line between them was ‘too thin’ (Political analyst, Kampala, 11 March 2015).
During his tenure, Kayihura transformed the police into a political tool for the
NRM regime. A veteran police officer described how Kayihura recruited party
loyalists to the Police Force who he quickly promoted through the ranks. At the
same time, he divided the command structure to create competing units so no one
could become too powerful:
When the IGP [inspector general of police Kayihura] came, he was so supportive
of the government . . . [at that time] the voting in the barracks was not good [for
the NRM]. He started transforming it. He has created all those directorates and
departments for his own interests. That’s where he can put his boys. There can
even be counter groups to other traditional departments. He started transform-
ing it, one, by massive recruitment of officers . . . And then after massively
recruiting them, bringing them up and putting them in the command structure.
And then now splitting the departments to have specific departments which are
for regime sustenance. You know? Very strong! You come out for a demonstra-
tion, they are there! They want you from court, they are there. With an AK-47
and no uniform. (Veteran police officer, 29 January 2018)
The veteran police officer noted that Kayihura’s police were used to suppress the
public, at demonstrations and in court. They were heavily armed even while
wearing civilian clothes, highlighting that when they acted outside of their man-
date as police, it was difficult to hold them accountable. He went on to explain that
many of Uganda’s police admire the military and see it as a mark of pride to be
mistaken for a soldier:
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In Uganda, it is very prestigious [for a police officer] to be mistaken to be a
soldier. [When community members say] ‘That policeman seems to be a solider’,
it is pride! The young generation likes it. They don’t want to be honourable civil
police officers. Officers shoot to kill—we [police] kill, but it should be the last
resort. But for them [the new generation], they want it.
(Veteran police officer, 29 January 2018)
An NGO employee based in Gulu asserted that it is often impossible to tell the
difference between police officers and soldiers since they don each other’s uni-
forms interchangeably. The fact that ordinary citizens are at times integrated into
elite units—and that officers at times wear civilian dress—further perpetuates
confusion. Members of both institutions also receive similar military training
(Kagoro 2015, 170–82).
Militarization extends to society, further blurring lines about who can deploy
state violence and under what circumstances, while foregrounding the state’s
coercive resources. For example, the stated aim of Uganda’s flagship military
training programme for civilians—chaka mchaka—is to ‘demystify the gun’.
Verma explains how this reinforced public perceptions of the state’s monopoly
on the use of armed force:
the gun was ‘demystified’ and ‘democratized’ in language, but in practice it was
definitely still not for everybody to use, just as its alleged mystery might not be
equally mysterious to all . . . [G]un in hand (and with us), you may be ‘inside’, you
may be safe from fear. A move towards the right end of the gun barrel so as to not
remain ‘target’. (Verma 2012, 117)
In 1996, the interim electoral commission suspended chaka mchaka in
response to international concerns that the programme was a tool for indoctrin-
ating the public to support the NRM. However, Museveni later reinstated the
programme as a part of a strategy to ‘consolidate stability’ in Uganda. Chaka
mchaka took on an ‘increasingly compulsory character’ and was used to help
mobilize support for the NRM before the 2001 elections, particularly in the
southern and western parts of the country (Verma 2012, 63–4). In 2007, after
members of parliament went on a five-day retreat where they donned fatigues and
participated in drills, a law to make military training compulsory for all able-
bodied civilians was proposed (The Monitor 2007).³ In a context where citizens
can be mobilized as militia to protect the state against threats—and any political
³ The retreat was held at the National Leadership Institute Kyankwanzi. In 2012, Museveni ordered
that the Institute be turned into a directorate under the State House, reportedly reasoning that, ‘given
the central role of Kyankwanzi in inculcating values of patriotism and nationalism in the country, it was
prudent that the institute be taken to his office’. The move sparked debate about whether the taxpayer-
supported institute was being co-opted by the NRM (Mugerwa 2012).
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challenge can be justified as such—military training takes on a particularly
powerful role in shaping citizens’ perceptions of their identity in relation to the
state (also see Chapter 6).
Political power in Uganda is fused with militarism, something Kagoro has called
a ‘warriorised field of power’ (2015, 123).⁴ In my interviews, opposition politicians
spoke positively about military training for civilians and politicians, explaining
that it instils discipline and order in society. Government spokespeople also
suggested in general terms that chaka mchaka training and the more recent
Crime Preventer programme would make civilians more employable, giving
them access to government jobs (Verma 2012, 5; Kagoro 2015, 203). Such prom-
ises further contribute to the symbolic and material value of militarism. Today, the
perceived link between the military, the regime, and the state is strong enough that
even wearing military boots signals allegiance to the NRM and links to state power.
1.2 ‘The Multiplicity of Things’ and the Creation
of ‘Total Confusion’
Under Museveni’s rule, the security sector has become increasingly fragmented
and complex, in large part through the formation of new units and sub-units
within the Uganda Police Force, as well as the creation of parallel and auxiliary
forces, that are assigned overlapping and contradictory mandates.⁵ Moses Khisa
(2013) notes the many parallel security agencies—by his count, 14 different
security agencies and 13 discrete auxiliary forces. These do not include the
Police Field Force, an elite unit within the police force intended to ‘enhance the
overall defence capabilities of Uganda’ (Statehouse of Uganda 2014) or the Crime
Preventer programme, which was initially a community policing initiative and
later brought under the ambit of the military as a reserve force (Kasasira 2018;
Statehouse of Uganda 2016).
In practice, many groups have similar roles and responsibilities, and their
personnel are frequently reshuffled. Many have commented that there is little if
⁴ By ‘warriorized’, Kagoro means that Ugandans are ‘accustomed to military figures in politics and
to military means as a medium to political power . . . there seems to be a deeply entrenched shared
perception that attaches a high sociopolitical value to the military . . . [and] the military and its
associated ethos such as uniform, gun, rank, training, and participation in war appear to have become
a source of symbolic capital’ (Kagoro 2015, 123). Militarization is a key dimension of how the ruling
regime controls material and symbolic access to violence.
⁵ This is also the case in non-security-related sectors. A report derived from an ISO-funded
investigation, which was leaked to the public in December 2017, identified significant areas of
duplicated or overlapping functions among ministries and agencies within the government. The
Daily Monitor cited agricultural inputs as an example, noting that the National Agricultural
Advisory Services, National Agricultural Research Organisation, Uganda Coffee Development
Authority, Ministry of Agriculture, National Forestry Authority, Uganda Prisons, KCCA, Kyambogo
University, State House, Ministry of Education, Uganda Police, and Office of the Prime Minister were
all supplying agricultural inputs or materials (Kahungu 2017).
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any meaningful difference among various security actors. One local politician who
worked closely with the community policing programme in Gulu explained, ‘The
government has brought all these [auxiliary forces] to confuse the community.
Sometimes these people [e.g. crime preventers, police, civilian militias] work in
parallel. You don’t understand who is who’ (Local politician, Gulu, 16 September
2015). Another retired cabinet member explained:
It is there in the system to undermine people. Let me tell you: our president
doesn’t trust anybody. When we were ministers in the cabinet, we would have
parallel ministers. There is minister of justice—boys inside there responsible for
each aspect—each area or field. So, because of lack of trust [by Museveni], you
have to have different people here and there, here and there. It is all to undermine
people. Our government is not about people, it’s about sustainability in power . . .
There are multiple centres of power. The military is fighting with police. There is
no central authority. (Retired cabinet member, Kampala, 9 February 2018)
Many of my respondents expressed the view that fragmentation is intended to
prevent any one actor or institution from gaining too much power. Multiplication
of duties means that no individual is indispensable. A former government com-
missioner explained:
I think that’s why government has survived for long. You create different units
which bring in different information and so on, so you don’t have all your power
in one unit. If that one unit collapses then you are finished. If you have different
systems then you can play them off each other—that one is telling you that, the
other [is telling you] another thing.
(Former government commissioner, Mbarara, 18 January 2018)
Kayihura exemplified this strategy in his work as IGP. The Observer newspaper
reported that ‘If he fell out with a particular director . . . Kayihura would create a
parallel department . . . Kayihura’s almost weekly reshuffles and deployments of
officers also injected a heavy dose of confusion in the force’ (Mukasa 2018). The
complexity of these networks makes it difficult for ordinary citizens to know who
is who and who is responsible for what. Moreover, different units inform on one
another, as well as on the population, creating widespread suspicion that weakens
social and political relations.
Further confusion arises when one branch of government supersedes another.
For example, in 2005, a paramilitary force dubbed the ‘Black Mambas’ waited
outside the High Court in Kampala to detain 14 members of the political oppos-
ition who had just received bail (Ross 2005). In response, the head of the high
court, Judge James Ogoola, said, ‘The court witnessed the most naked and
grotesque violation of the twin doctrines of the rule of law and the independence
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of the judiciary’ (Vasagar 2005). The identity of the men—who wore black
T-shirts—was unclear. While the army claimed they were part of the anti-
terrorism unit, the same men were reportedly seen the following day at court
wearing police uniforms (Ross 2005). While it appears that significant acts of
violence conducted in public view must be backed by the regime, the mixing of
military and civilian symbols creates doubt. When such operatives wear police
uniforms and use legal doctrine to justify their activities, it shows that the regime
can also stretch the law to disguise exceptional violence. When dressed in civilian
attire, such operatives demonstrate the regime’s ability to deny its responsibility,
and also foster the perception that anyone could be a part of these operations.
1.3 Ambiguity between Lawful and Exceptional Violence
Police violence often exceeds the law; however, the regime has also used the law to
justify its interventions. In 2013, the government passed the Public Order
Management Act (POMA), which prohibits gatherings without notifying the
police at least three but no more than 15 days beforehand. Before, during, and
after the 2016 elections, the police used POMA to justify the violent dispersal of
events organized by opposition political parties, as well as the arrest and detention
of participants. Political candidates are also required by law to travel with a police
convoy, nominally for their own protection. Heavy-handed responses are both
common and plausibly legal in such scenarios.⁶ The police often use live or rubber
bullets to disperse riots, protests, or crowds. In 2017–18, the Uganda Police Force
budgeted 44 billion shillings for purchasing tear gas out of an annual budget of
505 billion shillings (Tajuba 2017).
These laws are frequently enforced against Museveni’s political opponents.
Museveni’s long-time rival, Kizza Besigye, has been charged with treason and
rape; he has been tear-gassed, beaten, and held under house arrest. When former
prime minister and long-time NRM loyalist Amama Mbabazi challenged
Museveni in 2016 presidential elections, he became the focus of the police.
Moses Khisa explains that when
Mbabazi was due to address a series of consultative meetings on 10 July, there
was massive police and military deployment. There were reports of intimidation
and threats against those involved in organizing the meetings and owners of
booked meeting-venues, including hotels. For example, the manager of Mbale
⁶ POMA notes that the duty of the police includes ‘preserving law and order’ giving the open-ended
provision for police to ‘disperse defiant or unruly crowds or individuals at a public meeting in order
to prevent violence, restore order and preserve the peace’ (Public Order Management Act 2013, Part III,
9(1)(f)).
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Resort Hotel, Isaiah Weboya, told the Daily Monitor newspaper that ‘he would
not host Mr. Mbabazi because he feared for both his own security and that of his
job’. (Khisa 2016, 737)
Mbabazi was detained and charged with ‘disobeying lawful orders’ and warned
that because his party (at that time, still the NRM) had not endorsed him, his
consultations would be ‘deemed illegal meetings’. Supporters were allegedly har-
assed and arrested across the country; Mbabazi’s financial assets were reportedly
frozen and his potential funders in the business community were intimidated
(Khisa 2016, 737–8).
Kayihura’s removal from the police force also exemplifies how the regime
alternately uses law and exception to govern. During my fieldwork in January
and February 2018, respondents across Uganda widely agreed that Kayihura was
the second most powerful person in the country after the president. However, on 4
March 2018, Museveni dismissed Kayihura.⁷ Shortly thereafter, the former IGP
was arrested, and in 2019, the US government placed sanctions on Kayihura for
‘serious human rights abuses and corruption’ (The Independent 2019). Though
Kayihura had run the police force for over a decade, his firing and replacement
with his deputy met little resistance. Protests in his home district of Kisoro were
shut down under the banner of POMA, a policy that Kayihura himself had
reportedly devised (Muhereza 2018). The district RDC defended the use of
POMA, saying: ‘Police were right to foil the planned demonstrations in Kisoro
Town because the organisers did not seek permission as required by the law.
People should keep calm as government sorts out Kayihura’s issues. Any person
holding any illegal assembly, meeting or demonstration shall be arrested and
charged’ (Muhereza 2018). Crime Preventers, a programme often viewed as
Kayihura’s pet project, was declared an auxiliary force of the UPDF (Kasasira
2018). Rumours circulated that Kayihura would be tried in military court for
unsolved assassinations, as well as violence previously attributed to the ADF rebel
group and criminality in the police force. Opposition political leader Kizza Besigye
tweeted in response to Kayihura’s arrest: ‘When you allow to be a tool and prove
to be a good one, you’ll be used most, wear out fast, have no more use and be
disposed of ’ (Waswa 2018). Kisoro’s district chairman noted that much of
the intimidation and coercion that the police carried out under Kayihura’s tenure
directly benefited Museveni’s regime:
The NRM government should instead be rewarding Gen Kayihura because he
protected it from the Walk-to-Work demonstrations that had threatened it,
⁷ Kayihura’s removal followed accusations of police inefficiency, and several national scandals that
implicated Kayihura and his allies in the police with the activities of paramilitary groups in Kampala
and the covert repatriation of Rwandan refugees (Mufumba 2020).
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especially in Kampala. In October last year, President Museveni thanked Gen
Kayihura for his exemplary leadership and few months later, dropped him from
the job of IGP. Now he is being detained and embarrassed. (Muhereza 2018)
Kisoro’s district secretary for health echoed this: ‘He could have done wrong
while executing his duties as IGP as he protected the government but it is a
shame that the very system he was serving and protecting is the one that is now
embarrassing him’ (Muhereza 2018). From the perspective of the public, the
police are subject to similarly shifting rules, harsh sanctions, and intrigue. Even
powerful men such as Mbabazi and Kayihura could not prevent their own tools
of manipulation and oppression from being turned against them. Using arbi-
trary power under the guise of legal procedure, and doing so to elites as well as
to ordinary citizens, makes it difficult to challenge punishments and to deter-
mine the extent to which the system is personalized. The rules thus remain
constantly open to change and, at the same time, can be ruthlessly applied and
enforced.
1.4 Spectacular and Unexplained Acts of Violence
The unexpected demise of elites, including suspected assassinations of high-
ranking government officials, are framed in popular discourse as examples of
the state’s capacity to reach citizens anywhere and to kill with impunity. For
example, in 2012 Cerinah Nebanda, a woman MP, died unexpectedly at the age of
24 after repeatedly critiquing the NRM government and the president himself
(Epstein 2014a). In 2015, General Aronda Nyakairima died on an overnight flight
from South Korea to Dubai and was rumoured to have opposed a secret plan,
dubbed the ‘Muhoozi Project’, to instate Museveni’s son as his successor (Butagira
and Tumwine 2015). Another general, David Sejusa (also known as Tinyefuza),
who played an instrumental role fighting for the government in the LRA conflict,
fled to the United Kingdom in 2013, allegedly because he had learned of his
planned assassination as a part of the Muhoozi Project. Helen Epstein interviewed
Sejusa and other Ugandan elites and reported:
More than a dozen of Museveni’s critics had perished in mysterious car crashes
or after sudden unexplained illnesses in recent years. They included senior army
officers whom he suspected of plotting a coup, opposition party agents, and an
attorney general who was trying to block Museveni’s campaign to eliminate
presidential term limits. In Kampala, terrified MPs told me that they avoided
driving after dark and establishing routines like going to a certain bar after work.
In restaurants, they ate only from buffets, and never ordered from the kitchen.
(Epstein 2014b)
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District- and national-level politicians whom I interviewed expressed similar fears.
Widely discussed was the case of the assistant IGP, Felix Kaweesi, who was
gunned down in 2017 in broad daylight outside his Kampala home. Many
speculated that his murder was an inside job because of its brazen nature, the
weapons used, and infighting in the police force and among various branches of
security. Along with photos of the president and the IGP, I sometimes saw
Kaweesi’s picture hanging in police offices. I asked a veteran police officer why
he had put up Kaweesi’s photo. He said that Kaweesi had risen quickly through
the ranks, reflecting a shift in the Ugandan police toward tribalism and politiciza-
tion, and went on to discuss the nature of power in the Uganda Police Force.
[What does it make you think of when you see Kaweesi’s photo hanging in your
office?] What makes him rise, what makes him die like that? What makes him so
powerful? . . . Competence is got through training. I felt he rose so fast, he took it
for granted that since the bosses admired him, he was competent. He was bathing
in that, basking in that love and favour, and that illusion that your high rank
means you are so strong and so big. An assassin takes the best to intimidate
the rest. (Veteran police officer, 29 January 2018)
The police officer notes that Kaweesi’s authority came from his connections and
that, for many, his murder was interpreted as a reminder of the secret webs of
power in the police force and the government. The obvious reality that the
regime’s access to violence dwarfs that of other actors causes citizens to self-
police and make conservative calculations about challenging the regime. As a local
authority in Mbarara explained:
Ordinarily, the political elites should provide leadership to the masses in terms of
what society can aspire to, what they should be involved in on the ground. But . . .
the political elite has been silenced so they don’t provide necessary political
leadership. Even when they are called upon to participate [in political processes],
it is only in support of what Museveni wants . . .
[Does this impact ordinary people?] I’ll cite you an example—if so-and-so [an
important person] is afraid of doing this, who am I? What can I do? Even if they
were to say the right thing or act the right way, there is no cover of justice. If I do
the right thing, and am arrested, seeking justice will be a nightmare. The
[government’s] ears, as I mentioned earlier on, are from the person next to
you, whose political inclination you don’t know what it is now or what it will
be tomorrow. You play safe by saying nothing and doing nothing about it.
(Religious leader, Mbarara, 15 January 2018)
These examples show how fear of exceptional violence, both reflected in and
exacerbated by rumours, permeates the political environment. Unexpected and
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unsolved deaths have two sides. On one hand, citizens broadly imagine that the
regime has approved or directed them, and they attribute sovereign violence and a
will to kill with impunity to state leadership. On the other hand, the possibility
that these murders are perpetrated by high-level gangs or anti-state interests
further justifies the regime’s aggressive stance on criminals, rebels, and other
non-state violent actors.
While violence against elites shapes citizens’ imaginations of the regime and
offers evidence that the state can act with unaccountable force even against the
rich and powerful, there are also many instances in which ordinary citizens
experience state violence directly. Action is rarely taken against state actors who
permit or instigate violence against citizens. When state actors are held account-
able, their punishment is rarely as extreme as the dismissal of Kayihura—rather,
errant officials are more often reprimanded and reposted to remote areas of the
country as a form of punishment. The following case study examines the coercive
power of the police in the context of political jockeying between a democratically
elected district chairman (LC5) and a presidentially appointed RDC. The police
arrested a young man, reportedly for property damage, and refused to release him
unless his family paid a substantial bribe. His subsequent death in police custody
highlights the coercive nature of his arrest and detention. The case reveals the
complex dynamics between the involved authorities and how their comparative
access to state violence foregrounds their different sources of power.
2. Death in Pader: Police Coercion and Public (Dis)order
The events in question began in Pader Town in northern Uganda on 1 June 2015.
Around 8:30 pm in the town centre, a 21-year-old male market vendor lost control
of a vehicle and crashed into a house. The vehicle and building were damaged, but
the market vendor appeared unscathed. The proprietor of the vehicle called the
police, who impounded the truck and arrested the market vendor who had been
driving it. Although the proprietor retrieved his vehicle the following day, the
driver remained in custody. Reportedly, the district police commissioner (DPC)
had demanded 300,000 shillings (100 US dollars) for the driver’s release, which his
family viewed as a bribe and refused to pay. The detained driver began to
complain persistently of pain, becoming belligerent in his cell, but the police
refused to let him go to the hospital. The driver’s family expressed concern that
he may have sustained internal injuries from the accident. He died in his cell in the
early hours the following morning.
Rather than announcing the driver’s death, the police allegedly took the corpse
to the nearby health post and demanded that the nurse on duty produce a falsified
post-mortem report saying the man had died there. The nurse refused to take
responsibility for the man’s demise, arguing that a post-mortem could not be
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written at a health post. The police left the corpse there and returned to the police
station. As news of the death spread, community members began to gather at the
health post. Led by the chairwoman of the market vendors’ association, the
community members decided to report the case to the chairman LC5, their elected
district representative, to ask what could be done for the family of the deceased.
The chairwoman explained, ‘We had wanted the police to cover the cost of
burying this boy, feeding at the funeral, and other costs that might occur. That
is what we were after’ (Pader, 20 October 2015).
Arriving at district headquarters, the community members found the
LC5 meeting with the RDC and the DPC. The chairwoman raised the first
question, ‘LC5, we have not come here to cause grudge. We have not come to
claim for anything, but we just want a simple explanation. From where did this
boy die?’
The LC5 deferred to the DPC and the RDC, who reiterated the claim that the
man had died at the health post. The chairwoman described how the exchange
escalated:
What really annoyed us was that the RDC . . . [responded] with a lot of vulgar
language . . . ‘You people of Pader, you are killing yourselves, because you do not
want people from other districts or other parts of the country to come in and
work in Pader . . . ’ Then he picked his book and he left.
(Pader, 20 October 2015)
The RDC’s suggestion that the people of Pader were ‘killing themselves’ was
interpreted by many to harken back to the conflict. The statement recalls an oft-
cited comment that Museveni purportedly made in the early years of the war:
In [Museveni’s] first address to Acholi elders in a gathering at the Acholi Inn, a
hotel in Gulu, in 1986, a number of the participants report him as saying in
reference to the Acholi people, ‘We will put them in a calabash like nsenene
(grasshoppers) and let them bite themselves to death. In this way we will rid
Uganda of gasiya (nuisance) once and for all.’ He is reported also to have made
similar such statements referring to the Acholi as grasshoppers in addresses at
Kaunda Grounds in Gulu in 1987 and 1988. (Whitmore 2010, 22)
Anthropologist Sverker Finnström notes that people ‘frequently referred to this
statement’ when lamenting the government’s abdication of responsibility for the
LRA conflict (Finnström 2008, 106). The RDC’s statement was interpreted as an
allusion to past experiences of state violence and the ability of the state to create
insecurity with impunity.
The LC5 accompanied the enraged community members back to the health
centre and called for the RDC to join them to ‘solve the matter amicably’
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(Chairwoman of the market vendors’ association, Pader, 20 October 2015). The
chairwoman described the scene at the health centre:
The body was laid down. The RDC was on one side near the feet, LC5 was on the
other side. The leaders of the market stood just beside. The DPC was between the
RDC and the chairman LC5. The very language the RDC used from the district
council, he again mentioned the very word [‘the people of Pader are killing
themselves because you don’t want help from outsiders’]. That is what really
triggered . . . the LC5 to come and hold the RDC by the shirt. The RDC was now
trying to take off his coat [to] fight . . . After that, people were really very annoyed.
They had big stones, and they had wanted to hit the RDC with them, because of
the chaos he caused. He was being protected through the orders from above. The
police were deployed with tear gas, each and every thing.
(Market vendor, Pader, 20 October, 2015)
In Uganda, failure to properly bury a deceased person or to pay the requisite
compensation to the aggrieved can result in long-term spiritual harm.⁸ Although
no one specifically mentioned these fears, several respondents commented on the
physical altercation between the RDC and the LC5. It is taboo to fight near a
corpse—let alone over it. Those who described the event physically recoiled in the
retelling.⁹
Reportedly, after the confrontation, the police surrounded the RDC to protect
him from the community members as he left the health centre. The LC5, along
with the community, decided to carry the body in a gurney back to the police
station, less than 500 meters away (see Figure 4.1). A local community member
who witnessed the protest explained that the community members believed that if
the body was left at the police station, the police would have to take responsibility
for the youth’s death. He recalled around 200 community members facing as
many as 20 police officers wearing full riot gear (Community member, Pader, 20
October 2015). Upon leaving the health post, the protesters discovered they were
isolated on the road—behind them, the health centre had locked its gates to
prevent the police from returning the body; in front, the police, armed with tear
gas and guns, advanced. A journalist described the scene:
[Shockingly], when the angry residents and leaders move[d] a few meters away
they found police had block[ed the] way, armed with tear gas canisters, rubber
and live bullets in AK-47, and they [deployed] tear gas, [and] rubber
⁸ Acholi culture stipulates that the dead are present and interact with people in their daily lives,
rewarding and punishing people to settle past scores (Hopwood 2011).
⁹ Sophie Seebach, in her study of death and burials in northern Uganda, also documents a story in
which a spirit rejects a sacrifice because those who were to sacrifice the goat argued on their way to the
grave site (Seebach 2016, 254–6).
OUP CORRECTED AUTOPAGE PROOFS – FINAL, 17/5/2021, SPi
, ,      89
bullets forcing people [to] flee away including district chairman leaving the deceased
body on street. (Journalist, unpublished news report, on file with author)
The RDC presented a different narrative of the day’s events, reflecting that
‘sometimes there are role conflicts [between the LC5 and the RDC]. You might
step on someone’s toe and get into serious problems.’He explained that the police
used ‘minimum force’ to restrain the population when they tried to bring the body
back to the police station.
Community members recalled that the police retrieved the body from where it
was abandoned on the road and drove it to the health post in the nearby town of
Pajule. Although the police reportedly promised to provide material for the
funeral, including a coffin, transportation, and refreshments, the family maintains
that they never did. Instead, the market vendors’ association in conjunction with
the community and family members raised money for the funeral locally. The
deceased was eventually laid to rest in his ancestral home.
Despite the presence of a journalist from a mainstream newspaper and multiple
radio journalists, media coverage of the event was limited. Only one story aired on
the local radio and none appeared in print. One print journalist explained that his
editor rejected the story on the grounds that he had posted about it on social
media. The editor told him that this contravened the newspaper’s policies. The
Fig. 4.1 Residents carry the deceased from the health post toward the police station
Source: Photo courtesy of Owot Robert
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journalist speculated that his editor and fellow journalists may have strategically
avoided the story:
Sometimes if such a story happens [journalists] say ‘ah ah, something which
involves security’—they fear. Today you may do a story, but after it is published,
you may not know what is going to happen tomorrow next . . . Today you are in a
crowd, but when you are followed you are alone.
(Journalist, Pader, 20 October 2015)
Similarly, the radio station journalists hesitated to discuss the story with me,
explaining that this issue was ‘very sensitive’.
A community member in Pader reflected that the LC5 chairman could have
helped the aggrieved family more if he had reported the situation to the regional
police commander or called in an independent doctor to conduct the post-
mortem. Instead, he said, the LC5 took advantage of ‘people who do not know
the law’ to stage himself front and centre as the people’s defender. When asked
about why the RDC and the LC5 handled the matter so differently, he noted their
differing sources of authority: ‘I’ve been thinking, because the RDC has been
appointed by the government. So, he comes to protect the side of police because
they are workmates. They are all on the government side. The LC5 is the political
wing, elected by the people’ (Community member, Pader, 20 October 2015).
Another young man reflected that the proximity of the LC5 and the RDC to the
executive and the security services was more important than their political party
in determining their choices.
I feel they are all NRM, NRM, fine . . . [But] the LC5 is elected. The RDC is
appointed by the president of the Republic of Uganda. The RDC has much more
power than LC5 . . . It’s maybe 55 per cent, 45 per cent. As I told you before, the
RDC was appointed by the president to make security in the district. So, he is the
one who is in charge, and the police officer is also a security organ. So he’s
protecting the security organ rather than someone who was elected.
(32-year-old male, Pader, 21 October 2015)
In an environment where state, party, and the state’s security institutions are
deeply intertwined, the police’s capacity for force shapes how ordinary citizens
imagine political power. More so than political party affiliation, access to the
president—and even more particularly, to state violence—determine relative
power.
Though a police investigation into the case was nominally opened, no conclu-
sion was made public. Nearly one year later, the chairman LC5 noted that he had
not followed up on the case as he had been busy with other things, in particular his
own campaign for MP. During an interview, two crime preventers reflected on the
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events. Their responses demonstrate the complex and contradictory views held by
members of the community:
[How do you feel about the conflict that happened here between the police and the
community when that boy from the market died in police cell?]
Crime preventer 1: The grievances between community members and police
were so high. The crime preventers could not really do anything or protect the
situation, so the police came in to handle the situation.
[I feel that the police] should sensitise the community [and explain to them
that] if they rally they will have these circumstances. Those who led the demon-
strations should have been arrested to make an example toward the rest of the
leaders who might organise for a demonstration. To me, I feel the government
should have sensitised the community in an organised manner so people would
understand.
Crime preventer 2: For me, I really feel annoyed . . . Such kind of leaders, where
they are not uniting the community or [where they are] doing things anyhow to
the community, they [the DPC and the RDC] should have been punished . . . I
feel concerned humanitarianly [when my brothers are being tortured].
The crime preventers’ comments illustrate the community perception that the
police, under the guidance of the RDC, intervened with excessive violence and
without sufficient justification. The first crime preventer suggested that the police
should have explained to the community that if they protested, the police would
have to use force. He further said the police should have limited their coercive
power to arrest and detain the leaders of the protest rather than attacking the
entire community. The second crime preventer expressed his view that the police
had used excessive violence, and that the DPC and RDC should have been
punished, presumably by the higher authorities. Because the RDC reports directly
to the president, and the DPC to the regional police commissioner, this implies
that the crime preventers believed that the highest powers in the country were
responsible for resolving this local-level conflict.
The case offers a stark illustration of how state violence underpins the relation-
ship between state and society. While contests over authority and responsibility
are pervasive among public authorities of all stripes, state actors maintain the
ability to deploy overwhelming violence to enforce their claims. The ability to do
so varies even among government authorities, with those who are more closely
associated with the president and state security organs wielding greater access to
potentially unaccountable violence than those who have more tentative links to
regime elites. The capacity to deploy overwhelming force in defence of shifting
jurisdictional claims makes it difficult for citizens to manage or ignore the
possibility of state intervention. The ability of state actors to frame these violent
acts as alternately lawful or exceptional makes them difficult for citizens to
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contest. As a result, the possibility of intervention can function to govern citizens
even in the absence of a regular state presence.
3. Blurring the Boundary between Lawful and
Exceptional Violence
The case depicts the daily coercive power of the police in a community, and offers
a window into the police force’s ability to suddenly deploy significant and
unaccountable violence against the population. The police donned riot gear and,
armed with tear gas and rubber bullets, forcibly dispersed the population as they
approached the police station. Although several journalists attempted to report on
the story, it made few ripples in Ugandan media. District authorities supported a
closed investigation and declined to assist the family of the deceased. Some of
these acts were lawful—when the police responded to a complaint by making an
arrest, when the RDC described the violence as ‘minimum force’, and later when
an investigation was opened into the events. Others appeared exceptional—when
the police attempted to use their coercive power to place the driver’s death at the
health centre, when they used tear gas and rubber bullets to disperse the commu-
nity, and when they eventually abandoned the body at Pajule.
Similarly complex dynamics emerged in other confrontations between citizens
and state security forces. For example, a crime preventer told me about a con-
frontation that took place in another town in northern Uganda, where the police
and military were deployed to evict the population so the government could sell
the land to a private investor (also see Abonga et al. 2019). The crime preventer
explained that the defence forces had been given a clear set of instructions for how
to deal with uncooperative locals:
[My aunt, a principal nursing officer in the division] said that the soldiers sent to
Apaa had one standing order, first gun fired up in the air, then down to the
ground, then find the leader and hit to kill. People were shot, others were not
buried here but taken to different districts and their bodies have not been found.
Police connived with army to give it a nice cover up that they were just missing
persons. (Crime preventer, Gulu, 25 November 2015)
A journalist elaborated on the allegations against the police, expressing scepticism
about the rumoured murders but emphasizing the excessive use of force on the
part of the police:
There were allegations that people were shot at [with live bullets], tear gas, etc . . . I
found out that over 21 people were injured seriously—some of them claim they had
gun wounds. Many people reportedly slept in the bush because in the centre there
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was deployment. They blocked roads coming in and going out, and I heard they
weren’t even letting sick people be transported out. After that chaos, people say,
three days of chaos, shooting, beating, tear-gassing . . . [When we went there] . . . the
demarcation was done yesterday. There was nothing to stop now.
(Journalist, Gulu, 20 November 2015)
In Uganda, potential state violence grounds the state–society relationship, creating
fear and uncertainty amongst the population. Pader, like many other parts of
Uganda, experienced violent conflict following the NRM’s take-over. A police
officer working in Pader commented:
This is a war-torn area. People are tired of running, and they know what made
them run [the conflict between the LRA and the NRM’s army]. They are eager to
have security. Without it, you cannot stay in your home. The taste of war has at
least taught them something. (Police officer, Pader, 19 October 2015)
The officer’s reflections emphasize that the legacy of war continues to shape
citizens’ views of the ruling regime. Having materially experienced violent conflict
and its ramifications, citizens value security when it is provided by a regime that
itself is unpredictable and capricious.
The violent capacity and militarization of the police in this relatively remote
and rural town also gives a sense of the extent to which the regime has extended
control across Uganda. In 2014, the population of Pader Town was estimated at
14,000 people; the main road remained unpaved. Though the police are under-
resourced and understaffed according to international benchmarks, they have
demonstrated capacity to intervene quickly and violently to enforce the presence
of the state, even in an otherwise sleepy town. Unpredictability and a fluid division
between lawful and exceptional violence magnify the effects of police intervention,
fostering the widely held public perception that the regime has the capacity for
overwhelming and unaccountable violence.
3.1 Fluid State Jurisdiction, Potential State Presence,
and Institutional Fragmentation
The Pader case shows how the factors of arbitrary governance are intertwined:
unaccountable violence reinforces changing jurisdictional claims; potential state
presence causes citizens to fear its violence; and the overall events create the image
of a powerful and consolidated state when the facts of the case appear to highlight
discord within a fragmented system.
Both the productive and negative work of arbitrary power are visible in
changing jurisdictional claims. For instance, the police initially claimed authority
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over the traffic accident and the detention of the driver. Their claim was rein-
forced when the DPC reportedly demanded a 300,000 shilling payment, and again
when he denied the driver access to medical care during his detention. After the
driver died, the police denied their jurisdictional authority, seeking to place it
instead under the jurisdiction of the health post. The nurse at the health post
refused to write a post-mortem, though she could not prevent the police from
leaving the corpse to imply that the body now fell under the jurisdiction of the
health post. The community tried to make the police assume responsibility for the
death, first seeking redress through a public meeting and, when that failed, going
so far as to face down armed police officers. However, the police, with the RDC,
quickly resorted to violence to deny responsibility for the dead driver. They
further passed authority off to the health sector when they delivered the corpse
to the health post in Pajule. Other authorities involved in the case—the LC5, the
RDC, and the DPC—also grappled over jurisdictional claims. The LC5 claimed to
represent the community and, in his fight with the RDC, seemed to assert that he
had the authority to determine how the case should be handled. The RDC denied
the LC5’s claim and—backed by the police—was able to simply ignore it.
The mess of competing and contradictory jurisdictional remits created a land-
scape in which it was difficult for citizens to ascertain which authority, if any,
would meaningfully take responsibility for the driver’s demise and burial. Rather
than making a tactical choice to seek redress in the most favourable forum,
community members approached numerous authorities, meeting dead-ends at
each. Shifting jurisdictional claims continually changed the rules of the game.
While the police initially asserted their authority over the accident—telling con-
cerned parties that they should come to the police with any concerns about this
case—they later denied that it fell under their remit. A fragmented governance
environment amplified confusion. Citizens attempting to make claims on state
authorities were diverted and left uncertain about whom they should address or
how. When all authorities denied responsibility, the community members and
family of the deceased had little recourse.
The case illustrates the potential presence of the state in two ways. First, the
police’s quick and armed appearance to quell a local protest is a material mani-
festation of the potential for state presence. Second, several respondents—
especially journalists covering the events—noted the possibility of surveillance
and intimidation. The newspaper article was rejected on the grounds that the story
had also been posted on Facebook; an explanation that the journalist found
unconvincing and interpreted as a justification to supress his reporting. In his
comment ‘when you are followed, you are alone’, the journalist emphasized
personalized and targeted aspects of regime intimidation that infiltrate everyday
life, even long after the event in question. Even while such stories are suppressed,
there is widespread public recognition that the police regularly use overwhelming
violence against citizens. Such experiences are simultaneously exceptional and yet
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so common and widespread as to be almost unremarkable. They thus become
important landmarks, shaping the terrain of everyday life even while they fade
into the background.
4. Conclusion
The perception of the state’s capacity for overwhelming and unaccountable
violence allows the regime to project its power into the everyday life of local
authorities and ordinary citizens. The Ugandan state produces and manipulates
the imagined opposition between lawful and exceptional violence. State violence
can extend beyond the state’s institutions in moments that appear exceptional—
for instance, when security forces tear-gas, beat, or shoot at demonstrators, or
when they arbitrarily detain journalists and members of the political opposition.
The state can also retract, leaving authorities who previously had access to state
violence unable to enforce their jurisdictional claims. At other times, the regime
uses violence in accordance with the law, sometimes in high-profile cases, for
example when the police used Kayihura’s own POMA to disperse his supporters
after his arrest. These dynamics occur against the backdrop of the regime’s
liberation narrative and warnings that the state could easily return to civil war,
thereby threatening the collapse of any distinction between lawful and exceptional
violence. Keeping lawful and exceptional violence separate in some moments
maintains their power as distinct governing tactics; melding them in other
moments makes citizens uncertain about what kind of authority is being exercised
and whether they have avenues for recourse. The possibility of the rule of law and
due process keeps ordinary citizens and local authorities at least minimally
engaged with a governing system that regularly manipulates, marginalizes, and
exploits them.¹⁰
The institution of the Ugandan police offers a lens through which to observe the
continually changing relationship between lawful and exceptional violence. The
police at times use violence within the purview of the law, following due process
and protecting those in its custody. At other times they deploy overwhelming and
even lethal violence against the population, whether as uniformed police officers
suppressing public gatherings with tear gas and bullets or in cooperation with
plain-clothes militias who arbitrarily detain political opponents. One senior
member of the police force, who was eight years old when the NRM came to
¹⁰ Compared to ordinary citizens, elites may find these movements more predictable, thanks to their
proximity to central state power and access to resources that allow them greater control over everyday
life. However, in many cases the risks to elites are also higher, as illustrated by targeted assassinations
and reinforced by popular rumours.
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power, explained how police—even those in the highest positions—become
implicated in this system:
I’m 37-years-old—I would have wished to see a different president, but me as a
security officer, my hands are tied. My role is to improve security. My goal is to
make things better, one day at a time. If I can do that, then I will have done
something good . . . If one institution doesn’t perform, we [the police] are forced
to step in. We won’t allow the country to appear that it is stateless.
(Senior police officer, 5 November 2015)
In a country where state, party, and security institutions are deeply intertwined,
the police are often seen as an extension of the ruling regime, implementing both
lawful and exceptional violence.
Iterative and unpredictable acts of violence, as citizens experience them
through personal and lived encounters, highlight the threat of state intervention.
As Nic Cheeseman notes when discussing the politics of fear in Zimbabwe, the
ruling party and its candidates use past violence to threaten the population and
instil fear: ‘This is known locally as “shaking the matchbox”. Once you have
burned down someone’s house, you don’t need to do it again; showing them a
matchbox is enough’ (Cheeseman 2018b). Linda Green has described how the
possibility of violent intervention translates into ‘a chronic state of fear’ that
‘destabilizes social relations by driving a wedge of distrust within families, between
neighbours, among friends. Fear divides communities through suspicion and
apprehension not only of strangers but of each other’ (Green 1994, 227). Fear is
an important component of governance, smoothing out episodic acts of state
violence into a daily lived reality that materially weakens civic organization.
By producing, undermining, and manipulating the imagined opposition
between exceptional and lawful violence, Uganda’s ruling regime is able to foster
the perception among citizens that it wields unaccountable and overwhelming
violence. This first factor of institutionalized arbitrariness solves a small part of the
puzzle of how modern authoritarian regimes project power. The following chap-
ters illustrate that the perception of the state’s sovereign violence interacts with
other factors of institutionalized arbitrariness, including the state’s shifting juris-
dictional claims and unpredictable presence and absence, to produce an image of
the state as powerful and ever present.
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5
Claiming Jurisdiction
Local Vigilantes and the Struggle
to Consolidate Power
On 25 February 2014, a few hours before dawn, a local vigilante group patrolled
the dusty streets outside Gulu Town in northern Uganda. It had been a busy night:
they had broken up an after-hours dance party, beating the palms and emptying
the pockets of the attendees, and then they had caned a girl and her brothers in the
family compound for the girl’s indecent dress. The vigilantes were escorting a
suspected thief to a nearby police post when they stopped a man driving an NGO
vehicle. Someone threw a rock through the windshield; the driver reported being
roughed up and robbed. The next day, four members of the security group, as well
as a sub-county politician who was instrumental in its creation, were arrested.
A week earlier, the village leader had discussed the group in a community
meeting,
I would like to say clearly that these boys of ours have made us proud because
they do their patrol right from here to [the neighbouring villages] . . . To me if I’m
to compare the good and bad of these boys then I would give them on the good
aspect 80 per cent. (LC1 chairman, Gulu, 1 March 2014)¹
Other community members reported sleeping more easily at night owing to the
patrol. A friend confided to me: ‘People are glad that there is a security group—
stealing was a big problem before—but they are not happy with some of the
behaviour’ (38-year-old female community member, Gulu, 27 February 2014).
In Uganda, local security or vigilante groups are trivial, in the sense that they
are part of the everyday, and they are also significant, in the sense that they are
essential to maintaining basic standards of security and order. These organizations
attempt to assert their jurisdictional claims at a local level. They thus offer a useful
lens through which to examine institutional fragmentation, contestation over the
use of violence, and political disordering that are key to the governing strategy of
the Ugandan state. In particular, vigilante groups can help researchers understand
¹ The chairman of the local council at the village level works as a schoolteacher during the day. He
later reduced their grade to 70 per cent.
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how the state’s shifting jurisdictional claims destabilize the opposition between
public and private, hollowing out the institutional form of these local organiza-
tions and rendering them fragile and precarious governance actors.
Vigilante groups are widespread in Uganda, though names for them vary. The
Acholi people of northern Uganda often refer to them as ‘the young people who
keep security’, ‘peace keepers’ (ogwa kuc), ‘youth vigilantes’, or simply as ‘youth’
(bulo). These terms are consistent with those used in other areas of eastern Africa.
In Tanzania, local security groups are called Busalama, literally ‘person of peace’;
in eastern Uganda, Banalukoosi means ‘the people of peace, order and respect’
(Abrahams 1998). Sometimes in Uganda, local vigilantes are also lumped in with
more formal government programmes such as ‘Crime Preventers’ or ‘Local
Defence Units’. Unlike other security personnel in Uganda, they work mainly in
the communities where they live and report to local authorities instead of—or in
addition to—the police, military, or other state governance actors. In a survey
conducted in the Acholi and Langi sub-regions of northern Uganda, nearly 88 per
cent of respondents reported that such youth ‘peacekeepers’ were present in their
communities.²
Such groups take many forms. While some resemble loosely knit groups of
youth carrying out ad hoc acts of corporal punishment and mob violence, others
are made up of selectively identified community members who receive formal
training and are organized into security units that work with the local government
and state security services. While they vary significantly in their access to and use
of violence, some level of coercive capacity underpins their utility as security
providers in the community. As Bruce Baker notes, ‘The NRM government has
never insisted that policing must be a state monopoly. Instead, it has sought
security partners who will work within the law and under its supervision’ (Baker
2005, 30, italics added). Somewhat counterintuitively, rather than asserting a
monopoly over the use of force, the Ugandan state outsources violent enforcement
to civilians. The NRM regime has consistently employed this strategy across the
country, particularly in times of conflict, when the state has turned to more
militarized groups like Home Guards and LDUs (see Chapter 3), as well as in
times of peace, when it has turned to vigilantes, community police, and more
recently, crime preventers (see Chapter 6). These initiatives have reportedly been
devised, approved, and—in the case of the Crime Preventer programme—overseen
by the highest authorities in the country, including the IGP and President Museveni
himself. In the context of a conflict-affected and politically divided country like
Uganda, such an approach points to a paradox: how can the Ugandan state allow—
and even encourage—young men to violently police their communities and yet
prevent them from evolving into public authorities in their own right?
² Author’s analysis of the Secure Livelihoods Research Consortium 2015 survey.
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Existing scholarship reinforces this puzzle. The literature suggests that outsour-
cing violence to non-state actors comes with significant trade-offs, not least the
likelihood that violent actors, given time and space, will use their coercive capacity
to organize and institutionalize jurisdictional claims, becoming loci of power
autonomous from the state. As Mancur Olson argues, criminal organizations
are parasitic, and thus have a vested interest in the welfare of their host popula-
tion. As a result, they often become protection rackets, monopolizing control over
crime in order to offer paid protection from themselves as well as other would-be
criminals. The ‘stationary bandit’ becomes a sort of governor, engaging in relent-
less tax theft rather than occasional plunder, and thus protecting and even
nourishing the population in pursuit of prosperity (Olson 2000; also see Tilly
1992). Robert Bates applies a similar logic to African countries to explain state
failure, arguing that changes in global trade patterns created conditions that made
the relative rewards of elite predation comparatively favourable to income gener-
ated from public revenue. As a result, African states ‘fell apart’ as rulers—or
‘specialists in violence’—created insecurity to profit off of civilians (Bates 2008).
Others have highlighted how adopting the symbols, rhetoric, or institutional
arrangements of the state can confer governing authority, thereby facilitating
sustainable extraction (Lund 2006a; Stel 2016). These scholarly traditions suggest
that, all else equal, local non-state violent actors threaten state control, as their
attempts to maximize long-term extraction naturally cause them to transform
from bandits, vigilantes, and gangs into governing authorities who attempt to
exercise jurisdictional claims over people, space, and time. Thus, state actors
should see vigilantes as a threat to the state’s monopoly over the legitimate use
of force and seek to eliminate, regulate, or tame them.
In other scenarios, the state has little choice but to work with such actors
because of limited capacity or geographic reach. Anton Blok’s 1974 book on the
Sicilian mafia is a classic illustration of this interdependence between state and
non-state violent actors, rife with collusion, cohabitation, and contiguity. Blok
describes the mafia as a kind of violent broker thriving in the interstices of peasant
life and society, both withstanding the state’s governmental apparatus and relying
on ‘covert and pragmatic relationships’with state authorities to solidify local control
(Blok 1975, 6). Others have described such complex networks as a ‘killing consen-
sus’ (G. D. Willis 2015) or ‘security assemblage’ (Abrahamsen and Williams 2010).
David Pratten draws on Michel de Certeau’s concept of ‘tactics’ to describe how
vigilante groups in Nigeria act in the ‘absence of power . . . play[ing] on and within a
terrain imposed upon them’ by the state (Pratten 2006, 710). For Pratten, tactics
allow vigilantes to find a niche for themselves in space and time. While variously
emphasizing violence or the absence thereof, these scholars attempt to explain how
networked violent actors create a complex but stable governance landscape.
Unlike these scenarios in which violent entrepreneurs consolidate and
thrive, in Uganda arbitrary governance keeps jurisdictional claims unstable by
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unpredictably and inconsistently asserting and denying state authority over
people, issues, places, and times. State actors can reinforce jurisdictional bound-
aries through both asserting and denying their control. For instance, productive
work, found in assertions of state power, occur when police tell ordinary citizens
that violent crimes can only be handled by the police. Negative work occurs when
police deny authority, for example, when a police officer refers a complaint back to
local leaders ‘at home’, because he determines it does not rise to the level of the
police. Other times, the very idea of discrete jurisdictions is collapsed—all citizens
are considered part of the NRM regime, and in this way, there is no meaningful
way to be ‘outside’ the state’s jurisdiction. Frequently, the distinction is made
complex and fluid, as individual actors at times act as state authorities and at other
times as private actors. The resultant fluidity in state jurisdiction—the second
factor in institutionalized arbitrariness—precludes the emergence of a stable
‘consensus’ or ‘assemblage’ in which actors consolidate complementary control
over discrete jurisdictions. Instead, the status quo in Uganda is more aptly
described as ‘confused’ and ‘contentious’ (Alava 2017; Goodfellow 2014), helping
the state to maintain control over multiple, competing local violent actors and
limiting the emergence of local authorities with sources of power autonomous
from the regime.
Scholars examining vigilantes and informal security in other contexts describe
similar phenomena: groups remain precarious and fluid, changing over time.
Suzette Heald (2006) examines how Tanzania’s vigilantes were simultaneously
authorized and penalized due to the divergent interests of different branches of
government, with various state authorities treating vigilantes in contradictory
ways. Other authors discuss contexts in which state security agents—for example,
police or soldiers—sometimes act as private security guards or vigilantes. Thus, a
single person’s actions can sometimes carry the authority of the state and not at
other times (Debos 2011; Göpfert 2012). Pratten (2006; 2008) elaborates how
Nigeria’s vigilantes move between roles as enforcers of state law and as lawless
actors, alternately employing forms of legality and illegality in order to insert
themselves into political and economic niches in the state and open spaces for
themselves to govern. In these roles, they produce notions of justice and law that
are ‘ambiguous, dynamic, and very powerful’ (2008, 64–5). The works of these
authors emphasize that uncertainty shapes how vigilante groups interact with the
community, and whether they constitute constructive or corrosive forces in
society (Meagher 2012).
This chapter studies local vigilantes to reveal the micro-dynamics of ongoing
struggles to consolidate authority. It shows how—in an environment of coercion,
perceived government surveillance, and institutional fragmentation—the state’s
shifting jurisdictional claims foster many low-level authorities, none of which can
meaningfully consolidate power. The chapter begins with descriptive findings on
the form and function of such security initiatives, with a focus on northern
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Uganda. In contrast to Blok’s account of the fertile ground for exploitation in
Sicily, the findings show that the interstices between the Ugandan state and society
are inhospitable to those seeking to consolidate autonomous governing power. To
use Pratten’s language, the Ugandan state shapes the space for tactical action by
consolidating and dissipating over space and time, in this way unpredictably
opening and collapsing niches that other nascent authorities, including vigilantes,
might seek to occupy. The chapter then offers a detailed case study of one vigilante
group, highlighting the strategies they used to claim control over their community
and constituents, as well as how unpredictable and violent state intervention
thwarted their ability to do so meaningfully. The chapter analyses this evidence
to show how arbitrary governance allows Uganda’s ruling regime to maintain its
position as the most important authority in an environment of multiple and
competing violent actors.
1. Fragility in the Interstices of State and Society
Broadly speaking, existing literature supposes an observable relationship between
a governing authority’s form and function that emerges as the authority institu-
tionalizes and lays claim to a given jurisdiction. This assumption is based on the
premise that governance actors tend toward an ideal type that maximizes resource
extraction and minimizes associated costs. However, in practice there can be a
mismatch between form and function. Despite adopting objects and symbols of
authority, such as ID cards, professional titles, and by-laws, Uganda’s vigilante
groups maintain only a tenuous claim to authority. As often as community
members praise vigilantes, they criticize them, using the terms ‘crime preventer’
and ‘crime promoter’ almost interchangeably. This section examines vigilante
groups in their local communities to show how such groups’ institutional form
is disconnected from their function. The chapter argues that this results from the
Ugandan state’s unpredictable assertions and denials of its jurisdictional
authority.
Vigilantes sit in an uncomfortable position between the Ugandan state and
local communities. When crime is high, government authorities—like the RDC or
the DPC—often call on communities to organize local youth into a vigilante
group. With the guidance of the local council chairman (LC1), the vigilantes are
tasked with managing crime on a daily basis and liaising with the police when they
need assistance. However, the role for vigilantes is poorly defined. They are
prohibited from taking the law into their own hands, yet they are formed with
the mandate to police their communities. State authorities and community mem-
bers often ask them, implicitly or explicitly, to go beyond these duties and act as
judge, jury, and executioner. Operating in this grey area, their activities can be
framed as licit or illicit. Although vigilante groups are framed as local responses to
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local problems—at times deemed ‘too local’ to merit the attention of higher
authorities—the government retains the right to intervene in their activities,
frequently arresting vigilantes for overstepping their mandate. At other times,
state authorities allow vigilante groups to operate unfettered. As one sub-county
administrator said, ‘The government of Uganda leaves space for such things
[vigilante groups] to exist’ (Sub-county authority, Lira, 4 November 2014).
Such groups take a variety of forms, from quasi-criminal organizations that
extract communal resources for private gain to more bureaucratic bodies that
intervene in a range of governance issues and enforce community rules. Some
vigilante groups have formal procedures for detention, trial, and judgment. Others
mobilize in seemingly spontaneous acts that resemble mob justice; in my inter-
views, some respondents compared such acts to ‘natural disasters’ in their degree
of unpredictability. Some groups oscillate between differing modes, becoming
more active and organized when their services are needed and lapsing when the
security situation improves.
Respondents in Gulu often described contemporary security groups as a
response to insecurities resulting from the regime’s conflict with the LRA and
forced displacement to internally displaced persons’ camps. One government
security officer explained:
When we moved from the camp back home, there were a lot of challenges
regarding security. When people were in camp, some youth never had time to
attain education. The majority of those youth became jobless; many were sitting
redundant, doing no work. They need a lot of things in life: phones, go for this
disco, some even smoke and drink, running girls up and down. Movement on
boda boda [motorcycle taxi] . . . Even going to saloon [for haircuts], playing cards,
those things need money. But where do you get the money from? Many don’t go
through proper channels. So they became security problems. Of course, there
should be an answer to it. The answer is the youth group, the Crime Preventers,
and the rest of it. (Internal security officer, Gulu, 18 November 2014)
The loss of moral order due to camp life and the subsequent need to police wrong-
doers stands out in this account. Many people also emphasized that social norms
were weakened after the war, creating particular challenges. One 63-year-old
woman reflected: ‘[During the war] cultural practices went into limbo. It [cultural
practice] was the only way we, the elders had to discipline the children . . . the
children do not listen to us the elders. If they did, some of the situation [crime and
moral decay] would have been contained by today’ (63-year-old woman, Gulu, 11
November 2014). Another respondent, a 28-year-old male, explained that their
group was formed in part to manage insecurity after the conflict: ‘In the commu-
nity, we had people of all different kinds. Near the barracks there were prostitutes
looking for money, soldiers who were murdered when people hit them on the
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head with bottles . . . The LC1 said, “What can we do?” ’ (28-year-old male vigi-
lante, Gulu, 27 February 2014). These comments highlight the perceived need to
manage, discipline, and control behaviour to establish a good living environment.
Holly Porter (2017) has described this as ‘social harmony’, while Sverker
Finnström (2008) writes about piny maber or ‘good surroundings’. Both concur
that for Acholi, peace and security are communal, requiring the protection of a
hierarchal, patriarchal, and gerontocratic society in which spiritual order is
paramount.
Despite the narrative of vigilantes as a response to post-war social chaos, such
groups existed long before the war and displacement. Some dated the origins of
vigilante groups to the NRM’s Resistance Councils and their associated LDUs;
others to the earlier reign of Obote II and the system of mayumba kumi in which
every ‘ten households’ constituted a self-policing cell (see also B. Jones 2009,
78–9). Framing local vigilantes as a part of post-conflict reconstruction empha-
sizes their role in reinstating correct social orders that existed ‘before’ and shows
how communities tie the groups’ activities to local values. Such informal and local
approaches to security are often regressive, reinforcing conservative orders rather
than progressive or liberal norms (Allen 1997; Little and Sheffield 1983).
These vigilante groups often establish rules for their own internal functioning
as well as formal positions with designated roles, although titles may be idiosyn-
cratic. A two-man security team of an LC1 in Lira District consisted of a ‘corporal’
and a ‘brigadier’, another group in Gulu had a ‘whip master’,³ and many more
have a president, vice-president, secretary, and treasurer. Positions are often
determined internally, and by formal vote, after members have been selected.
One group elaborated the unwritten rules for their work:






While in practice vigilantes frequently disobey such rules, their content reflects the
view that vigilantes’ authority rests on moral conduct. Many communities seek to
recruit the most upstanding and virtuous youth in the village. However, some take
³ The ‘whip master’ was formally tasked with caning suspects. The group created the position based
on the logic that designating one individual to do so would help regulate the use of violence. However,
the position was vacant at the time of my interview. Its occupant had been removed from the group
after being accused of incest.
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the opposite approach and intentionally select wrong-doers whom they hope to
reform and persuade to report other criminals.
We selected those who are very stubborn—those who smoke—because they
know who is doing bad things. An example was a boy who was arrested—those
who were in the group turned him in. He was selling marijuana. The boy denied
his involvement. But the policeman was smelling it, and then he saw it on top of
the latrine. They then took the boy to the police. Later, he was released. He is still
continuing that [security] work up until now.
(LC1 chairman, Gulu, 17 October 2014)
Incorporating criminals into vigilante groups can serve contradictory purposes,
both allowing communities to keep a close watch on problem-causers while at
times providing them with new opportunities to commit crimes.
Vigilante groups often enforce village-level by-laws. These by-laws, whether
written or unwritten, are usually made by the local council and approved at a
community meeting. Common by-laws stipulate that women should not engage in
sex work, that children should attend school and be prohibited from entering
dance halls, and that witchcraft and wizardry, as well as fighting and theft, are
unlawful. By-laws also impose social regulations, such as limiting hours for selling
alcohol or banning drugs and gambling. Some also specify punishments, such as a
specific fine or number of cane strokes depending on the infraction and the
offender.⁴ An LC1 narrated from memory a set of rules that reflected a desired
social order:
[The by-laws] included community roads—if you don’t show up to dig, then we
take a chicken from your house, sell it, and share the proceeds among those who
did the work. Also, you must pay 5,000 shillings if you don’t send your children
to school; there is no walking after 10pm until morning; no playing music loudly;
no unnecessary fighting of housewives; and no over-drinking or shouting. Also,
under my leadership, I decided everyone must have one full garden for cassava,
because that is our staple food. There is no playing of cards, and no sitting around
in the morning drinking [alcohol]. (LC1 chairman, Lira, 7 November 2014)
By-laws are supposed to be approved at the sub-county level, where they can be
checked for accordance with Uganda’s Constitution and be stamped by the LC3.
In practice, by-laws are often not formally recorded and can be difficult to access.⁵
⁴ Some by-laws give more lenient corporal punishment to the young, the elderly, and the infirm.
⁵ In several cases when I requested to see a community’s local by-laws, respondents either informed
me that they were unwritten, or showed me a book of minutes from the local council with a haphazard
and annotated handwritten list of by-laws. It seems unlikely that the specifics of these rules are known
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A major focus for vigilantes—not only in Gulu, but also in my other research
sites—was deterring theft of livestock. One community member narrated the
activities of the vigilante group in his area.
I can remember in October 2013 around 11:00 in the night when the security
group arrested three people moving with herds of cattle towards Gulu Town.
When the security group asked the people for a permission letter from their area
of origin, they couldn’t produce it . . . [t]he security group detained the cattle and
told the people to come for the animals the following day. The three people
reported [in the morning], but the real owner of the cattle was already informed
so when he came he was ordered to wait for the [others]. As the three people
reached the LC1, the security group and the few community members were there.
It was ruled that the three people were thieves and they were forwarded to the
police. I don’t know what transpired from there.
(Community member, Gulu, 31 October 2014)
This vignette reflects many that I heard in the course of my research, with
vigilantes conducting night patrols, detaining stolen property, and helping adju-
dicate cases the following morning. It further reveals that vigilantes function as
both security and governance actors—investigation, arrest, detention, charge,
hearing, judgment, sentencing, and punishment often blend together.
Central state officials and locals alike often expect communities to handle
problems at a village level. Common examples include petty theft, fighting, and
witchcraft. A lawyer explained: ‘You know, there are also those events you can
handle on your own, not everything has to be forwarded to the police. You can
provide instant justice, immediately. Especially for juveniles, because they are
never treated by the police’ (Lawyer, Gulu, 1 March 2014). Negotiating the
discrepancies between community norms and state policies is a difficult element
of local security work, and part of what makes vigilantes’ positions so fragile. For
example, in Gulu, the punishments for repeated acts of witchcraft are either exile
from the community or mob violence. The same local punishments are standard
for repeated acts of theft.⁶ However, mob violence is illegal in Uganda. Similarly,
though witchcraft is outlawed under the Witchcraft Act of 1957, a constitutional
petition in 1997 specified that offenders cannot be banished from their commu-
nities (New Vision 2011). Vigilantes are thus often expected to enforce local
orders that have no basis in law. These instances illustrate the difficult position
throughout the community. Their relative informality indicates some flexibility in their application, as
well as the fact that they reflect common norms.
⁶ Also see Suzette Heald’s research (1986) on how Gisu of eastern Uganda understood witchcraft
and theft as similarly deviant.
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vigilantes inhabit between state and society, lacking sufficient power to impose
their will on either.
1.1 The Limits of Violent Entrepreneurship under
an Arbitrary State
While vigilantes use force to bolster their authority and extract resources from the
community, they are unable to regularize these practices because state actors
frequently detain, fine, and arrest them. These interventions undermine vigilantes’
authority, fragmenting their organization and depleting their resource base. Thus,
though vigilante groups continually try to consolidate power and extract
resources, they do not mature into the kind of protection racket that Olson
described. A closer look at the interplay between violence and resource extraction
highlights the limits of violent entrepreneurship under an arbitrary state.
Vigilante groups enforce local by-laws by detaining and punishing those
deemed suspects or criminals. Often, they conduct this work at night when
criminals are believed to be most active. Various respondents described how
vigilantes would require male ‘suspects’ to remove their shirt and shoes and sit
by the side of the road. While some groups marched suspects to the nearest police
post for detention, others locked them in a hut overnight, or detained them at the
home of the LC1, who would determine their guilt or innocence in the morning.
Still others required detainees to patrol with the group until morning, when they
would take them to the LC1’s home for judgment. Those who were detained often
did not have a proper coat or shoes, and thus spent an uncomfortable night
walking around in the dark as a captive. In this way, detention could serve as its
own type of punishment. Many explained that judgment was better done ‘in the
light’ and in front of the community to protect the vigilantes from suspicion of
wrong-doing. Although the legality of detaining a fellow civilian is questionable,
one local authority explained:
In some places farther away, the groups do sometimes detain people—but in a
way this is good for the police too. How can the police go 50km in one night? So
as long as they are delivered in the morning, it is a favour to the police as well.
(Community policing forum chairman, Gulu, 6 October 2014)
Because vigilantes are unpaid, respondents noted, they were difficult to motiv-
ate and often turned to theft themselves, leading to high turnover in group
membership. One secretary in a vigilante group explained: ‘Most members are
not very happy because there is no [financial] motivation. To keep them in the
group, I tell them, “If you leave, who will do security? You never know, you might
be promoted, and become someone different” ’ (Vigilante, Gulu, 14 October
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2014). Some communities attempted to address this situation by collecting dona-
tions, usually between 500 and 1,000 shillings per month per household (0.17 to
0.33 US dollars). However, collections were rarely sustained. I only came across
one such effort that reportedly lasted more than several collection cycles; often
vigilantes recalled with resentment their community’s unfulfilled promises to
support them. One vigilante explained another challenge of receiving contribu-
tions from community members, and their group’s solution:
We don’t accept [money] from the community [anymore]. We [found that]
people who contributed also made mistakes—so when we would come to arrest
them, they would start abusing us, saying that ‘What are you doing trying to
arrest me when I am supporting you?’ This happened about four times. Instead,
we get appreciation from people who are taken before the LC—there is a 5,000-
shilling tax, and we save it. We use the savings as a ROSCA [rotating savings and
credit association], with a 10 per cent interest rate. The loan must be returned
within a month. This is good, because before, our wives were complaining,
saying, ‘You’re not being paid, why don’t you stay home?’ But the wives can
use the money for small loans and make some income.
(28-year-old male vigilante, Gulu, 10 October 2014)
In many cases, the complainant is expected to pay a small fee to the vigilantes and
local authorities who intervened in the case, typically ranging from 2,000 to 3,000
shillings—or 0.67 to 1 US dollars. This ‘appreciation’ can be used to buy phone
credit or hire a motorcycle taxi to transport a suspect to the police. Although
community members are frequently unwilling to provide for the groups them-
selves, they also lament the lack of support and propose other possible funding
sources, including NGOs, government training programmes, and donations from
as-yet-unidentified western patrons.
Vigilantes frequently find themselves on the wrong side of the law. In a survey
of 41 vigilantes conducted in Gulu Town, 65 per cent reported that they had been
arrested at least once, almost always for excessive use of violence. Many vigilantes
find this disheartening, as they were arrested for the very activity they were
recruited to perform. One former security group member explained that since
his arrest, he no longer wanted to work in informal security ‘because when a
problem comes, you’ll have to face it alone. I came into bad things from that thing
before, so I’d rather not do it. The Women Councillor Five and the LC3 came to
try to convince me to join [crime preventers], and I refused’ (Former male
vigilante, Gulu, 15 September 2015). The very act of extracting resources—a
principle aspect of consolidating governing power—threatens to place vigilantes
in a criminal category.
The police and military at times patrol with vigilantes. In this role, vigilantes
bolster the police force’s numbers, help state security actors identify wrong-doers,
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and locate ‘blackspots’ where they reside. Vigilantes explained that conducting
night patrols with police gave them access to firearms—a step up from their
typical sticks, batons, and ropes (see Figure 5.1). A few groups reportedly carried
bow and arrows or machetes. One vigilante explained: ‘There is no order that
crime preventers should hold a gun. Even handcuffs, it could take many years
before you handle that thing. When you do the night patrol, there will be a police
officer with a firearm on the vehicle’ (Vigilante, Gulu, 7 February 2016). Weapons
are protected as tools of state security actors. Access to them must be earned
through demonstrations of loyalty, association with state security, or back
channels.
Vigilantes expressed apprehension about run-ins with wrong-doers who might
be armed. One LC1 colourfully described the risks that the group in his village
faced:
[T]he [two] night[s] when the police were patrolling with the group, there were a
number of people going by on motorcycles who would not stop [for the
roadblock]—they almost knocked the police. If people going by don’t even fear
the police with guns, what chance do we have against them? At that time, I told
Fig. 5.1 Two batons used during night patrols; the one on the right is broken from
beating a suspect
Source: Photo by Rebecca Tapscott, Gulu, 2015
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the youths not to patrol anymore . . . A person who comes from far away to kill
without a gun might be having something different or be a trained person. They
might have different kinds of weapons like a ‘spring knife’. What would the
government do? You’ll just die alone. (LC1 chairman, Gulu, 8 October 2014)
Patrolling with the police has the added benefit of not getting arrested or hassled
by the police: many security group members explained that without identification
cards or other credentials they were at risk of being categorized as wrong-doers.
To avoid this problem, one group made its own laminated identification cards,
while others carried letters from the LC1. Such tactics resemble those documented
in other studies, where vigilante groups make claims to authority by adopting the
symbols, rhetoric, and institutional forms of public authority, such as uniforms,
ID cards, rules of procedure, or formal titles (Lund 2006a). State actors’ ability to
reframe the role and jurisdiction of security group members at a moment’s notice
suggests an additional explanation for local vigilantes’ efforts to collect material
symbols of authority: uniforms and ID cards offer hard evidence of their remit
that cannot be denied as easily as verbal agreements.
Vigilantes therefore play a variety of roles, inhabiting an ambiguous space
between the central government and local communities. However, unlike
Olson’s thriving gangs and Blok’s mafia, these groups remain precarious. While
they adopt common approaches to institutionalizing local control, the regime
stymies these efforts in several ways. The groups’ access to violence is marginal
compared to that of state actors, and thus they are unable to reliably extract
resources from the state or society. Moreover, their tenuous claim to authority
over a community is made fragile as state authorities grant and rescind it repeat-
edly and unpredictably. Finally, their ability to organize is compromised by
membership that constantly fluctuates due to poor pay, bad working conditions,
and unpredictable state intervention. The following section offers a case study of
one such vigilante group in Gulu Town to further develop these themes.
2. Crime Preventer or Crime Promoter? Committing
Grievous Harm in Pakure
Vigilante groups in Uganda virtually all experience tensions with other governing
authorities, most notably state authorities. The details of these processes help
illuminate how the state’s arrhythmic assertions and denials of jurisdictional
authority undermine nascent public authorities. One such case—which occurred
in a peri-urban village that I call ‘Pakure’ in Gulu Municipality—illustrates both
the efforts of vigilante groups to consolidate authority and how fluid jurisdictional
claims rendered these efforts futile. The case also demonstrates how pervasive and
potentially lethal violence, both by state authorities and in the absence of them,
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raises the stakes of vigilantes’ actions and inactions. As a key outcome of these
dynamics, the state looms large in the imagination of ordinary citizens.
The vigilante group in Pakure was formed in October 2013 to address what
members of the community describe as an upswing in crime when civilians
returned to their homes from internally displaced persons’ camps around 2008.
The origins of the group were disputed, with several respondents, including
community members, the LC1, and the RDC claiming credit for initiating the
group as a means to fight crime. All respondents described high demand for
security services and low supply, emphasizing that the police were unreliable
because they were under-resourced, understaffed, and corrupt. Police had been
relatively absent from the north during the LRA conflict and had only recently
begun to re-establish their presence. The RDC held a meeting with this village and
neighbouring ones to address the insecurity. One LC1 chairman who was in
attendance recalled:
The RDC came to [our] village and said, ‘I know you can protect yourselves by
yourselves. Local people know the bad boys and the good among themselves. If
the community can accept it, I would ask for 10 boys to volunteer [to form a
security group].’ The RDC then could give authority for the patrol and to enforce
the by-laws. (LC1 chairman, village neighbouring Pakure, 4 March 2014)
Another security group member described the meeting more colourfully: ‘The
RDC said, ‘Just kill two or three thieves and then it will be calm. It will give them
[the criminals] fear.’ It was that night that we started formally with the approval of
the RDC’ (Vigilante, village neighbouring Pakure, 14 February 2014). The LC1
nominated 10 young men to form the group; the community approved them at a
village security meeting. The vigilantes worked under the guidance of a local
politician who was a councillor on the LC3 committee. The LC1 and LC3
councillors explained that they selected young men of good moral character
who were known to the community. The youth themselves linked their mandate
to community values.
we started the process of community wellbeing in this village of ours and it was
the community that had put trust in me who is talking right now. We have come
with an idea that we as youths of this village should give a helping hand to the
community of the village as we work according to the by-laws that we have
written down.
(Chairman of local security group at a community meeting,
Pakure, 15 February 2014)
They began to patrol at night, sometimes with the police and sometimes inde-
pendently, enforcing village by-laws. A local political leader reported that these
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by-laws were approved by the sub-county and reviewed by lawyers for accordance
with the Ugandan Constitution. The vigilantes reportedly used code words to
protect the confidentiality of their operations and keep secrets within the group:
[During this time, how many times would you conduct night patrols per night?]
This was kept confidential. It was within the members themselves. For better
security and confidentiality, their communications were encrypted with pass-
words. This was to keep the group alert at all times. There was also hierarchy
during the patrol; no one worked independently.
(Local politician, Gulu, 10 November 2014)
The vigilantes were eager to collect symbols of authority. They set up formalized
positions, including president, vice-president, secretary, and ‘whip-master’, an
individual who was tasked with doling out corporal punishment. The group
requested funding for boots, rain jackets, and the like from district and local
authorities; however, they had no uniforms or material form of identification.
According to those in attendance, when the RDC announced his support for the
security group’s work at the community meeting in November 2013, he also
promised training; however, it was delayed due to a lack of funds. The absence
of uniforms, training, and formal authorization was a sore point with the LC1,
who described waiting on unfulfilled promises.
The local leader guiding the group also emphasized security as a necessary
component of economic development, highlighting the relationship between
violence and poverty. He offered an example of the group’s early work:
the truth is that in any community . . . [if] everything is destroyed, there will be no
development. For example, maybe you pile your timbers to make a roof, whereby
you find that the timbers are being stolen. Like these whites came here [referring
to an American family who moved into the community] . . . For us, we welcomed
them, because we saw that they will change [develop] our community. But
shortly after they joined us, their solar panel was stolen.
(Local politician, Gulu, 10 November 2014)
In a later interview, he added that he and the vigilantes were able to repossess the
solar panels by using their knowledge of the ‘members of the community and their
activities . . . [to] engage the suspects I knew; and just within a few hours they
started revealing what they knew’ (Local politician, Gulu, 3 February 2016).
Although community members generally concurred that it was a good idea to
start a security group, there were also complaints about the group’s activities.
Within a few months of commencing operation, the group was implicated in an
act of mob violence in which a local thief was killed. Some saw this as an initiation:
a way of communicating the group’s power, access to violence, and impunity. The
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group also beat women who wore revealing clothing and confiscated waragi (local
brew) from drunkards and sellers operating without licenses. The group faced
numerous accusations of wrong-doing, including harassment, theft, and corrup-
tion. Below are a series of complaints posed during a public community meeting
in February 2014:
I would like to talk on an issue that concerns a report I received from one of the
boys . . . who was beaten by some of the security boys from this village. He has a
fractured arm, which happened if not yesterday then the day before. I advise the
security organ from the village that they should look for another house whereby
they can detain a wrong-doer for a few hours. In the morning, they will see what
to do. Not everyone who moves at night is a wrong-doer.
(Community member 1 at village security meeting,
Pakure, 15 February 2014)
Another community member complained that vigilantes were using their posi-
tions to carry out personal vendettas.
I stand firm to say that beating people doesn’t solve any problem because you
might cause a permanent injury to someone and later you stand to be blamed . . .
More so, it could be that the security personnel could have had quarrels with
someone. Security should not take advantage of being in control of the night. On
meeting the enemy, he might want to take revenge.
(Community member 2 at village security meeting,
Pakure, 15 February 2014)
This quote concludes with meaningful ambiguity: whether it is the vigilante or his
enemy who ‘might want to take revenge’ on the other, the speaker cautioned that
one malicious act can spawn further violence. Another community member
presented tentative evidence that the group lacked local legitimacy:
The money that is contributed from about 600 households [to support the group’s
work] should have been about 600,000 shillings, but the money contributed is only
about 100,000 shillings. Therefore, there is something wrong somewhere and
somehow. It could be that the community members are looking at something
wrong that they can’t talk about, so they resort by not paying the money.
(Community member 3 at village security meeting, Pakure, 15 February 2014)
The LC3 councillor who worked closely with the group estimated they
had made at least 80 ‘arrests’ in relation to various crimes during this period
(Local leader, Pakure, 10 November 2014). Around the same time, on 7
February 2014, the police spokesperson for Aswa Region, which includes
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Pakure, wrote a memo to all the LC3 councillors asking them to sensitize
communities on the Uganda Police Force’s community policing programmes.
The letter explains:
The UPF [Uganda Police Force] is now a pro-active force unlike those days
where you would find police officers waiting for cases to be brought to them.
Now it’s the opposite we are so much engaged in community policing where we
talk to the public, sensitize and let them know that fighting crimes is a collective
responsibility, it should not be left to police alone since wrong doers live/stay
within our communities hence we should make them aware that their involve-
ment into crime reductions is one way of weeding out such people such that
peace harmony and security prevails in your division.
(Letter from Aswa regional police spokesperson to LC3
chairman dated 7 February 2014; on file with author)
The letter urges action on the part of community members and also requests
citizens ‘to move with the Police during . . . sensitization programs’. However, it
does not note any limits on this collective responsibility, thereby leaving ambigu-
ous the extent to which citizens are encouraged to take law enforcement into their
own hands.
Vigilante groups sometimes engage in local politicking though their role is
ambiguous as different actors seek to leverage them, whether to increase their local
popularity or to intimidate voters. One local politician explained that the vigilante
group in his community was preventing political hopefuls from competing, while
at the same time trying to gain popularity with the community for being tough on
crime:
[They are] telling people, ‘We are protecting you. So you have to hurry behind us.
It is so-and-so who is not with us—who is frustrating the effort we have brought
[to keep security].’ They incite people against leaders. In the meantime, they want
to achieve their goal of 2016.
(Community member and local politician, Pakure,
18 September 2014)
For their part, the vigilantes accused their detractors of being wrong-doers who
were threatened by the tightening of security. The same local politician also
recounted that the vigilante group’s instigator—the LC3 councillor who was, at
that time, a member of the opposition—intended to join the NRM. The respond-
ent suggested that the councillor hoped to gain political support from the RDC,
which would help him to intimidate the local community into electing him: ‘The
RDC is being used. The councillors, those who have ambition to stand in 2016,
they want to use the state organ to intimidate people’ (Community member and
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local politician, Pakure, 18 September 2014). The respondent’s comments reflect a
link between political power and access to violence—community members also
reported that the vigilantes invoked the RDC’s go-ahead to justify corporal
punishment, thus linking their work and mandate to authority granted by the
president’s office.
Political party affiliation also enters into the dynamics of vigilante groups,
though at times in unexpected ways. For example, a respondent recalled a
situation in which he sought to report local vigilantes to the police for assaulting
community members. ‘They [the vigilantes] were quarrelling that I might be
bought. [They said that] maybe [I had been hired] to attack opposition. But
I said, there is nothing political in that thing’ (Community member, Pakure, 25
November 2014). The respondent argued that the vigilantes made the spurious
claim that they were being persecuted as members of the opposition, as a way to
delegitimate him and his accusations. As another example, the LC3 councillor
who worked with the security group explained in an interview that he had initially
joined the opposition
Because at that time, it was very difficult to win politics in the ruling party. You
can shout, you can pour money . . . no one will listen. That’s why I went to that
camp. Just to pass. When I was in [opposition], I voted for the president
anyway—I did not even vote for my party head. Because it was difficult to say,
‘I’m NRM.’ (LC3 councillor, Pakure, 11 November 2014)
He was later prevented from standing as an opposition candidate because of his
support for the president, and thus he opted to change political parties. Two years
later, shortly before the 2016 general election, he reflected,
Parties cannot make any change . . . The power they [the government] give to
parties is too little. Some presidential candidates have not even come here [to the
north] because it is the government to give the car and the money and the police
escort [for them to travel]. If the police tell you, ‘You’re not going there,’ you have
no choice . . . [political affiliation] is like a school uniform. It doesn’t matter which
stream you are in, you all wear the same uniform and take the same exam.
(LC3 councillor, Pakure, 3 February 2016)
The councillor’s comments show how the government’s control over resources
and violence causes citizens to fall into line. Party affiliation is thus often a
strategic calculation.
Shortly after the community security meeting, the police arrested and detained
four vigilantes, including the group’s chairman and secretary, on counts of
malicious damage and grievous harm. Accounts of the group’s violence are
graphic. One victim described being pinned down by at least two vigilantes and
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beaten with chains until he could not walk the 20 meters to his house. A resident
of the village explained that he witnessed vigilantes detaining and beating a man;
he continued to watch so that he could report the act if the man died. One
complainant reported violent intimidation, death threats, and the looting of his
workplace; as a result, he decided to leave Gulu. A journalist commented:
[T]he group in [Pakure] has turned from being a security group more to being
organised criminals. If they arrest someone they don’t know, they are supposed
to hold them or ask them questions or turn them over to the police. Now, instead,
they are actually doing the work of the police, deciding on the punishment,
fining, and beating. (Journalist, Gulu, 29 February 2014)
In defence of the vigilantes, the LC1 noted their lack of training and the
government’s deferred responsibilities, stating: ‘In my view, the RDC
started the programme without a plan. The group needs training and identifi-
cation, like raincoats with reflectors . . . Not giving training or support is like
making these boys commit suicide—they did not know the law, which is why
they are in prison now’ (LC1 chairman, Pakure, 4 March 2014). In this case
and similar ones, complainants and government authorities described vigil-
antes as crossing the line between acceptable and excessive use of force. They gave
varying explanations—perhaps the group members were acting out of greed, or for
political or personal ends. The vigilantes maintain that they were trying to prevent
crime:
You know this programme has obstructed [the complainants] from stealing, over-
drinking, smoking opiums, or beating or raping young people on the way . . .What
I think, those who reported those cases . . . want us to be there in prison. They want
us to suffer and to let them continue with what they were doing.
(Former member of security group, Pakure, 30 November 2014)
Others claimed that the accusations against the group were politically motivated,
arguing that those who opposed the group wanted to undermine a successful
community programme so the LC3 councillor could not claim credit for improv-
ing local welfare and security.
Despite their protestations, the four vigilantes were arrested, charged, and held
for one month on remand. The LC3 councillor who had been directing them fled
the area, only to return six months later after two of the three charges had been
dismissed. The accused group members paid their own bail of nearly 500 US
dollars each. Several community members went to the RDC to argue in favour of
the vigilantes, to no avail. Otherwise, the accused were left to manage detention
and arrest on their own. The LC1 responded by distancing himself from the
group:
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In the process of executing their duties as the security group, they went astray
and they had to face the law as individuals. The by-law is very clear on the roles of
the security group . . . All along they did this without the knowledge of the LC1 of
the area. The police, who should have been the better guide for them, sometimes
also took them to other areas above their jurisdiction . . . The arrest of these
people reduced the morale and trust of the community members.
(LC1 chairman, Pakure, 11 November 2014)
According to a 28-year-old male community member who had multiple alter-
cations with the group, the RDC also disowned them:
[T]he RDC himself was called and he denied it and said that he didn’t know that
group. Some people called him, even those radio stations and the big people in
the district, even the LC5 called the RDC . . . The RDC had to deny it. There was
no proof even to show that he was working with them. But he was working with
them. There was no evidence, like an ID he had given them, and so on.
(Community member, Pakure, 25 November 2014)
It was rumoured that the officer in charge at the nearby police post had told the
group to work independently of the police on numerous occasions. He was
reportedly transferred around this time.
In September 2014, one charge against the group was referred back to the
community to be resolved by the LC1. The LC1 failed to mobilize the relevant
parties and, as a result, arbitration was unsuccessful. By October 2015, the two other
charges had been dismissed due to the absence of the state prosecutor and com-
plainants in court. According to former members of the security group, a newly
appointed RDC subsequently returned to the village to encourage the youth to join
the government’s Crime Preventer programme. One of the accused vigilantes
elaborated that the RDC had summoned them to her office where she apologized
for their arrest and detention and invited them to join the Crime Preventer training.
Several community members explained that while the security group used to have
problems, they had become ‘more organised’. Indeed, anecdotally, the punishments
that other group members administered became less severe after the arrest.
The vigilantes who had been arrested declined Crime Preventer training and
stopped patrolling. The LC3 chairman who had led the group lost his political
position due to absenteeism and did not run in the 2016 elections. Other security
groups continued to work in the community, for instance, carrying out corporal
punishment on behalf of the LC1. Additionally, residents of Pakure continued to
work with security groups in neighbouring villages, and the government recruited
crime preventers in the area.
This case is reminiscent of the fate of many security groups I encountered
during my research. Such groups are formed in an ad hoc manner to address an
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immediate security need, typically with the explicit blessing of district-level
authorities. Their daily management takes the form of irregular relationships
with and oversight by local politicians, community members, and police officers.
But, whenever their activities come to the attention of authorities outside the
village, local authorities disavow them. These vigilante groups both contribute to a
fragmented and unpredictable security and governance environment, and them-
selves are subject to it. As such, they offer a small window into the functioning of
arbitrary governance in Uganda, and how it occurs through ongoing struggles for
control between national and local actors.
3. Arbitrary Governance and the Fragmentation of
Local Authority
The Pakure case illuminates several aspects of arbitrary governance, in particular
highlighting how the state’s changing jurisdictional claims undermine security
groups in their efforts to consolidate local authority. The case illustrates the LC3
councillor’s attempt to organize violence under his control with the stated desire
of building political support. His comments and those of community members
suggest that, much like the criminal gangs in Olson’s story, the LC3 councillor
sought to use his access to violence to get constituents to ‘hurry’ behind him.
However, these efforts were unsuccessful. State actors intervened to arrest and
detain the vigilantes, thus halting the group’s consolidation of power. Because the
arrest and its aftermath mostly occurred in a liminal space where legal processes
and sanction were threatened but never actually applied, it left little scope for the
vigilantes and the LC3 councillor to strategize a response. Instead, the state’s
arbitrary and violent intervention in an environment of institutional fragmenta-
tion undercut the group’s nascent authority. This case thus offers insight into how
state authorities change their jurisdictional claims over space, time, and people,
and further how this limits the ability of other actors to consolidate power
autonomously from the state.
3.1 Shifting Jurisdictional Claims: Creating and
Collapsing the Interstices
This case highlights multiple authorities’ shifting jurisdictional claims. In particu-
lar, state actors variously redefined jurisdictional claims over both space and
subject matter. For instance, sometimes the village was defined as outside the
purview of the state, divesting state authorities of responsibility for village goings-
on. At other times, the village was defined as under state jurisdiction, giving state
authorities the right and responsibility to intervene and regulate behaviour. For
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example, in the first village security meeting, the RDC reportedly instructed the
local authorities to form a security group and ‘kill two or three thieves’, thereby
explicitly giving the group authority to use violence to police their community and
implicitly defining the community as outside the state’s jurisdiction. But later the
police arrested and charged security group members with assault and destruction
of property, thereby reasserting state authority over the village. Then the magis-
trates’ court returned the case to the community, again redefining issues of assault
and property damage as local problems better solved at home.⁷ For their part, the
security group also tried to manipulate jurisdictional claims to their advantage.
The group asserted its authority to implement by-laws including a curfew, fines,
and corporal punishment. At the same time, vigilantes used the police as an
outside jurisdiction where they could leave suspects at the end of a night of
patrolling, thereby divesting themselves of further responsibility.
Local security actors—including vigilantes, police, local administrators, and
politicians—recognize the fluidity of jurisdictional claims. Payments to the police
can be understood alternately as appreciation or as a bribe; IDs can be legitimate
because they were granted by a local authority or counterfeit because they were
not mandated by the central state; lynching a thief is a reasonable way to deter
future crime as well as the most serious criminal offence. The police have
authority over a given jurisdiction in a formalized, documented, and stable way;
vigilantes in an informal, undocumented, and fluid way. Thus, government-issued
IDs, uniforms, and certificates not only bolster claims to authority, but also help
stabilize a vigilante group’s jurisdiction. In this case, the group’s best efforts to
claim authority over a given jurisdiction through the adoption of symbolic and
material representations of the state were still insufficient in the face of the
government’s superior access to violence.
Respondents in my study were clearly aware of how authorities change the rules
of the game, noting that they were obliged to support state security personnel
when called, while recognizing that no government official or police officer would
formally recognize groups they could not monitor or control. Indeed, some
government officials framed security groups as local responses to local problems,
efforts so informal that they did not merit the attention of a researcher such as
myself (Community development officer, Lira, 5 November 2014). In this way,
sub-county and district officials also construct the local as outside state jurisdic-
tion. Their disavowals place vigilante groups in a precarious situation. Vigilante
groups are established under the aegis of the government to handle the village
domain. In this capacity, they strive to gather threads of authority in a delimited
space (the village). But then, at uncertain times, state authorities such as the police
⁷ Some types of crimes are more likely to be considered local concerns than others. For example, in
northern Uganda, Holly Porter writes about how sexual crimes are typically addressed gang gang or
‘down home’ by relatives like respected elders or kinship-based authorities (Porter 2015, 309–34).
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intervene, making the village a public space subject to state sanction. Vigilantes are
arrested, humiliated, and receive burdensome fines, thereby stripping them of
whatever authority they may have accrued.
In an environment where the state unpredictably asserts and denies its author-
ity, thus destabilizing jurisdictional remits, claim making on the state or other
authorities becomes increasingly arduous. Such authorities can simply shift the
terrain to justify ignoring the claim, or to legitimate intervention on behalf of
either the complainant or the accused. There is an ever present possibility that the
government can redefine its jurisdiction at any point in time—often with costly
ramifications.
3.2 Unpredictable Authority in a Fragmented
and Competing Governance Environment
Throughout the Pakure case, numerous authorities exercised control over aspects
of the vigilantes’ behaviour. Perhaps most notable was the LC3 councillor, who
took responsibility for the group, gave directives, and patrolled with them.
However, the LC1 also promoted the group, developing by-laws for them to
enforce and championing their work until they were arrested. Community mem-
bers attempted to use their local security meeting as a forum to exercise control
over the group, illustrating the potential disciplining role of ‘the community’. The
police exercised their authority both when they patrolled with the security group
and when they later arrested group members. The magistrates’ court intervened
when cases were opened against group members. The RDC was also a key source
of authority; he gave local leaders permission to form the group and served as a
justificatory reference point for the group’s actions. But the next RDC imple-
mented a different set of rules for local security groups, thereby introducing
another dimension of unpredictability into this institutionally fragmented envir-
onment. Executive changes in appointed positions can occur at any time and bring
with them unpredictable changes in policy and programme implementation. Even
the office of the president was invoked as a pertinent authority when the group
attempted to claim the right to intervene in their community. The relevance of an
array of actors—from local to national and including centrally appointed and
elected officials as well as community members—reflects a fragmented govern-
ance environment.
Institutional fragmentation has two relevant consequences. First, each different
authority and its institutional settings use different rules, thereby contributing to
uncertainty. For example, the community evaluated the security group based on
local moral orders. The LC3 councillor employed a personalized logic based on
consolidating political power. The court, which managed the accusations against
the vigilantes, applied legal processes which meant the cases were never heard due
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to absent witnesses and insufficient evidence. Though the accused had to attend
court an estimated 10 times to avoid being held in contempt and returned to
detention, the court never formally resolved their cases. Moreover, the complaints,
complainants, and accused were shifted among these different authorities. For
example, the complainants in this case appealed to the police to rein in the security
group, thereby shifting the vigilantes from the jurisdiction of the LC3 councillor to
that of the police and the magistrates’ court. Later, when the court sent the case
back to the community, it placed the group back under local jurisdiction. The
community sought to put the vigilantes under the jurisdiction of the RDC, though
the RDC denied authority over the matter. Because each system employs a
different set of rules, being passed among them further deterred the vigilantes’
ability to anticipate what rules would be relevant, thereby preventing them from
strategic negotiations that could have protected their nascent authority.
Second, institutional fragmentation can indicate successful governance, rather
than its failure. Many studies on institutional plurality—or ‘multiplicity’
(Goodfellow and Lindemann 2013)—understand the presence of competing insti-
tutions as part of a transitional period in which externally implemented formal
state authority clashes with previously existing local authorities. However, my
study suggests that the existence of many competing, low-level authorities could
be a sustainable and desired outcome for a regime because, under the overarching
authority of the state, no other actor is able to gain meaningful control over any
jurisdiction. This might be visualized as a kind of umbrella that protects and even
encourages a complex, contradictory, and competitive environment where count-
less low-level authorities can thrive. A fluid state jurisdiction allows the regime to
outsource many of the day-to-day tasks of security and governance provision
without ceding authority to autonomous agents.
3.3 A Violent State and the Imposition of High Stakes
State actors’ unpredictable assertions and denials of jurisdictional authority are
meaningful because they are backed by coercive force. For example, in the Pakure
case, the police were able to arrest, detain, and extract large fines from security
group members because they could threaten arbitrary detention without options
for recourse. The case also illustrates how state actors allow exceptional violence
and lawful violence to meld. The police arrested the vigilantes lawfully, based on
community member complaints that led to charges of grievous harm and mali-
cious damage to property. However, the vigilantes experienced the justice system
as pre-trial detention and repeatedly set and delayed court dates. The cases against
them were never heard. The exercise of state power occurred largely through
processual rules rather than the substantive application of law. The process left
open the space for local security groups to exist, while failing to set future
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precedent for what are or are not acceptable activities for local vigilantes. At the
same time, state actors reinforced the regime’s power through the threat of
arbitrary and unaccountable violence in the form of potentially ongoing
detention.
Detention in Uganda is no light matter. Numerous respondents described
imprisonment—whether in a police cell or in prison—in stark terms. A long-
time friend of mine recounted his own arrest as a moment when he became
materially aware of the state’s power to overturn his entire life and subject him to
physical discomfort, stress (in particular related to losing his job and letting
friends and family down), and humiliation. Another respondent, a minibus driver
in Lira, compared arrest to falling ill: ‘It’s like going to the hospital, you can’t say it
will never happen. One day you fall sick and you just go . . . Even when you’re a
good person and did nothing wrong. You just pray hard that it doesn’t happen to
you’ (Minibus driver, Lira, 8 November 2014). In other cases, arrest and impris-
onment can involve physical harm. They are almost always financially costly, as
police officers extract bribes, demand fines, and confiscate valuable personal
belongings, such as cell phones. The possibility of violent state intervention
looms behind interactions with state authorities, particularly in matters of security
and governance.
Furthermore, state violence against one security group shapes the actions of
other vigilantes. An LC3 chairman discussed a different case in which the police
intervened and shot several vigilantes, explaining that other local security actors
heard about this event and responded by self-policing and keeping a low profile:
District security, the RDC, went to that place and told them to form groups to
protect themselves. I know she won’t accept [that she said this], but that is what
is on the ground. Youths started patrolling [to defend the community against
the killers]. When you are defending against killers, you must carry something
for defence, so they were moving with pangas, bow and arrow, etc. Someone
tipped the police that ‘these people are robbing’, so the police went there and
shot them.
. . . The police and government blame those people and end it like that, trying
to scare them. The state decided to get a common position at the expense of the
community.
[Does that raise issues with the groups in your areas—what if this happened in
our place?] Yes, certainly! They said, ‘What if this happened in our place? We
have no appointment letter.’ They will be disowned if there is a problem. This
annoyed me so much. These people were mandated by the office of the RDC to
be vigilant to protect their area.
[Why don’t you provide them with a letter, then?] I did not provide them with a
letter because if something goes wrong, I would be liable—it would be as if I was
responsible for everything they do. (LC3 chairman, Gulu, 27 October 2014)
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The LC3 chairman’s comments illustrate the difficult situation facing vigilantes.
On one hand, they are tasked with providing security in a given jurisdiction
(typically their community), and on the other hand, this authority can be denied
at a moment’s notice. Because the state has a preponderance over the use of force,
vigilantes can neither manage nor ignore the possibility of state interventions.
Instead, if they take up the work, vigilantes are faced with the constant possibility
that state actors will intervene violently with potentially life-changing consequences.
State actors were further perceived as having the capacity to offer protection.
For example, the community needed the RDC’s go-ahead to form the security
group in the first place. Without the state’s permission to police locally, the group’s
ability to fight insecurity would have been limited. The community members who
petitioned the RDC on behalf of the security group also testified to the state’s
perceived capacity to protect. In this way, the state resembles the protection racket
Blok describes, though its modus vivendi is less about sustained resource extraction
andmore about forcibly outsourcing responsibility. The government’s capacity both
to prevent and perpetrate violence is key to this dynamic.
4. Conclusion
Local security groups in Uganda share many characteristics with vigilantes,
bandits, and gangs in other historic and geographic contexts. Yet unlike the
violent entrepreneurs described by Olson and Blok, local security groups in
Uganda remain fragile in form and function, precarious in their authority, and
local in their reach. This chapter has demonstrated both how and why jurisdic-
tional fluidity helps produce and maintain fragility and precarity, as well as how
this dynamic allows the regime to project arbitrary power in local communities.
The chapter has shown how, in northern Uganda, vigilante groups have long
attempted to consolidate power locally, using violence to police their communi-
ties, implement local laws, and extract resources, whether in the form of local
taxation or extortion. In tandem with their efforts to consolidate control, local
security groups adopt various symbols of authority, like ID cards, boots, and
raincoats, as well as procedural formalities like internal group rules and commu-
nity by-laws that govern their activities. However, their efforts have been repeat-
edly stymied. Such groups operate in an inhospitable environment between state
and society, where the state’s unpredictable assertions and denials of governing
authority ensure that they remain precarious, unable either to consolidate access
to violence and resources or to safely occupy a niche in the state. In turn, their
limited access to violence prevents such groups from regularly extracting
resources, resulting in high turnover rates as vigilantes seek employment oppor-
tunities with higher pay, greater respect and job security, and less risk of incar-
ceration or injury. The experience of vigilantes in northern Uganda is much like
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that of those in other areas of the country, who similarly operate in a grey area
between the licit and illicit. Indeed, the NRM regime has consistently cultivated
informal policing arrangements defined by this ambiguous position, in times of
both war and peace.
Fostering the existence of vigilante groups while ensuring that they remain
precarious contributes to arbitrary governance. Ordinary citizens have many local
security and governance actors to go to when they experience wrong-doing or
conflict, but few, if any, of them have the unchallenged authority needed to
reliably resolve local issues. As a result, the arbitrary power of the state remains
palpable in local communities through the active possibility of its presence or its
absence. When deployed, state power reshapes the landscape of local governance
in unpredictable ways. Such fluid state jurisdiction helps explain how the ruling
regime can maintain its superior position in a country beset by countless com-
peting local authorities, even while outsourcing violent enforcement to them. This
phenomenon highlights two findings. First, state actors deliberately, unpredict-
ably, and often suddenly withdraw from governance over certain matters without
prescribing an alternative authority to deal with the claim. Second, these unpre-
dictable assertions and withdrawals of authority are backed by meaningful threats
of superior and unaccountable force—and as a result, they limit the ability of other
actors to organize and consolidate power.
The fluidity of state jurisdictional claims obfuscates which authorities and
institutions are responsible for any given infraction. For example, it is not unusual
for a police officer to send a complainant home, explaining that the matter would
be better handled by a local authority or within the family. Cases deflected in this
way range from petty theft to rape and murder. Another police officer might refer
the complainant to a traditional leader; still another to his own superior, the
officer in charge. Jurisdictional uncertainty destabilizes and fragments civilian
claims on the state and undermines local state and non-state authorities. One
sub-county official explained that officials at various levels and in various sectors
unpredictably shift their jurisdictional claims:
Security, development, education, health . . .We are ever exploited, though we
love our work . . . Institutions are not doing the way they are supposed to do.
Institutions are not independent. Sometimes, you find a few people influencing.
This [authority] cannot [take an action], because he is waiting for [approval
from] the other. Whenever I am doing my work, someone intervenes. I can fear
to do it [my work] because there are other authorities who go beyond even this
book [of local government guidelines] that guides me.
(LC3, Mbarara, 19 January 2018)
If those who have superior access to material and symbolic power can continually
redefine their responsibilities and use their access to violence and resources to
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enforce various jurisdictional claims or disavowals, there is little the average
citizen or local leader can do to challenge them. Such limitations extend to elites,
including opposition leaders or NRM politicians who fall out of favour with the
regime. Moreover, if assertions and denials of authority are irregular, citizens
cannot easily organize around a given set of expectations. The state’s fluid
jurisdictional claims thereby limit organized resistance.
This account of jurisdictional fluidity as the second factor in institutionalized
arbitrariness leads to some useful insights. First, for citizens to make meaningful
claims on the state, there must be a socially accepted understanding of what falls
under the state’s jurisdiction, giving the state not just legitimacy to intervene in
those issues, but also a responsibility to do so. This common understanding is
needed to enable citizens to make claims on the state. Second, as things currently
stand, if local and non-state entities have any claims to authority, these are fragile,
since they could potentially be side-lined or upended by state actors. Thus,
unpredictable and violent state interventions fragment and undermine the author-
ity of local groups seeking to consolidate autonomous power, rendering the
interstices between state and society a dangerous and inhospitable place for
political entrepreneurs.




Surveillance, Crime Preventers, and
Potential State Presence
Despite the apparent weakness of the Ugandan state, as measured by indicators
like water and sanitation, control of corruption, and government effectiveness, the
possibility of state presence is felt across the country.¹ Even in remote and rural
Uganda, where the state has been dismissed as absent, its interventions have been
likened to the ‘dry season rains . . . occasional and potentially destructive’ (B. Jones
2009, 3). In my research, ‘the state’ was made real and potentially present neither
by brick-and-mortar initiatives nor by seeking to extend and regularize its control.
Instead, its potential presence emanated from a fluid distinction between state and
society. State actors sometimes hold that there is no difference between state and
society, considering the state as embodied in Ugandan citizens. They thus transfer
responsibility for state performance to citizens, committing citizens to police their
own neighbours and transmit intelligence to higher authorities. The state exists
wherever citizens are present. Other times, state authorities uphold the division
between state and society, drawing a bright line between the two entities. Citizens
are outside of the state, and thus subject to state surveillance and discipline as
members of society. More often, authorities place populations and individuals in a
liminal space between state and society, with the possibility of determining their
status at any future time, thereby keeping their rights and responsibilities in flux.
These scenarios reflect a fluid opposition between state presence and absence,
whereby at times the state is clearly present or absent, at times it is hard to tell, and
at times there is no meaningful way for the state to be absent, as it is embodied in
ordinary citizens.
Key to this form of state presence was the widely shared conviction that
government spies are omnipresent. As one sub-county official explained:
[People say that the government has eyes and ears everywhere in Uganda—is it true?]
Yeah, that one is very true. Actually, everybody is like an informer of the other. It’s
just too much now. You will not know who is who, who is taking the information
where . . . There are so many spies, even in police, those intelligences . . . you may
¹ In 2008, a Brookings report ranked Uganda as the 27th weakest state out of 141 countries in the
developing world (Rice and Patrick 2008).
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think sometimes they work together with the army. That’s why security in Uganda
is so tight. Everybody is a spy. They have also been using women—you will not
know who is who in Uganda [laughs].
(Sub-county official, Moroto, 19 February 2018)
The perception that government informants are everywhere both comes from
instability in the opposition between state presence and absence, and further
destabilizes it. Ugandans widely report government informants ‘deep down in the
village’, and conclude that one can never know to whom one is speaking. The added
possibility that a person may act as an informant in the future creates further
uncertainty and fear of betrayal. Countless unofficial informants report to isolated,
fragmented, and obscured chains of authority, which are commonly thought to
reach the Statehouse. Given that citizens believe the regime is informed and has the
capacity to intervene, non-intervention appears to be as much a choice as interven-
tion. In this way, potential state presence—the third factor of institutionalized
arbitrariness—transforms the regime’s overwhelming capacity for violence from
an episodic reality to an omnipresent imaginary that governs citizens’ daily lives.
The perception of possible state presence can be achieved in diverse ways. Joel
Migdal—who famously described contemporary states in the global South as ‘weak’
and overrun by society—argued that the state and its capacity can only be under-
stood through ‘the process of interaction . . . with those whose actual behaviour they
are vying to control or influence’ (Migdal 2001, 23). Timothy Mitchell emphasizes
that the state’s boundaries are drawn and maintained through internal interactions
between people acting as members of the state or society. The boundary is made to
appear external and authoritative as a ‘distinctive technique of the modern political
order’ (Mitchell 1991, 78). The state must therefore be understood not as a structure
‘but as the powerful, metaphysical effect of practices that make such structures
appear to exist’ (Mitchell 1991, 94, emphasis added). The presence of the state, then,
is not simply about its manifestation. It is also about the production of its limits.
That is, citizens’ sense of state presence is produced by divisions that actors draw
and reify between state and society. Building on these insights, my research shows
how drawing and redrawing these divisions destabilizes the imaged opposition
between state presence and absence, creating the perception that the regime could
potentially be present at any time.
Uganda’s NRM regime has consistently adopted programmes and policies that
rely on and reinforce the fluidity and complexity between state and society. This
chapter focuses on one such programme: Uganda’s Crime Preventers, nominally a
community policing initiative that recruited tens of thousands of underemployed
youth shortly before the 2016 presidential elections. These crime preventers would
be the regime’s ‘eyes and ears’ and ‘help with the elections’. Paired with unofficial
status, this created the impression—and perhaps the reality—that crime pre-
venters could be anywhere and everywhere, working as government cadres and
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reporting to the regime. The programme dramatically expanded the state’s sur-
veillance apparatus and quite literally embedded it in local communities. And yet,
unpaid and often disowned by the regime, crime preventers also remained at times
meaningfully distinct from the regime, reliant on their families and neighbours to
survive. A veteran police officer described the programme as a ‘parallel group’
designed to spy on the police, a ‘sort of political force which works for the benefit
of ’ the regime, who are ‘used to boost numbers during campaign rallies . . . Buses
of them. Those are artificial crowds. The floating population’ (Veteran police
officer, Soroti, 29 January 2018). Having been identified as willing volunteers, they
were on standby for the regime, ready to engage in ad hoc work of a wide-ranging
nature and able to be disowned at any time.
This programme interchangeably cast crime preventers as members of society
and members of the state security apparatus. Sometimes, government officials
declared that crime preventers were no more than concerned citizens volunteering
information to state security services. Other times, officials declared that all
Ugandans should be called ‘crime preventers’ simply because they are citizens.
The latter framing collapsed the imagined distinction between state presence and
absence, placing the burden of responsibility for crime prevention on citizens.
Finally, government officials sometimes claimed that crime preventers were granted
special access to and knowledge of the state, and thus were subject to particular rules
restricting their rights to talk to the press, to discuss politics, and to protest
government initiatives. Though they were volunteers and civilians, they were
threatened with martial law if they disobeyed these orders. These continual refram-
ings produce a fluid opposition between state presence and absence that regularly
recalibrates the political playing field to favour those already in power. A focus on
crime preventers further helps reveal how Uganda’s NRM approaches controlling
its massive youth population, which in 2020 constituted approximately 80 per cent
of the population.² Uganda’s Crime Preventers programme therefore reveals a
balancing act in which the regime distributes just enough resources to just enough
citizens to produce a convincing enough image of state presence.
1. Producing Crime Preventers as Ambiguous Actors
While media frequently framed crime preventers as a political militia, state
actors ultimately formed and maintained the programme by alternately and inter-
changeably deploying multiple justifications for their existence. Contradictory
² In 2014, an estimated 75 per cent of Ugandans were below 30 years of age (Uganda Bureau of
Statistics 2016). Born after the regime took power, Uganda’s youth are less enamoured of the regime’s
liberation narrative; moreover, an estimated 64 to 83 per cent of them are unemployed (Reuss and
Titeca 2017, 2354).
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narratives made crime preventers difficult to discern—both for society and for
crime preventers themselves. Many youths joined the programme because they
believed the 2016 elections would return the regime to power, and that supporting
this result would give them access to regime patronage. Their calculation seemed
conservative—for decades, the NRM has controlled distribution of resources and
economic opportunities. At the same time, one of the regime’s basic justifications
for the Crime Preventer programme was the regime’s limited capacity and need
for volunteers to help keep peace during the potentially tumultuous electoral
period. This paradox—of a state that controls distribution of economic, political,
and social opportunities and also needs to recruit uneducated, impoverished
youth to ensure its continuation—reflects a dilemma. The regime needed to
gain support from youth, but it also needed to prevent youth from organizing
politically and demanding benefits, jobs, or more representation. The following
section illustrates how crime preventers were produced as ambiguously state and
non-state actors, with two important effects. First, their activities further culti-
vated the state’s potential presence at large; and second, the ambiguity of their role
prevented crime preventers from threatening the regime in their own right.
1.1 An Opportunistic Repurposing: From Community
Police to Political Tool
Like many of Uganda’s informal militias, crime preventers operate awkwardly
between state and society, taking on responsibilities associated with formal state
security providers while reaping few of the benefits. Authorities often justify such
ambiguity through references to the UPDF Act of 2005 and the Constitution,
which together provide for all able-bodied Ugandans to undergo state-provided
military training and for trained civilians to serve as auxiliary forces.³ In 2018, an
army spokesman explained that anyone can join the Reserve Forces; he encour-
aged his interlocutor, a newspaper reporter, to join, noting that reserve forces
support the nation in diverse activities when needed, and not just in times of war
(Bagala 2018a). Similarly, many state authorities framed crime preventers equally
as state agents and civilians. As ambiguous actors, crime preventers were particu-
larly effective at intimidating ordinary citizens without requiring access to power
that would allow them to make effective claims on the regime.
³ Section 6(1)(c) of the UPDF Act 2005 states that the sources of the Reserve Forces shall include
‘auxiliary forces, state security organisations and such other citizens of Uganda as have undergone
military training under Article 17(2) of the Constitution’. That article states: ‘It is the duty of all able-
bodied citizens to undergo military training for the defence of this Constitution and the protection of
the territorial integrity of Uganda whenever called upon to do so; and the State shall ensure that
facilities are available for such training.’
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According to Bruce Baker, the first crime prevention panels in Uganda were
established as early as 1993 to bolster policing capacity at a local level.⁴ The
programme reportedly trained tens of thousands of participants in:
[T]he nature of community policing and crime prevention; the differences
between criminal and civil cases; the importance of preserving evidence at the
scene of a crime; the institution of criminal proceedings; the LC judicial structure
and the cases that they should and should not handle; summons and warrants;
road safety; community service; bomb threats; sexual offences; human rights;
constitutional rights; domestic violence; laws as they relate to children; marriage
and divorce; and mob justice. (Baker 2005, 30)
While the programme Baker described had no apparent political role, this had
changed by 2011, when crime preventers were recruited to help provide security
for the presidential elections. The programme was nominally voluntary; partici-
pants formally received no payment. In some locations, recruits received three
months of training and were provided with uniforms and batons and instructed to
patrol public spaces. Some were accused of intimidating and beating members of
the political opposition. One former crime preventer explained his role as similar
to that of a polling assistant:
We also helped a lot with the voting—escorting the votes. We would take the
presiding officer with the ballot box up to the polling station. We would make
sure the votes aren’t stolen by opening the box before voting started to show
everyone it was empty. Then we would make sure people vote only once by
marking their finger with ink when they leave the polling station. Then we would
take the ballots up to the sub-county and they would be counted from there.
(Former crime preventer, Lira, 7 November 2014)
Some of those who helped with the 2011 elections reported receiving a one-time
payment of 300,000 shillings (100 US dollars) and additional training to be
hired as special police constables, or police officers on contract. Reportedly,
some crime preventers were able to climb the ranks and become fully incor-
porated into the police force, while others were retrenched, often without notice
or explanation.
Broadly speaking, Ugandans described the Crime Preventer programme as little
different from other government programmes including mayumba kumi (‘ten
houses’), chaka mchaka (military training for civilians), LDUs, and other militias,
such as home guards and arrow boys, established in response to specific security
⁴ A Ugandan journalist dates the Crime Preventer programme’s first ‘pass out’—or completion of
initial training—to 1994 (Bagala 2015).
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threats. An official working for the ISO⁵ told me in late 2014 that all local
vigilantes had been transformed into crime preventers. Although such a trans-
formation was not universally recognized—nor presumably implemented—his
statement reflects the reality that many were unclear on the specifics of the
Crime Preventer programme, viewing differences among informal security
arrangements as purely semantic.
Part of this confusion can be explained by an organizational shift that occurred
in 2014. The then IGP Kale Kayihura, in what appeared to be an opportunistic
move, organized and trained young elites, and gave them the helm of what had
formally been a local community policing initiative. This group of young elites—
mainly university students in Kampala, coalesced in January 2014, when they
requested self-defence training from the police to prevent on-campus crimes. The
students reported that Kayihura ‘picked interest’ and supported their cause,
training 700 students at the Police Training School at Kabalye (Bagala 2015).⁶
By layering a formal, top-down institutional design on top of the Crime Preventer
programme’s original localized structure, the regime was able to quickly construct
a national programme with name recognition, local legitimacy, and grass-roots
connections.
The elite students took on leadership roles in the formal structure, named the
National Crime Preventers Forum (NCPF), and maintained close relationships
with the president and then-IGP Kayihura. Rumours circulated that the top
leadership of the NCPF were the IGP’s son and daughter.⁷ Photographs posted
on Facebook in 2015 pictured the top leadership of the NCPF with Museveni and
Kayihura at Museveni’s private home (on file with author). In the months before
the election, the top leadership of Crime Preventers publicly acknowledged their
own support for the president and the NRM, explaining that Kayihura and
Museveni were patrons of the programme (NCPF leadership, Gulu, 4 February
2016).⁸ When I visited the NCPF offices in Kampala in December 2015, it
appeared they were in the midst of moving in. New laptop computers were
stacked on a table in the lobby, and posters of Museveni’s face, inscribed with
‘The Father of Our Country’, adorned the walls.
⁵ The ISO is the country’s national counterintelligence agency.
⁶ Although a press release noted, ‘The public is also invited at any stage to come and witness these
programs at the Police Training School to help appreciate its value to all’ (Enanga 2014), I did not find
this to be the case. When I visited the Training School, I was turned away because I did not have a letter
from the office of the IGP.
⁷ In my interviews, this rumour was both denied and affirmed by people with first-hand knowledge
of the IGP’s family. While lower-level crime preventers unanimously believed the rumour, higher-level
crime preventers denied it and said it was merely a reflection of the close relationship between the IGP
and these ‘brilliant’ young leaders.
⁸ One respondent, a leader in the NCPF, claimed that crime preventers were non-partisan, while
also explaining, ‘We are mostly being facilitated by the sitting government. We cannot do work without
them’ (NCPF leadership, Gulu, 4 February 2016).
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The NCPF adopted an institutional structure that paralleled that of the police,
with coordinators at the village, parish, sub-county, district, and sub-regional
levels. The extent to which the NCPF coordinated with the Uganda Police Force
remained unclear. Crime Preventer coordinators—or ‘commanders’, as they were
sometimes called—explained that they frequently received instructions from the
NCPF headquarters, which only sometimes appeared to have been shared with
local police. Between 2014 and 2016, the number of citizens trained as crime
preventers surged, and by November 2015, the government claimed to have
recruited 30 citizen volunteers in each of Uganda’s 56,000 villages for an estimated
total of 1.5 million (Gaffey 2016; Uganda Police Force 2015). This would have
constituted nearly 4 per cent of the country’s population. Many argue that
these numbers were inflated to intimidate the political opposition; however,
more accurate tallies are difficult to come by since Crime Preventer coordi-
nators dutifully filled village rosters with the 30 required names—whether
or not those listed committed to participate actively. Crime preventers were
often trained by police or former military officers and asked to support the
work of the police.
Structurally, the role and identity of crime preventers was ambiguous. Crime
preventers were interchangeably accountable to various masters: they were for-
mally and institutionally accountable to the NCPF; informally accountable to
central government authorities, such as the president and the then IGP; and
personally and socially accountable to the communities where they lived and
worked. This ambiguity extended the programme’s foundational contradiction:
on one hand, state representatives emphasized the state’s potential absence, its
fragility, its need for additional capacity, and its inability to finance crime pre-
venters; and on the other, many participants decided to join the programme based
on their belief that they would be rewarded (with a job or payment) when the
government was successful in the 2016 elections.⁹
1.2 Training Crime Preventers: Political Education
and Military Spectacle
Training for crime preventers not only inculcated obedience and subservience to
the ruling regime, but also repeatedly revealed to recruits the military and
economic strength behind the NRM complex. Localized training, typically run
by active or retired police officers, taught crime preventers about state law as
well as the achievements of the NRM regime. Although training sessions were
⁹ The idea of the Ugandan government as both strong and weak has also been observed in the area of
national security, notably by Jonathan Fisher in his study of the Uganda’s manipulation of its status as a
‘fragile’ state (Fisher 2014b).
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generally modelled on other police and military training, there were no formal
instructions for what should be taught or how, leaving each individual trainer
to determine his own curriculum. Training at village and sub-county levels
emphasized marching (Figure 6.1), but also included other military drills
and culture, such as songs, Swahili commands, and saluting, as well as ad hoc
lessons in patriotism and law enforcement. Some crime preventers mentioned
tough punishments for being late or failing to take training seriously. However,
because crime preventers worked on a voluntary basis, commanders could not
be too harsh lest they quit. Training was often held in public places, such as
sport fields or sub-county headquarters, where passers-by could observe them
marching in formation. These performances of militarism distinguished crime
preventers from ordinary citizens in their communities. In some cases,
crime preventers reported that they were increasingly estranged from their
communities, where people saw them as spies and government informants.
The regime bolstered crime preventers’ loyalty through direct efforts at indoc-
trination. One LC1 chairman, who was himself a long-time supporter of the NRM,
explained his views on party indoctrination through chaka mchaka, a military
training course designed for civilians.
In the cadre course, they teach what they call patriotism. They have a lecture
given by experienced politicians. They start way back with the history of Uganda,
before colonisation. They talk of the good and the bad things that the
Fig. 6.1 Crime preventers at pass-out ceremony with President Museveni presiding
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government does and then you are given the freedom to discuss . . . Then you try
to compare the past and the present . . . It’s like a debate. The government in
power will always praise itself more. They explain that before [the NRM was]
there, things were like this or that, but now, we have UPE [universal primary
education], USE [universal secondary education], better security, roads, and so
on. During the lectures, they are also very tricky. The lecturer will tell you the
good things. Then there will be another one to tell the bad things. That’s when
you’ll hear a lot of questions. Then you will know who to focus on and how to
convince them. That’s how you can learn how to really support the party. I think
that the crime preventers are also getting these lessons.
(LC1 chairman, Gulu, 9 February 2016)
Patriotism and nationalism are common elements in Uganda’s military train-
ing. For example, in chaka mchaka, ‘political education’ or ‘ideology’ was a key
part of the training. Recruits were urged to become ‘transformation agents’ of
Uganda by participating ‘active[ly] in economic and productive development
and . . . act . . . as the instigators and promoters of government programs in their
communities’ (Verma 2012, 104). Patriotism became entwined with self-interest.
The LC1 explained, ‘The training on patriotism is a way of giving recruits the
wisdom of the good of the government and how to convince people that the
government in power is the best’ (LC1 chairman, Gulu, 9 February 2016).
Respondents were convinced that, on the whole, the indoctrination successfully
convinces recruits that the government is responsible for the good developments
they observe in society. Sessions on ‘patriotism’ and ‘nationalism’ were regularly
included in the curriculum at the Police Training School at Kabalye, where many
recruits went for more advanced training.
National-level training further reinforced crime preventers’ perceptions of a
personal relationship with the ruling regime. At such training, much of which was
reportedly held at the Police Training School at Kabalye, crime preventers learned
that their role was to support the state and protect the peace—for example by
disbanding protests. In Uganda, where state, government, and party are synonym-
ous, it was difficult for even the most thoughtful participants to distinguish
activities that were partisan from those that served the public interest. Simply
being incorporated into an institution affiliated with the police was sufficient to
win the rhetorical support of many crime preventers, even though material
rewards were minimal for most. One member of the NCPF explained that this
was because crime preventers felt the NRM regime was ‘the only one looking out
for them’ (NCPF leadership, Gulu, 4 February 2016). Many respondents com-
mented that the armed forces always vote for their ‘boss’, Museveni, and several
alleged that the military has been responsible for voting fraud in the past.
Militarization also contributes to support for Museveni. One regional police
commissioner explained:
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We teach [crime preventers] discipline—for example, when I say, ‘Stand easy’,
you don’t ask ‘Why?’; when I say ‘Turn right’ you don’t ask, ‘Why?’ And we teach
them rudimentary military skills, especially parade. You know us security people
like parade. And how to greet and pay compliments to authorities. Basically,
respect for the forces.
(Regional police commissioner, Kampala, 6 November 2015)
Crime preventers are taught to respect command hierarchy, do as they are told,
and ask questions later, if at all. The training also built a relationship between the
state and recruits, as one crime preventer explained:
With the force, once you join, they tell you that the first priority is to keep secrets
and be disciplined. With the force, it is command. That is the most important
thing. When the government gives you that knowledge, they will never leave you.
You cannot leave the army, because they have given you all the government
secrets. (Crime preventer, Gulu, 2 February 2016)
High-ranking government officials, including the IGP and the president, attended
these retreats personally to meet the trainees and bestow gifts.
1.3 Motivating Crime Preventers: Batons and Bikes
Though the regime promised to reward crime preventers, the distribution of these
goods was often opaque and unpredictable. Recruits were asked to show that
their loyalty was unwavering by sticking with the programme despite numerous
disappointments, broken promises, and wasted time.¹⁰ Even then, only some
participants were rewarded with promotions, payments, or praise. These rewards
were used both to cultivate personal ties between crime preventers and the
ruling regime, and to create examples that could be held up to motivate other
crime preventers. For instance, crime preventers who were eventually integrated
into the police became narrative lore. More concretely, in 2015, crime preventers
at the sub-county and district levels were given motorcycles, nominally to facili-
tate their movements and intelligence gathering. However, many crime preventers
used them for their personal travel or to start a motorcycle taxi business.
¹⁰ For example, respondents in Gulu told me that on numerous occasions they were asked to travel
to Kampala, they believed to participate in training. Crime preventers travelled from various districts to
the Central Police Station in Gulu Town. Upon arrival, they were told to go back home and return at a
later time, then asked to wait for hours on end with no food, water, or shelter. On one occasion, limited
transportation meant that many who came were sent home with nothing. Those who remained were
bussed to political rallies for the NRM in Kampala.
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One crime preventer explained that the motorcycles were framed as a gift to
reward crime preventers for all the unpaid work they had done to support
the regime:
The time of election [in 2011] we went to police school in Kabalye . . .We worked
day and night. Day and night! They can pick you even around 3am, moving,
patrolling. We worked, I said, ‘It’s ok.’ Until the time of elections, [then] they
gave us motorcycles. [It was on] 24 December 2015.
[Like a Christmas present?] Yeah. As a gift from the president for my work. We
moved with those motorcycles. We were very sharp in getting information . . .
You know if the president gives you a gift that is a gift—it is yours.
(Former crime preventer, Soroti, 31 January 2018)
The comments of this crime preventer highlight that though these motorcycles
were publicly justified as an investment in the programme, within the programme
they were recognized as patronage.
Promises made to crime preventers often relied on the regime’s survival: police
promised crime preventers that they would get their reward after ‘the big man’
won re-election; payment for the special police constables would occur after the
election results were announced. If Museveni was defeated, crime preventers
expected to return home empty-handed. They were thus implicated in the
regime’s success both professionally and personally. The IGP and the ruling
regime reinforced this narrative, suggesting in rallies and public speeches that
crime preventers should be prepared to fight for the government if the peace
was disturbed (The Insider 2016). Rumours of armed crime preventers making
arrests in Gulu and other districts were circulated constantly in the months before
the 2016 elections. In response to such rumours, citizens assumed that crime
preventers would be instrumental in enforcing the president’s electoral success,
whether with veiled or overt violence.
Crime preventers were regularly tasked with activities that demonstrated their
allegiance to the regime and distanced them from their communities—without
decreasing their dependence on those communities. In this way, they became
agents of regime-led projects of social control, carrying out a type of intimate and
personal governance that is distinct from neopatrimonialism. For example, crime
preventers were often tasked with arresting gamblers. Gambling is an illegal but
popular pastime. One crime preventer lamented that he no longer felt safe in his
community because of the work he did for the police.
Even my friends, they don’t like me [anymore] because they say for us [crime
preventers] we are capturing people, gamblers. Whether I am doing it or not,
they say I am the commander, I am instructing them [the crime preventers] to go
and do the work. I am not happy every day. The work which I’ve entered in is not
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good at all. My life is not safe . . . I have [moved] from the place where I used
to sit always because when I go there they are just saying ‘ah, this one is not
a good guy’. (Crime preventer, Gulu, 3 February 2016)
Many community members and elites such as lawyers, NGO workers, and
politicians described crime preventers as uneducated ex-rebels and criminals—
youth who have no option but to be used as tools of the ruling regime. At best,
such assessments were sympathetic, but more frequently they were dismissive.
Despite such denigration, many crime preventers decided to stick with the
programme, reasoning that they had already committed to it and their friends
and families would understand their choice as a potential pathway to a future
livelihood.
Those who refused to follow commands faced retribution or replacement,
as one commander explained: ‘If you say you don’t like [the command]—
immediately, I have to replace you. Because an order is an order. But not by
force. Not even putting that person in too much pressure. Saying, “You just go
out.” I have replaced them but not reported them’ (Crime preventer, Gulu,
3 February 2016). Dismissing crime preventers seems innocent enough; however,
many had made significant sacrifices in terms of time and personal relation-
ships hoping that their dedication would eventually yield a reward.
The relentless demands of the programme culled crime preventers, and
conditioned them to have high hopes and low expectations. Those who were
not desperate, patient, or committed dropped out over months of broken
promises. The occasional distribution of gifts and select promotions created
examples that leadership could point to when seeking to motivate crime
preventers. These hopes, in turn, encouraged competition among recruits,
which helped balance the camaraderie developed in training such that recruits’
strongest commitments were to the regime, not to each other. Thus, crime
preventers remained fragmented, protecting the state from an organized interest
group of young men that could otherwise have demanded representation or
remuneration.
2. Ambiguous Activities, Uncertain Identities: Fostering
Potential State Presence across the Country
During the 2016 elections, crime preventers took on an ambiguous role as at once
ordinary citizens and, simultaneously, state agents. The following examples
describe how crime preventers were used to bolster attendance at rallies, to police
the elections, and to spread rumours about electoral interference. Their activities
contributed to the perception that the state might be present anywhere at
any time.
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2.1 Demonstration at Karuma Bridge
During the 2016 election, crime preventers were called upon to attend rallies,
protests, and demonstrations, producing the appearance of a ground-swell of
support for government initiatives, programmes, and candidates. The pro-
gramme served as a network through which those in need of crowds could
recruit bodies in numbers. Because of the ambiguity surrounding the pro-
gramme, the government was able to brand participants either as crime pre-
venters or as ordinary citizens, often selecting post hoc the identity best suited to
its publicity needs.
In 2015, regime insider Amama Mbabazi joined the presidential race to
challenge Museveni. Mbabazi had formerly been Museveni’s prime minister
and a founding member of the NRM. Many initially saw him as a formidable
opponent to Museveni, someone who knew the regime’s strategies and could use
them to unseat the president, or at the very least peel off some of his support. It
was thus a surprise when, on 10 July 2015, an MP for the opposition—the
honourable Odonga Otto representing Aruu county in northern Uganda—
organized a protest against Mbabazi. The protest was planned to meet
Mbabazi’s convoy at Karuma Bridge over the Victoria Nile river. The location
was strategic both symbolically and practically: the bridge divides Uganda’s
northern region from the south, and it provides a choke point that cannot be
bypassed. The protest photographed well (Figure 6.2): over 400 youth mobilized,
publicizing the message that Mbabazi had stolen 1.4 billion shillings from the
Peace, Recovery, and Development Plan, a programme designed to rebuild
northern Uganda after the LRA conflict (Ocungi and Okaba 2015). Local and
national news media covered the demonstration; however, there was no con-
frontation as Mbabazi had delayed his trip to northern Uganda, reportedly for
unrelated reasons (Etukuri and Semakula 2015).
The following day, crime preventers from Gulu complained that they had been
‘tricked’ into joining the rally. They said that police officers had notified them that
there would be a three-month training at the Police Training School at Kabalye,
and those who wished to attend should report immediately to the Central
Police Station in Gulu and board the transportation provided. Instead, the crime
preventers were driven 65 kilometres from Gulu and told to disembark and don
T-shirts with a red ‘x’ through Mbabazi’s initials (JPAM) and the slogan ‘Why buy
a Benz of 600 million with PRDP [Peace, Recovery, and Development Plan]
money?’ They were then instructed to join the other protesters in marching the
remaining 10 kilometres to Karuma Bridge. The day after the protest, some of the
crime preventers were disgruntled at having been misinformed about the purpose
of their travel, coerced to march in the heat without water or food, abandoned
with no means to return to Gulu Town, and paid nothing for their time. These
crime preventers brought their complaints to the district and regional police
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commanders, who reportedly responded that they themselves had been similarly
misinformed.
Because the Crime Preventer programme had a loose and undefined mandate,
politicians were able to mobilize them for overtly political activities and then claim
that the crime preventers were acting of their own volition. In turn, the crime
preventers were willing to obey orders even when there was significant evidence to
suggest that they were being manipulated. For example, several crime preventers
reported that they were first put on a lorry that was in such bad shape they
doubted it would be able to make the trip to Kabalye. Then, when they were given
the T-shirts, they donned them without asking questions, despite not knowing
what ‘JPAM’ (Mbabazi’s initials) meant. They continued to follow the orders to
descend from the bus, join the rally, and march to Karuma Bridge. They only
challenged these orders in retrospect, when it became clear that they had gotten a
raw deal. The police rejected the crime preventers’ rights to make claims.
A variety of evidence suggests that the police who informed the crime pre-
venters about the sham training did, in fact, know that they were really being
taken to the demonstration. One retired police officer reflected that someone in
the police force must have given permission: ‘Because you can’t come from
nowhere and pick someone who I’m looking after [as a member of the police
force], and take [him] away’ (Retired police officer, Gulu, 16 October 2015).
Fig. 6.2 Protesters walking toward Karuma Bridge; some carry MP Odonga Otto
(centre)
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Others speculate that the police offered the services of crime preventers to please
the NRM party leadership, whether directly commanded to do so or not, because
‘That is how you get promoted—do something to please the president’ (Locally
elected politician, Gulu, 21 September 2015). One crime preventer who facilitated
training explained that he suspected foul play and initially refused to go:
I refused to go to Karuma—the CID [criminal investigations director] came to
talk to me, and said to me ‘Let me take these people, and then I’ll provide
transport for you to come back.’ The police knew that if I did not go the others
also would not. [In this way] I was forced to go to Karuma.
(Crime preventer, Gulu, 29 September 2015)
One district-level politician further asserted that there was evidence that the NRM
paid the organizing MP, Otto, to stir up resentment against Mbabazi in northern
Uganda (District-level politician, Gulu, 19 February 2016).
[After Mbabazi announced his candidacy] the Movement got in touch with some
individuals in the opposition in northern Uganda—one is honourable Odonga
Otto. Otto was given money [by the NRM] . . .Where did he get money to hire six
buses from, trucks for carrying people? He took over 400 youth. He fed them. He
gave them over 20,000 [shillings] each to return on. Where does he get over four
million to spend? . . . The people he took were crime preventers. The police lied to
crime preventers that they were taken for further training in Masindi. They [the
crime preventers] went on radio; they were very bitter . . . The most disturbing
part is, how do the police mobilise such people, don’t tell them the truth and
allow a political leader to use them in a wrong way?
(Elected official, Gulu, 25 September 2015)
He posited that this was why Otto—an opposition politician—meddled in internal
NRM party politics, despite facing discipline from his own party for doing so (The
Insider 2015). The protest was thus a political manoeuvre in which crime pre-
venters were collateral damage, instrumentalized by the NRM and Otto for their
own ends.
The crime preventers continued to seek redress: they threatened to march to
Gulu’s Central Police Station in protest, but were told that if they did, they would
be tear-gassed. Instead, the crime preventers went to journalists from the major
newspapers, who ran a number of articles with headlines including ‘We were
tricked to join anti-Mbabazi demo—Crime Preventers’ (Otto 2015), and ‘Gulu
Crime Preventers hoodwinked into joining anti-Mbabazi demos’ (Ocungi 2015).
They also went to a human rights NGO, which advised them to go to the
Department of Labour to complain about unpaid work. Reflecting on this
OUP CORRECTED AUTOPAGE PROOFS – FINAL, 17/5/2021, SPi
140  
recommendation, another crime preventer said: ‘But they are not government
employees, so they were left hanging.’
The police, who had previously been unresponsive, contacted the complainants
and threatened them with jail time for going to the press. When asked why crime
preventers are not allowed to talk to the press, the police public relations officer
for the region explained that it was for their own protection: ‘It’s risky [to talk to
the media]! If you report on your friend who has committed a crime, what will
stop him from doing something bad on you? So, it’s like you’re an intelligence
officer and you need to be protected’ (Police public relations officer, Gulu,
23 November 2015).
Seven months after the protest, in February 2016, one crime preventer declined
the opportunity to become a constable because he feared retribution for having
spoken to the press about the Karuma Bridge demonstration. Although the press
coverage of the protest noted 40 disgruntled crime preventers, my interviews
suggest that, in fact, crime preventers were bussed from various districts in
northern Uganda, including Pader and Nwoya. Others may not have complained
because they were satisfied with the amount they were paid (reportedly between
5,000 and 20,000 shillings, the equivalent of 1.67 to 6.67 US dollars). Or perhaps
they realized the potentially high costs of publicizing their situation, as alluded to
by the police public relations officer.
Crime preventers were used for rallies on other occasions, either to control
crowds or to increase attendance. For example, on the day of the president’s
nomination, buses full of youth dressed in yellow—the colour of the NRM party—
filled the streets of Kampala, whooping and yelling. One crime preventer
explained:
We went to Kololo for the president’s nomination. We went as supporters, and
we all put yellow [the colour of the NRM party]. The DPC said the president
wants to talk to the crime preventers. I thought, ‘The president needs to tell us
something important.’ They provided transport from and to. [We were told]
those who went will get 500,000 shillings each. Then we were told to stand for the
rally and listen to the speech. He was for nomination. They told us, ‘you should
be happy, you will be paid for it. Sing, dance and wave—you’re 500,000 [shillings]
is coming’. (Crime preventer, Gulu, 20 November 2015)
This strategy, although blatant, creates the appearance of massive support.
Because there is no transparency about who is there to get paid and who
genuinely supports the candidate—often there may be no substantive
difference—the ploy appears to be effective at bolstering a candidate’s popularity
and augmenting the perception that there is widespread public support for the
regime.
OUP CORRECTED AUTOPAGE PROOFS – FINAL, 17/5/2021, SPi
  ? 141
2.2 Special Police Constables and the 2016 Elections
One of the few publicly stated rationales for recruiting crime preventers, aside
from combatting crime in a general sense, was to help ensure peace during the
2016 presidential elections. This included the prevention of violent protests,
management of election rallies, and keeping order at polling stations. A few
weeks before the elections, the police reportedly recruited 36,000 police constables
(Kato 2016), many of them drawn from the crime preventers. The widespread
presence of crime preventers at polling stations bolstered the perception of state
presence at the very moment when the regime’s continued survival required
electoral support. Training and short-term employment also gave the crime
preventers a taste of how they might access the state’s patronage after the election,
helping ensure their loyalty at this key moment.
Although the selection process was not transparent, crime preventers believed
that they were recommended for work at polling stations by sub-county crime
preventer coordinators and selected based on the loyalty and commitment they
had shown to the programme over the preceding months. Reportedly, in Gulu
District, nearly one-fifth of recruits were dropped without explanation after
initial selection; this appears to have occurred in other districts as well.
According to police officials in Masaka District in the Central Region, some
were cut because they failed interviews and others because they were physically
weak or did not have the minimum educational requirements (Ssenkabirwa and
Kisekka 2016). In Gulu, one crime preventer speculated that those dropped did
not make it through security checks, which were conducted in Kampala after the
recruits submitted their fingerprints. Another guessed that cuts had been made
because of the government’s limited resources.
Those who were selected participated in a one-week residential training in Gulu
Town. A significant part of the training focused on disciplining the new recruits.
One recent recruit explained to me some of the tactics used to teach the recruits
discipline and respect for authority:
Say you are sitting with a colleague after hours. An instructor comes and looks at
you. ‘Get up, come. Go back. Come. I told you to come. Go back and sit. Come!’
He’s seeing how you are responding. It will be put in your notes, you’re someone
who can follow command, which is needed in the force.
There’s a lot of lies in training. They call them ‘sweet nothings’. They even
brought a very big fat cow. They say, ‘Today, it’s for you guys.’ They took it
behind the kitchen and hid the cow. Guys were happy . . . Guys started washing
their dishes, looking for pepper . . .When it came to lunch time, the whistle was
blown, and everyone started fighting to get into line. They dish beans and posho
[a staple food]. So when you come and you get you are expected to say ‘thank
OUP CORRECTED AUTOPAGE PROOFS – FINAL, 17/5/2021, SPi
142  
you’. When you don’t say ‘thank you’ [that’s indiscipline]. In the force, you are
not supposed to initiate anyone to support you . . . There’s no riot in the force.
[If there is a problem] go alone and say, ‘please, this was not good’. So, you can
also be handled alone.
(Newly recruited special police constable, Gulu, 13 February 2016)
In addition to instructions on their duties, crime preventers were trained on the
institutional organization of the police force, including their role as special police
constables. They were also provided with a list of activities prohibited on election
day and another list of ‘uniform rules’. The duties of the special police constables
included:
1. Know we are the special police constables, not election constables [who are
tasked with managing the voting process].
2. Support the police in patrol during night and day.
3. Manage violence and enforce the law.
4. Be ready to do duties of emergency in case of a bad situation arising.
5. We should be ready to work with the army security agency, including
prisons, army, and intelligence agents.
6. Discipline: we should not put on [political] party shirts, or flash any [party]
slogan. Anyone who does that will be charged with the Police Act.¹¹ That
person will be sent to prison.
The uniform rules focused on how special police constables should present
themselves as part of the force, rather than as crime preventers. Special police
constables are told that they must not be partisan; however, this is difficult in a
context where the regime and state are functionally fused. A few days before the
election, I asked one recent recruit what he would do if he observed violations on
polling day. He explained:
As a polling constable, there are certain limits—my hands are tied. If anything
happens, I have to note it down. So when you [the victim of injustice] go to your
candidate to make a complaint and they call me, then I can give the information
in court. Or, if I cannot go to court [because of my own security] I can give the
report [to someone else to deliver]. With the government having a longer arm,
people want to be on the safe side.¹² I’ll take note. I’m not going to court to be on
the safe side. (Special police constable, Gulu, 19 February 2016)
¹¹ The Police Act specifies that any ‘member of a security organisation placed under the command
of the inspector general for the performance of police duties’ is subject to the police disciplinary code of
conduct (‘The Police Act’ 1994, pts. VI, Section 44).
¹² This saying is akin to the phrase ‘the long arms of the law’ (Tapscott 2017b).
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The respondent felt that he could help improve the system through participation,
although he feared that making public statements in court about voter intimida-
tion, fraud, or other irregularities might put his own safety at risk. He also
explained that although special police constables were clearly instructed to keep
partisan attitudes to themselves,
At the end of the day, all the big people will come [to the training]. What they do
is say you have to vote wisely if you don’t want to go back to the bush or back to
the IDP [internally displaced people] camps. Of course, what they mean is to vote
for Museveni. It influences a lot of guys, but not all.
(Special police constable, Gulu, 19 February 2016)
Other researchers have noted that such security training programmes are infused
with pro-government propaganda. For example, a 2016 Human Rights Watch
report cited a Crime Preventer training programme that stated ‘Every good thing
you are seeing around is as a result of good NRM governance’ (Human Rights
Watch 2016).
On election day, special police constables were often indistinguishable from
long-serving police officers, though some were identifiable by their ill-fitting or
incomplete uniforms. I identified one special police constable by his boots, which
were pink and lined with faux fur rather than the black military boots that most
police officers wear. Outside the tallying station, a colleague whispered in my ear
that the officers with white lapels were crime preventers. The degree to which they
blended in, however, reflects a comment that a female employee at a human rights
NGO made to me:
When the [special police constables] came back from six months of training they
were uniformed and you could not tell who was who . . .When circumstances call
for it, they just change the uniforms around . . . Unless someone tells me who is
behind the uniform, we can’t know.
(Human rights NGO employee, Gulu, 29 September 2015)
The crime preventers who worked as special police constables were told they
would be paid 11,000 shillings (3.67 US dollars) each day for 14 days of work,
starting with the presidential elections on 18 February 2016. Reportedly, the police
asked some crime preventers to return their uniforms before paying them, which
resulted in riots quelled only when the police ‘explained to them the police
procedures and they [the crime preventers] understood our position and their
response to our order is now good’ (Bagala 2016).
Thus, young men who became crime preventers were introduced to the NRM
system, however cursorily, through a process of training and the hope of future
employment. The Crime Preventer programme served the regime’s need to bolster
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its perceived security capacity in the eyes of citizens, without substantially
increasing costs or training youth to the extent that they themselves could
threaten the regime. The programme had the added benefit of regularly expos-
ing crime preventers to the NRM’s military and economic strength, cultivating
their belief that the regime has access to wealth and sovereign violence that
these young men, if they played their cards right, could potentially
benefit from.
2.3 Rumours and Suspicious Activities
The many rumours circulating around the Crime Preventer programme helped
create uncertainty about whether or not crime preventers were agents of the
NRM. For example, in December 2015, crime preventers were reportedly
deployed across the country to check the voter registration list. This deployment
and Mbabazi’s call for an investigation into it were reported in various newspapers
(Mugume 2015; Musinguzi 2015; NTV 2015; Segawa 2015; Sserunjogi 2015).
Several crime preventers and civilians explained to me that crime preventer
coordinators for each village were given the voter registration list and asked to
verify it door to door, checking off individuals who were correctly registered,
marking deceased ‘D’, and those who had moved ‘DR’.
Crime preventers expressed conflicting interpretations of this activity. Some
argued that the information would be used to bias the election in favour of the
NRM. One crime preventer said that they were supposed to remove known
members of the opposition from the registry. Others suggested that checking
the list would intimidate voters; still others that the deceased would be made to
vote for the NRM. Another crime preventer pointed out that this task put him in a
difficult position: ‘Should I do anything stupid with [the voter registration list], it
will backfire on me. [The community members] know me from my childhood. It’s
very risky to do anything’ (Crime preventer, Gulu, 4 February 2016). Others
insisted that the exercise was intended to make the list more accurate or prevent
the opposition from rigging the election. A police officer in Gulu Central Police
Station explained:
The voter registrar of the Electoral Commission is the EC’s responsibility. Each
presidential candidate is given the voter registration to cross check if it’s okay. He
can use any method. The crime preventers are members of the community . . .
Some presidential candidate [might have] decided to use them to check [if the
voters are existing or dead] because they [crime preventers] are many . . . This
helps you know the number of people who are registered. The ones who are alive,
you can know the number, and then you can know if the number of votes given is
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more or less. When they add the votes up, it should be slightly less than the
overall list. This helps them to know there was no rigging.
(Police officer, Gulu, 13 February 2016)
Others denied knowledge of this activity, despite reports in the media, and by
community members and crime preventers.
Reportedly, each village coordinator was paid 5,000 shillings (1.67 US dollars)
to verify the list, while sub-county coordinators were paid 150,000 shillings (50 US
dollars). One sub-county coordinator explained that although the village coord-
inators were supposed to do the work, he was responsible for completing the task:
I leave it with village coordinator. If it becomes difficult for them, I fill it. Me as
a commander, I have to do the work to make sure the form is full. If they
[the Crime Preventer leadership] say, go and plant for me the maize, I cannot
say, ‘I’m tired.’ I have to finish the work . . . For them they know [which
community members are alive, dead, or have moved]. If they don’t know,
you have to ask someone who knows, so that he helps you to mark those
people. But secretly. When people know [what we are doing], that is another
problem again. That is why they are talking on us every day.
(Crime preventer, Gulu, 3 February 2016)
Despite the hundreds of individuals involved in checking the list across the
country, the purpose of the exercise remains obscured. A leader from the NCPF
said he did not know what happened with the revised lists, but implied that they
made their way all the way to the Office of the President. ‘I don’t know what [the
president] did with it [the updated voter registration list]. I don’t know where they
took them. We came back to do our work’ (NCPF member, Gulu, 4 February
2016). Respondents—including journalists, crime preventers, and politicians both
in and out of power—generally seemed unconcerned about this activity. Upon
further questioning, I interpreted this indifference as rooted in their belief that the
entire system was fixed. Thus, they saw little value—and lots of risk—in investi-
gating the minutiae of how.
These rumours show how crime preventers were cast in an uncertain light:
they were agents of the NRM and at the same time ordinary citizens simply
pursuing a potential livelihood. Their activities in the community brought this
ambiguity to the doorsteps of ordinary Ugandans. Together, the three
examples illustrate how crime preventers were leveraged for political ends
throughout their recruitment, training, and deployment. Both the police and
politicians continually redefined crime preventers’ relationship to the regime,
sometimes framing them as agents of the state and sometimes as citizen
volunteers.
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3. Analysis: Whither the State?
There is a saying in northern Uganda, gamente c’inge bor—which translates as ‘the
government has a long hand (or forearm)’. The saying is akin to the English
phrase, ‘the long arm of the law’. In an interview, a community member explained:
You see, the government starts with me and you who are seated right here
provided we talk what is consistent with what the government has laid down
in the laws . . . The strength of the government depends on us who are here at the
grass roots. Without us there is no government.
(50-year-old male community member, Gulu, 5 March 2015)
In this telling, the state is not only omnipresent, but actually embodied in
Ugandan citizens. The regime’s ability to collapse the state–society division and
to create the perception that all Ugandans are part of the state can be traced, at
least in part, to Uganda’s history as a no-party state. Many scholars note that
Uganda’s no-party system was akin to a one-party state. But the emphasis on all
Ugandans being part of the Movement—and a big tent approach to politics that
nominally encouraged meritocratic competition and even critique and reform—
helped fuse the NRM to the Ugandan state and citizenry (Carbone 2008). In my
interviews, many Ugandans linked contemporary political turmoil to the return to
multiparty politics. One LC councillor elaborated on this perceived fusion
between citizens and the state:
Nowadays we are all part and parcel of government . . . whether central or local
government. Whenever there is something going on wrong, we at the grass root
leadership try our best to report to the responsible authority [so they can]
respond and rescue the situation. It has become easier [now] that we do not
have to move very long distance to report cases of crime since there nearby police
post. The state has consolidated its authority up to the grass roots.
(LC1 Chairman, Gulu, 5 March 2015)
In his view, the Ugandan state is ‘consolidated . . . up’ to the local level in part
because of an historically embedded notion that citizens are the state, but also
that they are subject to the state. The co-existence of these notions allows the
regime to regularly reframe the identity of citizens, and concomitantly their
rights and responsibilities, thereby keeping the state–society boundary fluid and
unconsolidated. This fluid boundary makes it appear that the state could be
present at any time, embodied in ordinary citizens.
The use of the Crime Preventer programme was opportunistic: the ruling
regime repurposed an existing community policing programme to extend the
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party’s patronage system and earn the support of tens of thousands of
unemployed and desperate youth. The regime kept rules about crime preventers
vague, allowing sufficient space for powerful politicians to manipulate the pro-
gramme for political ends. The regime and the police used a combination
of promises and threats to keep recruits in a precarious situation; as a result,
crime preventers allied themselves with the regime, not with each other. Crime
preventers could not reliably predict whether state authorities would act in
their personal or formal capacity. Importantly, decisions by state authorities—
whether personal or formal—were backed by the dual threats of exclusion from
the regime’s system of resource distribution and of symbolic and material
coercion, such as arrest and detention. The resultant unpredictability undermined
the ability of citizens to act strategically or hold state actors accountable. Aspects
of this system reflect theories of neopatrimonialism. But the Crime Preventer
programme also demonstrates how internalized obedience to an abstract idea of
state power is an immediate force in individuals’ everyday lives. Patron–client
ties can exist in this system, but they are contingent and uncertain, framed by the
idea of the state’s power.
The Crime Preventer programme was able to mobilize and organize
unemployed and underemployed young men, while in the main keeping them
competing with one another rather than coordinating to make claims on the
regime. Those who became crime preventers were generally very poor; their
families needed food, shelter, and education. As young men, it was their desig-
nated social role to provide (Dolan 2011; Tapscott 2018). Those who complained
about the terms of work were made into examples—excluded from the pro-
gramme or even threatened. They were thus thrust outside the NRM’s patrimonial
structure, potentially losing access to resources in both the short and long term.
One crime preventer coordinator explained his conundrum:
The opposition doesn’t care about us. We need the money of the government
because we are the jobless people. [The government] say[s] they care about us,
but [I think] what we’re doing is not good. But we went [to be crime preventers]
because of the money.
[What do you think about that?] Their point is not bad. But when you support
[the government], there is nothing we shall gain from them. Their word is always
very sweet like that. But there is nothing to gain. You have to pray to God to help
you . . . but not these politicians. They’re all the same. Whether they send them
there, they will talk like they will give you something. But when they go for
parliament, you will see them after five years.
(Crime preventer, Gulu, 18 November 2015)
Local communities intensified these dynamics, viewing crime preventers as
unemployed, uneducated former rebels who were using the title and access that
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came with being a ‘crime preventer’ to become ‘crime promoters’. In this way, they
wrote off crime preventers and ignored many of their activities, estranging crime
preventers from their communities and making them even more precarious.
4. Conclusion
By examining the experience of young men recruited into the Crime Preventer
programme, this chapter has shown both how they contributed to the governing
strategy of institutionalized arbitrariness and how they were governed by it. While
the implementation of the programme was disorganized and contradictory, its
governance effects were in some ways neat. Because authorities sometimes nar-
rated crime preventers as integral to the regime, their presence offered ordinary
citizens evidence of state presence. Ordinary people saw crime preventers training
in public spaces, standing to attention for ceremonial ‘pass outs’ that marked the
successful completion of their initial training, apprehending suspects in their
communities, and guarding detainees at local police stations. Their participation
in rallies and demonstrations swelled crowds, physically demonstrating support
for the regime. Their recruitment in even the most remote villages revived the
perception of the state’s grass-roots surveillance capacity; their review of the voter
registration list seemingly brought the state’s eyes and ears to the doorsteps of
citizens across the country. At the same time, state authorities also disowned
crime preventers and categorized them as ordinary citizens. Crime preventers had
no uniform, no appointment paper, and no identification. They were unpaid and
disrespected. Their training was on offer to all Ugandans; they were doing their
duty as citizens. In such situations, powerless to pull strings or make claims on
state authorities, their experiences revealed and reinforced a stark division
between individuals inside the NRM tent and those left at the door.
By keeping the role of crime preventers ambiguous, the NRM regime also
transformed crime preventers from an apparently innocuous community policing
intervention into a tool to efficiently and effectively extend existing systems of
resource distribution to a potentially troublesome segment of the population—
underemployed, marginalized youth who might otherwise have joined the oppos-
ition. Overall, the Crime Preventer programme appears to have helped the regime
win votes and placate Ugandans during what might otherwise have been a
contentious and potentially violent election cycle. Although quite distinct
from the practice of encouraging local security initiatives, the Crime Preventer
programme worked on much the same logic. By keeping the purpose of the
programme fluid and undefined, the regime maximized its benefits while limiting
its responsibility for crime preventers’ activities and needs.
If the state is informed about everything and has the capacity to intervene, then
its lack of action appears to be as deliberate as its actions. This casts the
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appearance of state intention even in its absence. The perception of potential state
presence causes citizens to self-police, constantly trying to calculate the risks and
rewards of their actions. The relationship between state and society is constitutive
of any governing strategy. In democratic polities, a robust and secure civic space
theoretically allows citizens to make certain claims on the government—for
example, for better schools, lower taxes, or human rights protections. Instead, in
Uganda, the blurred and dynamic relationship between state and society creates a
possibility of state presence—one that is real enough to impose meaningful
threats, and at the same time, fleeting and difficult to pin down.
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7
Varieties of Arbitrary Governance
In the previous pages, I identified and described a new type of modern authori-
tarian rule based on an inductive analysis of local security in northern Uganda.
This regime type uses institutionalized arbitrariness—creating and maintaining
political unpredictability—to project power. In this chapter, I expand my study to
three more locations in Uganda to assess the validity of arbitrary governance as a
regime type. The probe includes three parts. First, I examine citizens’ perceptions
of state governance and find that citizens perceive arbitrary governance across the
research sites. The perception of arbitrary governance is not unique to Gulu or
northern Uganda. Second, I deductively apply my four-part framework of insti-
tutionalized arbitrariness to the additional study locations. The framework,
described in Chapter 2 and elaborated in Chapters 4 through 6, allows me to
identify different types of arbitrary governance. Third, I return to questions of
intentionality and societal agency, using findings from the additional research
sites and the book as a whole, to identify some limitations of arbitrary governance
as an explanatory framework.
The three additional research sites, Mbarara, Moroto, and Soroti, are located in
the west, northeast, and east of Uganda, respectively (see Figure 0.1). These sites
vary on level of conflict-affectedness and political support for the ruling regime,
two factors that could also account for perceptions of arbitrary governance. If
citizens in these alternative sites do not perceive the state as arbitrary, it would
suggest that perceptions of arbitrariness in Gulu are the product of local context-
ual factors in a weakly consolidated state—not evidence of a distinct regime type.
However, my research found that people across Uganda perceive the regime as
arbitrary, and that they self-police in response. Neither conflict affectedness nor
political leanings were necessary nor sufficient to explain perceptions of arbitrary
governance. Findings from these three additional sites both bolsters and nuances
the argument advanced in the earlier pages of this book.
Consider the two government strongholds—Mbarara, Museveni’s home district
is one of the most peaceful and wealthy areas of the country; and Moroto, a district
on the northeast border, long destabilized by government-sponsored disarma-
ment campaigns and internal cattle raiding among pastoralist indigenous groups.
In contrast to Gulu, both of these areas support the ruling regime but they have
had very different experiences of violent conflict. While citizens viewed the ruling
NRM regime as arbitrary in both locales, the data collected there also revealed
important variations. In Mbarara, citizens expressed a heightened awareness of
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state surveillance and reported fear of speaking openly, even in their own homes.
In contrast, respondents in Moroto described the central state as distant, its direct
authority largely circumscribed to military and police units. Respondents in
Moroto also depicted a more immediate experience of overwhelming state vio-
lence, describing torture by government soldiers during forcible disarmament
campaigns in 2006. These examples reflect how the regime’s efforts to project
power vary in implementation, producing different manifestations of arbitrary
governance across the country.
In each location, I studied local security arrangements to understand the micro-
dynamics of violence. I surveyed how ordinary people perceive state power, as well
as whether and how this shapes their everyday lives. I employed semi-structured
interviews designed to probe the four factors of institutionalized arbitrariness,
identified inductively in Gulu. In each study location, I interviewed approximately
20 respondents including members of informal security arrangements, police
officers, village- and sub-county-level elected officials, and members of civil
society including activists, elders, and religious authorities. I spent approximately
two weeks in each research site and triangulated my findings with scholarly
literature and newspaper articles.
This chapter makes three interventions. First, it shows that citizens who live in
areas with different histories, economies, politics, and societies—but all under the
same NRM regime—perceive and experience the government as an arbitrary
regime. Second, the chapter describes varieties of arbitrary governance. Each
variety disorders society and undermines relationships among ordinary citizens
and local authorities. However, each variety manifests arbitrary governance dif-
ferently, as each area is shaped by interactions among historically and contextually
contingent factors, chiefly local experiences of state violence by different regimes
and antipathy to (or affinity with) the ruling regime. Thus, the regime—using the
same ingredients in different quantities and qualities—produces arbitrary govern-
ance of different flavours. Third, the chapter explores some limitations of institu-
tionalized arbitrariness by re-examining questions of intentionality and societal
agency using all four sub-national cases and additional interviews with elites,
including former NRM stalwarts, high-ranking government officials, and mem-
bers of the military. The evidence shows that citizens perceive and experience
arbitrary governance in their daily lives, that arbitrary governance can be under-
stood as the result of a structure that the NRM regime has produced with the goal
of fragmenting and weakening civil society and local authorities, and that insti-
tutionalized arbitrariness is an understudied tool of modern authoritarianism.
The chapter is organized in four sections. Section 1 discusses case selection and
how each added study location tests the scope of arbitrary governance. Section 2
turns to the empirical findings, describing varieties of arbitrary governance in
Mbarara, Moroto, and Soroti, and offers a typology of arbitrary governance.
Together, Sections 1 and 2 show that arbitrary governance characterizes the
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Ugandan regime and illustrates how to use institutionalized arbitrariness as an
analytic framework. Section 3 summarizes the new varieties of arbitrary govern-
ance identified in the probe. Finally, Section 4 turns to synthetic insights about
intentionality and societal agency, drawing on all four cases and additional
interviews with elites.
1. Case Selection and Alternative Explanations
for the Perception of an Arbitrary State
Conflict-affectedness and relationship to the ruling regime are two potentially
persuasive alternative explanations for citizens’ perceptions of an arbitrary state.
Conflict-affectedness—or the extent to which a location has experienced sustained
armed violence and loss of civilian life, particularly at the hands of the regime—
should amplify citizens’ perceptions of the regime’s ability to deploy arbitrary and
unaccountable violence, whether to protect or harm the civilian population.
Violent conflict is generally understood as a disruption of political order. When
multiple armed actors contest power, everyday life becomes uncertain and unpre-
dictable (Debos 2011; Hagmann and Korf 2012; Vigh 2009). As researchers have
described in studies of Gulu, violent conflict leaves a legacy of exceptionality
inscribed on the land and people, both directly, through citizens’ memories of
war and its unpredictability, and indirectly, through the effects of social, eco-
nomic, and political upheaval.¹ If perceptions of arbitrary governance were limited
to conflict-affected locales, that would suggest such perceptions reflect the after-
math of violent conflict, and that arbitrariness characterizes as an interim period
until the state (re)consolidates its full authority, rather than constituting a distinct
type of governance.
To explore whether conflict-affectedness explains local perceptions of an arbi-
trary state, I selected Moroto, an area in addition to Gulu that experienced
insecurity and violent conflict between 1986 and 2016, and two areas that have
been comparatively peaceful and stable (see Figure 7.1 ‘Total fatalities per year by
case’). Gulu was the epicentre of the conflict between the LRA and the
Government of Uganda from 1986 to 2006, and the NRM government has long
intervened violently in the activities of pastoralists in the northeast Karamoja
region, where the urban centre Moroto has been a hub of humanitarian aid. In
¹ The scars of violent conflict and their legacy in northern Uganda have been widely documented,
including in relation to land (Hopwood 2015), love (Porter 2017), cosmology (Victor 2018), social
order (Finnström 2008), political power (Branch 2011), and gender relations (Dolan 2009; Schulz
2018). While these scholars examine how ordinary Acholi people navigated an exceptional time and its
fall-out, I instead propose here that war is only one way in which the regime blurs the line between
exceptional and lawful violence, and it is also one of four components that produce perceptions of state
arbitrariness.
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contrast, both Soroti and Mbarara experienced comparative peace and stability
between 1986 and 2016, though the figure reflects an exception in Soroti—armed
conflict between the LRA and the UPDF (along with the locally recruited militia
known as ‘Arrow Boys’), mostly isolated to 2003.
Political relationship to the regime is another key alternative explanation for
citizens’ perceptions of arbitrary and unpredictable state governance. Arbitrary
governance in places where citizens oppose the regime could be attributed to two
factors: first, the ruling regime’s decision to use more aggressive and destructive
interventions to punish its opponents in opposition areas; and second, the diffi-
culty of implementing central state authority in hostile locales, such that govern-
ance efforts might result in more uneven—and thus less predictable—state
presence and effectiveness. In the first circumstance, arbitrariness would not
characterize the regime as such, but rather would be one of many tactics it uses
to govern specific locales. In the latter circumstance, arbitrariness would not
constitute a governing strategy, but rather result from uneven implementation.
In the stronghold cases, one would expect the opposite: the regime might allow
greater social, political, and economic organization among those it views as its
supporters, and state institutions should be able to penetrate more effectively and









97 98 99 00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18
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Fig. 7.1 Total fatalities per year by district
Note: This figure shows fatalities beginning in 1997 reflecting the availability of armed conflict location
and event data. The dynamics of the preceding decade were similar to the years pictured in the chart,
with Gulu experiencing significant loss of civilian life as the epicentre of the conflict between the LRA
and the NRM regime, Moroto experiencing violence as part of ongoing cattle raiding and low-level
conflict, and Soroti and Mbarara being comparatively peaceful. Further details and exceptions are
elaborated in each case study
Source: Armed conflict location and event data
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to probe this alternative explanation, adding a second case, Soroti, to that of Gulu
that generally supports opposition candidates and two locations, Mbarara and
Moroto, that have voted reliably for the NRM. A high level of voter support for
Museveni (pictured in Figure 7.2) indicates that the regime does not face major
political challenges from the area.
To ensure comparability across the cases, I selected regional capitals, all of
which are small to medium-sized towns with relatively developed infrastructure,
including potable water, schools, hospitals, and security services such as the police.
Each is also fairly ethnically homogenous. To examine the importance of ethni-
city, I asked respondents how they think ethnicity shapes local and national
politics. I also interviewed respondents of different ethnic identities to probe the
extent to which ethnic ties might account for variation. Though ethnicity is clearly
a foundational cleavage in Ugandan society and politics, it did not emerge as a
salient factor in civilian perceptions of arbitrary governance.²
The four study locations place conflict-affectedness in relation to political
support for the regime to create a two-by-two typology in which each possible
combination is represented. The result is one case where both alternative explan-
ations are present (Gulu), and thus a place where arbitrary governance should be








1996 2001 2006 2011 2016
Gulu Soroti Mbarara Moroto
Fig. 7.2 Vote share for President Museveni by district
Source: Uganda Electoral Commission
² Though ethnicity did not emerge as a factor that makes citizens view the state as arbitrary or not, it
is certainly important politically and in security provision. For instance, Travis Curtice has documented
that, all else equal, Ugandans would prefer to report crimes to police officers who share their same
ethnicity (Curtice 2019a).
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explanation is present (Mbarara), and thus arbitrary governance should be least
pronounced and least observable; and two mixed cases (Soroti and Moroto).
For each case, I conduct two types of analysis. First, I use the cases to probe
whether citizens actually perceive the regime as arbitrary. If perceptions of
arbitrary governance were caused by conflict, one would anticipate seeing it in
Gulu and Moroto and much less so in Mbarara and Soroti. If, on the other hand,
perceptions of arbitrariness are due to antipathy toward the regime, one would
anticipate seeing it in Gulu and Soroti, and much less so Moroto and Mbarara (see
Table 7.1). My research shows that the citizens in all four regions perceive the
regime as arbitrary and therefore suggests that institutionalized arbitrariness
constitutes a particular regime type, rather than simply characterizing localized
perceptions of the regime.
Second, I use the cases to operationalize my analytic framework for institu-
tionalized arbitrariness, producing descriptions of arbitrary governance in each
location. Table 7.2 summarizes the four oppositions that I have used to describe
state capacity, and the effects when they are unstable as in the case of arbitrary
governance (the middle column) and stable as in the case of predictable govern-
ance (the right column). Each of the four factors contributes a different element to
arbitrary governance. They can be more or less fluid. The more fluid they are, the
more difficult it is for citizens to establish reliable expectations about what
authorities might do, thereby undermining their ability to organize and make
claims.
As discussed in Chapter 2, all four oppositions must be destabilized and fluid to
produce institutionalized arbitrariness. Comparing the additional cases gives a
sense of how arbitrary governance manifests differently given variation in levels of
conflict-affectedness and relationships to the ruling regime. They also offer add-
itional evidence that the Ugandan government under the NRM and Museveni has
built an unpredictable system of governance that allows it to project power across
the country.
The four-part framework for institutionalized arbitrariness generates hypoth-
eses for each opposition. Citizens’ perceptions of the state’s capacity for over-
whelming and unaccountable violence are produced by fear both of state violence
and state withdrawal, which can leave a region unprotected from rebels or other
Table 7.1 Case selection to probe alternative explanations for the perception of
arbitrary state governance
Highly conflict-affected Less conflict-affected
Pro-opposition Most-likely case: Gulu Mixed case: Soroti
Pro-regime Mixed case: Moroto Least-likely case: Mbarara
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Table 7.2 The four oppositions describing state capacity and their contribution to arbitrary governance
Arbitrary Governance ———————! Predictable Governance
Dynamic opposition Effect on citizens’ perception of the
regime when unstable
Effect on citizens’ perception of the regime when stable
Lawful versus exceptional
violence
Fear of the possibility of exceptional state
violence
Confidence that law and legal procedure with regard to use of state violence
will be properly implemented; ability to calculate likely risks and rewards of
encountering the state
State claims versus denials
of jurisdictional authority
Uncertainty about which authority will
intervene and what rules will be applied
Confidence about which authority has jurisdiction over any given matter;
ability to forum shop
State presence versus
absence
Belief that state inaction is as intentional
as state action
Confidence that inaction by the state means it is absent, and an ability to
establish new forms of authority in its absence
State fragmentation versus
consolidation
Uncertainty about who is part of the
regime, and fear of being excluded


































violent actors. Fear of being targeted by state violence is thus likely to be heightened
in regions that oppose the regime (Gulu and Soroti), while fear that the regime will
withdraw protection is likely heightened by conflict-affectedness (Gulu and
Moroto). Both conflict-affectedness and antipathy toward the regime should
make jurisdictional authority more fluid, such that it is most fluid in the most likely
case (Gulu) and least fluid in the least likely case (Mbarara). Perceptions of state
presence will be shaped by the regime’s demand for surveillance (which should be
highest in opposition areas) and the risks of providing surveillance (which should be
highest in conflict-affected regions). Finally, conflict-affectedness is likely to increase
local institutional fragmentation. These hypotheses are summarized in Table 7.3.
Below, I present the empirical findings from each of the additional sites, con-
cluding with a summary of the types of arbitrary governance revealed in the probe.
2. Empirical Findings: Varieties of Arbitrary Governance
2.1 Mbarara: Discipline
If any place in Uganda should disprove the notion that the NRM regime uses
political unpredictability to govern, it would be Mbarara. The region retains
strong links to the central government and is the homeland of Museveni’s
Table 7.3 Hypothesized values for four factors of institutionalized arbitrariness





fluid, citizens fear targeted state
violence and that the state will
withdraw protection
Jurisdictional authority: highly fluid
State presence/absence: surveillance




citizens fear targeted state violence
Jurisdictional authority: fairly fluid
State presence/absence: surveillance






citizens fear that the state will
withdraw protection
Jurisdictional authority: fairly fluid
State presence/absence: surveillance




somewhat stable, citizens do not
fear this regime, but fear instead its
removal
Jurisdictional authority: least fluid
State presence/absence: surveillance
is prevalent and overt
Institutional fragmentation: low
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Banyankole ethnic group. It is wealthier than northern and eastern regions of the
country, and has benefited from several decades of peace and development (World
Bank 2016). The region last experienced violent conflict before the NRM came to
power in 1986 (Tankink 2007; Roberts 2014). Descriptions of the violence and its
aftermath resonate with those of other conflicts experienced across Uganda,
though importantly, residents of Mbarara experienced war perpetrated by
northerners—Amin from West Nile and Obote from Lango.
Over the 30-plus years of Museveni’s rule, one might anticipate the consolida-
tion of power—whether under the regime or the state—and the emergence of a
relationship of mutual recognition and obligation between citizens and that entity.
Through such a process, local authorities would establish jurisdictional claims.
Government resources would flow through the same brokers consistently, and the
region would thereby come to resemble a patronage model. Lacking exposure to
state violence, citizens would have little reason to fear the state, seeing it as a
potential provider and protector rather than a menacing foe. Finally, because
Mbarara is a regime stronghold, the government should have a comparatively low
need for local intelligence—citizens would communicate willingly with the regime
and generally support its longevity. If these alternative explanations hold, Mbarara
should look like a patronage system rather than one of institutionalized
arbitrariness.
Evidence instead reveals an environment that, though unique from other parts
of the country in important ways, shares key elements of arbitrary governance.
Broadly speaking, citizens in Mbarara viewed the state more generously than
citizens in other areas of the country. Many respondents described it as a ben-
evolent force doing its best in the face of significant restraints. The state’s
unpredictability was interpreted less often as a manipulative and destructive
tool of governance, but rather as a benign inconvenience. Respondents often
described the state as low capacity—an agent altruistically attempting to con-
solidate power and provide services, but stymied by material or practical con-
straints. Some explained that the government produced ‘confusion’ by
promising one thing and delivering something entirely different (and sub-par).
In addition to noting that fragmentation was likely a result of a divide-and-rule
strategy, respondents also attributed it and the resultant experience of political
unpredictability to patronage and government efforts to continually create
jobs. At the same time, they argued that the government and Museveni himself
were aware of the consequences—the creation of non-viable districts, waste
produced by multiple and overlapping institutions, and low levels of account-
ability for state and non-state authorities. One former government commis-
sioner explained:
[Is it possible that the government intentionally produces confusion and uncer-
tainty to govern people?] People don’t know what is going to happen, so they
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cannot plan something against the government. To me, I think you might be
correct, the unpredictability of the system makes it survive longer. Because you
cannot easily predict so you cannot easily plan against it. It is an old war tactic. If
you cannot know exactly what the other side is planning and doing you cannot
easily attack. (Former government commissioner, Mbarara, 18 January 2018)
What emerges is a picture both of fragmentation and destabilization, paired with
opportunistic brokers who manipulate the system for personal gain. Inevitably
this produces unpredictable outcomes, not unlike Jean-François Bayart’s circula-
tion of elites, in which the changing relationships among elites and their pursuit of
personal gain create uncertainty (Bayart 1993).
Like in other field sites, respondents described state violence as manifest
through its potential to both harm and protect. However, in Mbarara, respondents
focused especially on the legal aspects of harm, for example, manipulation of law
and legal categorization on questions ranging from taxation to terrorism.
A former religious leader explained:
If they come and pick you up, they can put any accusations against you. But the
popular one these days is treason. You may be innocent, but they throw this at
you. By the time you disentangle yourself from that, you have lost so much, it
may be difficult to rebuild. Or simply imprisonment for a while. Or even taking
you to prison without taking you to court. Three to five months down the road,
you’ve been kept away, incommunicado. Later you are released, and even not
taken to court . . . you’ve lost so much. People are afraid of that kind of thing . . .
People don’t want to take [those risks].
(Former religious leader, Mbarara, 15 January 2018)
The respondent described how the regime can manipulate the police and the
judiciary to try citizens on trumped-up charges and occupy them with court
appearances or jail time. He also noted how the government can suspend legal
order and simply detain citizens with no explanation and no notice for months at
a time. Such detention is costly—people who are detained have no way to
communicate their status, and thus often lose the trust of friends and employers
who don’t know why they have disappeared or fear the potential costs of associ-
ating with someone on the regime’s blacklist. Respondents in the business com-
munity explained that the government also arbitrarily changes rules about wealth
and property, for example by ‘slapping heavy taxes on businesses’ or covertly
engaging thugs to destroy property.
Respondents saw the regime as having meaningful control over the use of force.
For example, a Forum for Democratic Change (FDC) party organizer in Mbarara
explained that if opposition political parties tried to recruit their own security or
youth wings it would result in detention and possibly death:
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[Why doesn’t FDC get their own Crime Preventer group?] Once you recruit these
vigilantes, they [the government] are going to name them as a terrorist . . . Those
guys, NRM members, they’ll say, ‘Oh, FDC are recruiting rebels!’ Then eventu-
ally they will arrest our people. Or they can kill them. You remember what
happened in Kasese—they killed so many people.³ During a demonstration when
Besigye was there they killed someone in Rukungiri.⁴ Even in Kampala! So that is
the reason we can’t recruit vigilantes. They are very important, we know they are
helpful, but you can’t recruit those guys and survive.
(FDC organizer, Mbarara, 19 January 2018)
The respondent referenced other instances of unaccountable and overwhelming
state violence in Kampala, Kasese, and Rukungiri and as evidence for his claims.
In terms of protection, emphasis fell on the regime’s capacity to protect the area
from the fall-out of future regime change. This view is historically grounded in the
regional and ethnic violence that accompanied the rise of Amin, Obote II, and
Museveni. For example, a resident of Mbarara recalled how Museveni recruited
his father to fight against Amin in 1979, and the subsequent years of political
turmoil:
I learned how to use an AK-47 when I was about six-years [old]. That’s how all of
us were militarised. I grew up knowing Obote would not stay in power . . . After
1979, [Obote] went in elections. There were sham elections, they were not as fair
as the elections of today. My father was killed before we had stabilised properly in
1987. I stayed the child of the revolution . . . I remember, much as I was young.
(47-year-old man, Mbarara, 17 January 2018)
The Museveni regime has leveraged memories like these to legitimate southern
rule and instigate fear that history will repeat itself if power again changes hands
(Bernard 2017). Many respondents also referred to the violence in northern
Uganda, noting that the north remains mired in poverty compared to other
parts of the country, and attributing this to northern opposition to the regime.
As in other regions of Uganda, state actors in Mbarara assert and deny their
jurisdictional authority, and express contradictory expectations about what rules
ought to be applied. A stark example is vigilante violence, which is illegal in
Uganda. During the weeks I stayed in Mbarara in January 2018, one of the
³ Referring to government-backed violence that occurred in Kasese in November 2016, when the
Uganda police and military reportedly killed over 100 people, including 15 children. The attack
followed long-standing tensions and sporadic violence between the government and the Rwenzururu
kingdom (Human Rights Watch 2018).
⁴ Rukungiri is the birthplace of major opposition leader Kizza Besigye, and has been the site of
numerous protests that have been violently shut down by the police. See, e.g. The Daily Monitor 2011;
Lule 2017.
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national newspapers, The Daily Monitor, ran three different news items about
vigilante violence in Lira, Jinja, and Wakiso. In each, government authorities
counselled citizens to report criminal issues to the police rather than take violence
into their own hands, lest they be arrested (The Daily Monitor, 18–22 January
2018, on file with author). However, in my interviews, elected government officials
at the district and sub-county levels condoned such violence as an effective
deterrent to other would-be criminals. One LC3 chairman noted the grey area
for those who act as vigilantes, describing his personal experiences from his
younger days. He explained that when some members of his vigilante group
were arrested for assault, the very authorities who recruited them to become
vigilantes denied knowing about their activities. He recalled the contradictory
expectations placed on vigilantes: they were expected to use violence to police the
community and deter criminals. At times, government authorities even verbally
encouraged them to kill wrong-doers to send a clear message. But if they ‘overbeat’
they would suffer costly repercussions of court proceedings and responsibility for
the recovery of their victims. A badly injured suspect could easily cause the
vigilantes more personal difficulty than a dead suspect. The chairman’s reflections
illustrate that those working in informal security are caught between the prohib-
ition against beating and the informal—and uncertain—authorization to lynch.
As in the rest of the country, fluid state jurisdiction is exacerbated by numerous
institutions with unclear and overlapping mandates. A community member
explained that this duplication is a key source of government confusion:
[Something people often have said to me is that government policies are confusing
for ordinary people. Do you think this is true?] Yeah, because the problem is we
don’t have institutions. Institutions like the civil service, parliament, judiciary,
are fused up. If the problem is health, where do you go? Do you go to the ministry
of health, department of health, the statehouse, the police—where they have
ambulances and standby doctors to help? I think the confusion is structural. No
institutions are very clear. You don’t know where the police starts and ends,
where security starts and ends, how powerful a district commissioner is, the role
of chairman and an RDC.
(53-year-old male community member, Mbarara, 16 January 2018)
Many respondents echoed his view, saying that it is difficult to know who holds
real power in any given scenario. Officials at all levels, from village and district
chairmen to those who had served in central state ministries, said they felt their
mandates were unclear and that this left them vulnerable to challenges from other
authorities.
Despite the relative peace in Mbarara, the institutional environment is still
fragmented, with significant ambiguity about the relationship among different
security actors, especially informal militias or vigilante groups. Though many
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respondents reported that LDUs had been disbanded in Mbarara in the early
2000s, I met and interviewed a 44-year-old man who identified himself as an
active LDU. Probing suggested that the programme had not been formally closed,
but rather that the government ceased recruiting LDUs in favour of recruiting for
other initiatives like Crime Preventers. One respondent, who self-identified as a
government informant, linked the phase-out of LDUs to national politics, explain-
ing that Uganda’s transition to a multiparty system in 2005 necessitated shifting
local security provision from the jurisdiction of the LC1 (a position which now
theoretically could be held by a member of the political opposition) to the police
(Government informant, Mbarara, 15 January 2018).
A journalist elaborated that, as in the rest of the country, Mbarara has seen
many local security programmes that repackage existing interventions, contrib-
uting to institutional fragmentation:
[In the] early ’90s, the government started recruiting and training some youth
from the university . . . in ideas of governance. In the ’90s, they put that cam-
paign out to the local leaders. They first trained—was it LDUs?—yes. LDUs.
Then the second batch was renamed into cadres. The third batch was LDF
[local defence forces] . . . Then . . . they trained another batch of youth—those
LDFs were elevated to SPCs [special police commissioners]. They were inte-
grated into police, given uniforms and assigned some duties. Most of those
things were done during election periods to manage electioneering. Up to now,
some are still working, others have been discharged. Of recent, 2015 to ’16, they
now changed the name to crime preventers . . . Up to date, we still have crime
preventers, working and replacing the old regimes of LDU, LDF.
(Journalist, Mbarara, 19 January 2018)
Respondents widely shared the sentiment that informal security providers are all
government militias, differing only in name. An LC1 chairman expressed the view
that institutional fragmentation is a part of the regime’s governing strategy,
likening it to a father using tricks to manage his children. He explained, ‘And
the smarter your children are the more difficulty you will have. And Ugandans are
very clever!’ (LC1 chairman, Mbarara, 22 January 2018).
A former government commissioner called institutional fragmentation a
regime survival strategy, in which ‘different units . . . bring in different
information . . . so you don’t have all your power in one unit . . . you can play
them off each other’. He elaborated on how the burden of this fragmented
system falls on the ‘ordinary’ person, who must negotiate a complex and shifting
governance environment.
As an ordinary person, to get by, you have to mould yourself to the authorities
around you. You must read the moods of the various powers. There are those
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who are pushing [you] around because they want money; they don’t mind what
is going to happen [to you]. [But] even in their position they have to be careful of
the other one who is in charge, [so that] they don’t conflict.
(Former ministry commissioner, Mbarara, 18 January 2018)
The phrase ‘read[ing] the moods of the various powers’ highlights how a system
that fosters parallel authorities creates space for the agency—and thus
arbitrariness—of each individual authority. The resulting jungle of potential
opportunities and pitfalls requires citizens to ‘mould’ themselves to the authorities
around them, producing a kind of malleable and responsive subjectivity. Knowing
that the state is the most important of these authorities subordinates sub-national
and non-state authorities, as well as ordinary citizens, to the regime. A young man
explained:
Looking at many things where the government is involved, it appears that the
government has a hidden agenda. Because they don’t want to reveal [anything] to
anybody, they do things in such a way that you don’t ask many questions. Even if
you wanted to ask many questions, what do you ask about and what do you
leave? They create an atmosphere of a confused population so there is no focus
whatsoever so they can continue with their agenda. And the population is in such
a confused state, and nothing is straight-forward and it works for them [the
ruling regime]. (30-year-old male driver, Mbarara, 15 January 2018)
Creating ‘an atmosphere of a confused population’ that cannot find a shared focus
undermines collective action and claim making on state authorities. Other
respondents cited this fragmented institutional environment as evidence that
the regime purposefully produces unpredictability to govern, calling it a strategy
of divide and rule.
Perceptions of state surveillance were more pronounced in Mbarara than in the
other three study locations, perhaps unsurprisingly. Museveni maintains direct
personal connections in the area, and visits frequently. Because Mbarara is a
regime stronghold, one might also expect little stigma to be attached to sharing
information with NRM authorities. Respondents unanimously expressed the view
that government surveillance was present in known and unknown ways. One
former religious leader explained that in Mbarara, you can never know who you
are talking to—and moreover, people are apt to change their allegiances for money
or power. He elaborated:
People have come to the point where they think there are ears all over the
place . . . Even when you are talking to someone you are not sure if this person
is not already bribed, or whether he will not be bribed to change his mind. So,
it becomes very tricky to choose who to talk to, so at any moment you can be
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betrayed for your own words. So, people are not free to talk. Even sometimes my
wife cautions me, ‘Why are you talking like that, what if there was someone at the
door listening in?’ Sometimes you have a meeting—thinking that you’ve selected
people very carefully—only to have [state] security [agents] descend on the
meeting. (Former religious leader, Mbarara, 15 January 2018)
Even in the most private spaces—one’s home—ordinary citizens are disciplined to
police their speech. Respondents agreed that the perception of surveillance limited
people’s willingness to discuss their political opinions openly, especially opinions
critical of the regime. This anxiety about surveillance extends even to those who
are seemingly inside the government fold. For example, during an interview with a
self-proclaimed government informant, I was instructed that at dusk, I should
move away from the window. My respondent feared that a passer-by might see my
white face in the window and make a report to the higher authorities.
While many respondents viewed the government’s surveillance system as
omnipresent, some articulated its limitations. For example, a former organizer
for the FDC party reflected:
I think it is true in the spying system. But it may not be so advanced. Because
we’ve had [laughs] our leader of opposition leaving this country without being
caught, without knowledge. [Turning to a friend] You remember when Besigye
escaped from this country? [Turning back to me] I think the eyes and ears of this
government are there but maybe not so much advanced.
(Former FDC organiser, Mbarara, 19 January 2018)
The respondent describes the surveillance state as a poorly oiled machine, reflect-
ing what David Bozzini has described as ‘low-tech surveillance’. In systems of low-
tech surveillance, rumours are combined with occasional harsh punishments to
create a credible-enough perception that there might be a functional system.
Stathis Kalyvas has noted that in contexts of state surveillance and targeted
violence, it is easier for the regime to sow doubt and fragment communities
than it is for society to build trust.⁵ These doubts underscore the tension between
perceived state presence (reflected in the perception of surveillance) and its
potential absence (found in the nagging possibility, or even probability, of its
incompetence or deficiency). As in other places in Uganda, the destabilization of
this opposition makes it difficult for citizens to strategize their engagement with
the state.
⁵ Kalyvas writes, ‘When uncertain about the victims’ innocence or guilt but somewhat persuaded
about the organisation’s credibility, most people tend to infer guilt and alter their behavior accordingly’,
offering examples from Algeria, Vietnam, Sri Lanka, and Colombia (Kalyvas 2006, 191).
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Though governance in Mbarara is more legible to civilians than in other areas
of the country, it is still characterized by the four factors of institutionalized
arbitrariness, producing uncertainty that disciplines the population. The regime’s
actions blur the line between lawful and exceptional violence, using unpredictable
categorization to determine some citizens enemies of the state, stripped of their
rights, and others as criminals, afforded due process even if that process is
instrumentalized to bankrupt the defendant. At the same time, citizens’ percep-
tions of the regime’s capacity for violence are based more on observing the
experiences of other parts of the country and a historical record of state violence
than on their own lived experiences under the NRM regime. Networks clearly
matter, but at the same time, many people—from well-educated elites to ordinary
citizens—do not know how best to navigate this environment. Instead they are
constantly trying to ‘mould’ themselves to authorities and negotiate a fluid and
unpredictable system.
2.2 Moroto: Violence at Scale
Karamoja is often described as Uganda’s lawless frontier, still eluding central
government control. The area has experienced significant and ongoing conflict
due to intercommunal cattle raiding and central government efforts to pacify the
region. Though cattle raiding has long been central to life in Karamoja, it became
increasingly deadly in the early 1980s, when guns widely replaced spears and other
low-tech weapons (Mirzeler and Young 2000). The Ugandan government has
launched at least nine disarmament campaigns since 1945, including in 2001 and
2006 (Stites and Abakwai 2010, 11). Despite the tensions resulting from forced
disarmament and the low level of development and central state presence,
Karamoja has regularly delivered upwards of 90 per cent of its vote to the
NRM. Whether this reflects a genuine commitment to the NRM as a political
party or apathy about the central state in Kampala, there is little in the way of
political competition originating from this region.
The Karamojong people are frequently described as a conglomeration of
numerous ethnic groups, with shifting alliances and without a coherent political
identity (Stites and Abakwai 2010, 6–7).⁶ Traditionally, they have combined
agriculture and pastoral livelihoods depending on the region and local climate;
today some also engage in mining (Stites and Abakwai 2010, 7). The Karamojong
have historically narrated themselves as ‘warriors’ and, across the rest of Uganda,
⁶ The ‘Karamojong people’ include the Jie (inhabiting the central part of the region), the Dodoth
(inhabiting the northern part), and the Karimojong (inhabiting the southern part). The Karimojong are
further divided into the Matheniko, Bokora, and Pian. Minority groups include Tepeth, Ik, and
Nyangia, while the Pokot inhabit the Uganda-Kenya borderlands (Stites and Abakwai 2010).
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they are still stereotyped as fierce and uncivilized people who rarely wear clothes
and who easily revert to violence (Mirzeler and Young 2000).⁷ Mustafa Mirzeler
and Crawford Young note that ‘The mode of state reproduction which defined the
nature of the African colonial state could not fully operate in Karamoja. An armed
and mobile pastoral population could not be readily subjected to an organized
administration, nor serve as a labour pool for coerced service elsewhere’ (Mirzeler
and Young 2000, 412 internal citations omitted). It simply was not profitable for
Kampala to dominate Karamoja. Instead, the government has long treated the
region as a buffer zone, subjecting it to sporadic and often violent intervention.
One therefore might anticipate that governance in this region would resemble
indirect rule, in which the regime might delegate authority to loyal (enough)
counterparts. However, in practice, the regime’s approach to governing Karamoja
is more complex and unpredictable.
Over the past several decades, the NRM regime has increased its efforts to
consolidate control over Karamoja, waging disarmament campaigns, implement-
ing programmes of sedentarization, and introducing state law enforcement as a
primary means of addressing criminal violations. Elizabeth Stites and Darlington
Akabwai note that disarmament in Karamoja has had perhaps unintended, but
not unanticipated consequences, including:
increased insecurity for communities; stripping of essential and productive
assets; the erosion of traditional mechanisms to cope with vulnerability and
food insecurity; shifts in gender-based labour roles, responsibilities and iden-
tities; transfer of animal management responsibilities; and the collapse of the
dual settlement and migratory systems central to the success of pastoral and
agro-pastoral livelihoods. (Stites and Abakwai 2010, 11)
Nonetheless, traditional authorities and clan structures remain strong compared
to those in other regions of the country.
Particularly during forced disarmament, the NRM regime deployed substantial
violence in Karamoja, described as torture and human rights abuses (Human
Rights Watch 2007). One crime preventer recalled his personal experience of
forced disarmament:
[The government] brought the soldiers to attack us from the kraal [an enclosure
for cattle] . . . and removed our guns. Also—beating. [Also,] they tied our hands
like this [moves his hands behind his back]. Something again happened, because
⁷ For example, youth were traditionally disciplined through a practice of ameto, where the offender
is tied to a tree and beaten by his age-mates.
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when they tie the hands and legs, they tell you to look at the sun. No closing the
eyes! That was the bad thing again.
(Crime preventer, Moroto, 17 February 2018)
Abuses also included arbitrary detentions, a practice of ‘castration’ that involved
‘twisting the testicles over a small stick’, and beatings (Stites and Abakwai 2010,
13). Despite these abuses, respondents noted certain benefits of disarmament:
when it was completed fully, they reasoned that the absence of lethal weapons
made cattle raiding less violent. However, in many cases, incomplete and irregular
disarmament exacerbated violence and raiding, as newly disarmed communities
became easy marks for others who were still armed. Though these experiences
sowed distrust of the state among citizens, new vulnerabilities also forced alle-
giance to the state (Stites and Abakwai 2010, 14). Respondents described how
many young men reacted to state-run disarmament campaigns by joining state-
initiated militias, such as LDUs or ASTU (the anti-stock theft unit). In these state-
backed militias, the men were re-armed—often, government authorities would
redistribute the very weapons they had confiscated from their new recruits only
weeks earlier. This delivered a clear message that anyone who wanted to be armed
would have to pledge and enact loyalty to the government. At the same time,
citizens’ ability to recoup their weapons shortly after being forcibly disarmed
illustrates a mode of civilian agency.
The benefits and harms of disarmament that Karamojong report highlight a
complex dynamic in which the government appears to stand outside the moral
order of the Karamojong, violently enforcing its will while also policing communal
violence with some measure of success. As an LC1 chairman explained
[Why do people in Karamoja support the NRM?] Why we are also still making
Mzee [Museveni] to go on chair, it is because since he came to power, he brought
peace here in Karamoja. The first thing he brought in Karamoja, why people are
very happy, disarmament of this gun. If it was not removed you would not even
get me as chairman here. He has taken away the gun, everyone has peace. That’s
why we would like him to stay and die there on that chair of his. If Mzee goes
away form the chair, here—Karamoja—will suffer.
(LC1 chairman, Moroto, 18 February 2018)
An elder explained that he perceived disarmament as a mode of weakening
Karamojong resistance to the central state and facilitating resource extraction:
We’re beginning to see. The gun has gone. For what reason? Even among
ourselves we knew it was not useful anymore. But we’re seeing there is another
danger. I think these guns were removed from us for a purpose. We have seen
now our land is going . . . Our minerals are going . . . the corridors where we used
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to graze our cows, they are now gone. Places where we used to take our
traditional shrines of ours are gone . . . As much the gun is gone, we are left
vulnerable for anything to happen. That’s our worry.
(Elder, Moroto, 20 February 2018)
Even while the regime organizes material extraction from this region, it appeared
more distant than in other parts of Uganda. Indeed, local government in
Karamoja has been described as ‘phantasmal’ with limited authority (Mirzeler
and Young 2000, 424). At the same time, respondents articulated recent memories
of physical torture at the hands of government soldiers during disarmament
campaigns, as well as a keen awareness of the state’s ability to disarm the
population and leave them at the mercy of other armed cattle raiders whether in
Uganda or neighbouring Kenya and South Sudan. In this way, the state has made
its violent capacity known in Moroto, both as a potential instigator of violence and
as a protector.
In Moroto, non-state authorities appear to consolidate jurisdictional authority
more successfully than do those in Gulu, Mbarara, or Soroti. However, the process
is not without conflict and contestation, contributing to what Mirzeler and Young
have called ‘a stable form of disorder’ (Mirzeler and Young 2000, 426). For
instance, although the state does not formally recognize elders’ authority to
address issues of criminal justice, it also rarely challenges it. In their study of
public authority in Karamoja, Julian Hopwood and his co-authors report ‘no
instance of where elders had been challenged or sanctioned by the state for
overstepping their authority’, even though elders’ justice relies on violence to
discipline (Hopwood et al. 2018, S150). My fieldwork revealed that the relation-
ship between elders and state authorities is far from settled. For example, some
saw ongoing efforts to empower women and youths as a way of eroding the
authority of Karamojong elders, thereby making the authority structure more
easily penetrable by the central state:
That’s degeneration of the culture—[the government tries to] put us [the elders]
as equals [with youth and women]. Maybe for human rights. They are just
putting us down . . . Even the colonists didn’t do that. They used to respect our
culture . . . But for us, the government is trying to do something where they can
easily penetrate the society . . . Penetration of society could be easier through
women, or through the youth. The elders are bit tough—they still hold the roots.
(Elder, Moroto, 20 February 2018)
Though such programmes may be well intentioned, the elder’s comments reflect
an ongoing process of realignment and fragmentation, in which existing sites of
authority are being reshaped in the mould of the state. Injecting pluralism into
traditional institutions is a way of fragmenting them while leaving them in place.
OUP CORRECTED AUTOPAGE PROOFS – FINAL, 17/5/2021, SPi
    169
The jurisdictional authority of elders also faces direct challenges. For example,
the police address criminal violations differently from elders. Traditionally, in the
case of murder, the family of the perpetrator must compensate the victim’s family,
but according to an elder, this can cause problems with the police.
We [the elders] are almost disarmed in a way, because of the law . . . If they
could combine [traditional and state laws] and say, ‘What is the traditional way
of punishment? These are your laws, these are ours of police, can we meet
together . . . ?’ We want [wrong-doers] to bring peace by paying something. That’s
what we need as the Karamojong—but the police say no. This causes friction
between the elders and the government. (Elder, Moroto, 20 February 2018)
The regional police commissioner—himself from Karamoja—reflected on these
tensions as evidence that the basic fundamentals of state authority had yet to be
established in Karamoja:
The people down there want a person who is killed to be compensated rather
than punishing the offender. We have to go to them and say, ‘This offender has
not offended you but the state. The person who has killed has offended the state
and the state should handle the matter.’ The issue of compensation should not
arise, it is court [to punish the perpetrator]. You cannot have two at a go:
compensation of the dead person and the person in prison. You cannot punish
twice. (Regional police commissioner, Moroto, 19 February 2018)
Ordinary citizens saw arrest and detention as a type of disappearance from
society that does little to right a wrong and lacks moral or ethical value. This
corresponds with Mirzeler and Young’s analysis of how the militarization of the
region affected elders’ authority:
The power of guns, however, has no such [spiritual] connection [like traditional
weapons]. As a result, the Jie and Karimojong elders consider the war waged with
AK-47s to be profane, lacking the spiritual sanction of customary forms. Thus
the norms which regulated and limited such conflict no longer apply, and
disorder is far more menacing. (Mirzeler and Young 2000, 409)
This analysis is reminiscent of Sharon Hutchinson’s work on the amorality of state
violence in South Sudan, which was perceived as an outside force that could
intervene with impunity (Hutchinson 1998).
Perhaps because of the remoteness of Karamoja and its diffuse population, the
government has relied heavily on irregular forces in this area, forming and
maintaining local initiatives to help manage conflict. One man working for a
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local development initiative explained that in addition to the basic government
structures that function across Uganda, Karamoja is home to the anti-stock theft
unit, rapid response units, LDUs, peace committees, community working groups,
and a district justice committee (40-year-old man, Moroto, 16 February 2018).
Some of these committees reflect the significant NGO presence in Karamoja,
which often supports the formation of new initiatives as development interven-
tions. Though there are youth vigilantes in Karamoja, they appear to be less
common than in other areas of the country, perhaps because they are seen as
benign or even impotent in this highly militarized environment.
LDUs in Karamoja are more militarized than in the rest of the country: they
are issued guns, live in the barracks, deploy with the military, and are paid
salaries for their work. The fact that they are armed, unlike informal security
personnel in other parts of Uganda, may have helped them secure and maintain
such material benefits. Moreover, because they are tasked with preventing cattle
raiding, they have direct access to high-value rents. Following disarmament in
2006, many of these groups were demobilized or integrated into the military.
However, this has not protected LDUs from being arrested or detained by state
authorities. In a group interview with seven LDUs, four reported that they had
been previously arrested, for actions ranging from losing their government-
issued gun to fighting. Informal security providers in Moroto thus appear to
face high levels of uncertainty in their positions, much like those in other parts of
the country.
Respondents perceived crime preventers, even more than LDUs, as precarious
due to their poorly defined mandate and lack of pay. As in other locations,
respondents reported that crime preventers often overstepped their role. One
LC1 chairman explained that in his village, crime preventers enforced a blanket
4 p.m. curfew on market day, rather than adopting a targeted approach to regulate
drunkenness and gender-based violence as they had been asked to do. They were
reported to the police, and the LC1 concluded that ‘Instead of preventing crime
they are the ones causing crime within the village’ (LC1 chairman, Moroto, 16
February 2018). The chairman also noted that the crime preventers were scattered
and ‘somehow invisible’, suggesting that though they lacked power in comparison
to peace committees and other informal security actors who are more ‘rooted’ in
the community, they still constituted potentially present agents of the state. He
reflected that the trouble for crime preventers, even more so than for LDUs and
peace committees, was that ‘they have not seen their role. It’s not clear’ (LC1
chairman, Moroto, 16 February 2018).
In this highly fragmented institutional environment, one authority can easily
bypass another. Local government officials, in particular, are sandwiched between
society on one hand and the state on the other, as the relationship between crime
preventers and local authorities shows. In an interview with an LC1 chairman, a
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local opinion leader, and a UPDF veteran, the LC1 chairman disparaged the crime
preventers for bypassing him, thereby undermining his authority:
For me, I also dislike the way the crime preventers are working . . . For them they
carry a person to police directly, before interrogating them. The work of the
crime preventers was to come and meet me as a chairman. I’m the boss. I know
what is happening. They should come to me and say, ‘So-and-So has done this.’
Then I can bring him to the round table. It is good to ask the other one also.
Maybe the one who remains behind, he is wrong. Then we can counsel them and
see what the way forward is. (LC1 chairman, Moroto, 18 February 2018)
The local opinion leader added:
I don’t know why they give them pickies [motorcycles] when we are the ones who
are working. Any case can occur. I’m supposed to rush to the peace committee or
the police . . . but I don’t have transport. You find the crime preventers have run
there . . . without informing the local leaders . . . These crime preventers, we don’t
know their work, but they say they are working . . . That’s a difference [between
them and LDUs]. They are put as CIDs [Criminal Investigation Department]—
they just come and see what the community is doing [and report].
(Opinion leader, Moroto, 18 February 2018)
The chairman and opinion leader were particularly concerned that crime pre-
venters received benefits from the government, reported directly to the police, and
did not consult with local leaders, thereby challenging their authority.
Despite the low level of development and the comparative strength of certain
non-state authorities like elders and LDUs, civilians perceive the state as poten-
tially present and overseeing their daily lives. As in other areas of Uganda, several
respondents expressed their view that the government had spies everywhere. An
employee of a local government initiative elaborated:
We have auxiliary branches of security agencies. There are those that are
constitutionally recognised, but there are sub-structures of informing. They are
very complex . . . You cannot understand . . . You move within your shadow and
yourself. Those complex situations . . . ! You can have a division commander here
operating as a security person, but for me [an ordinary person] . . . I may have a
hotline of statehouse. And I’m reporting what he’s doing on the street or
elsewhere to statehouse, which effects his job. That complex network is a bit
complicated to understand. And yet we have the [formal] security intelligence
system. We have ESO [External Security Organisation], ISO at national level,
regional security internally, district security, then sub-county GISO [Gombolola
Internal Security Organisation], PISO [Parish Internal Security Organisation],
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then we even believe it has gone up to family—household. You may have a FISO
[family internal security organization]. A wife investigating on the husband and
husband on the wife. That complex structure. You don’t know where the
story goes. (40-year-old employee of local development initiative, Moroto, 16
February 2018)
A female crime preventer explained that government surveillance was used both
to combat insecurity, for example by tracking down terrorists and foreigners, and
also to marginalize members of the opposition, for example, by denying employ-
ment opportunities to them and their family members (Female crime preventer,
Moroto, 16 February 2018). However, respondents generally spoke freely about
the regime both with me and each other, demonstrating that, though they felt state
presence, they were not fearful of it. Many linked state presence to services, in
addition to the kind of deep state surveillance that their counterparts described in
Gulu, Mbarara, and even Soroti.
The result is a type of governance that is less atomizing but still demobilizing,
which I describe as violence at scale. Instead of dividing citizens, the regime uses
broad-based, group-level violence to isolate the region from the rest of the
country, while further leveraging ethnic and regional divisions by which
Karamojong already see themselves as distinct from much of the rest of
Uganda. While local authorities, including elders and clan authorities, have clear
notions of their jurisdictional claims, their authority is undermined—or at the
very least, reshaped in relation to the state—when the state wages violent cam-
paigns against society as a whole. State violence is comparatively organized and
deployed according to public policies, though these policies are ever changing, as
illustrated by oscillating campaigns of armament and disarmament over the
decades.⁸ State intervention appears both as a potential threat but also as a
potential enforcer of political order. State acts of violence at scale allow for
local-level order to prevail in the absence of the state, but shape citizens’ sub-
jectivities in relation to the possibility of violent state intervention.
2.3 Soroti: Contested Assemblage
Soroti is the largest urban centre in the Teso region in eastern Uganda. Since
Museveni took power, the town has remained a site of political grievance, with low
support for the NRM in both national and local elections. The region and town
have experienced some armed conflict over the past several decades, though
⁸ See also changing policies related to food aid as described by Hopwood et al. (2018).
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comparatively less than Gulu and Moroto.⁹ When the NRM first took power,
locals supported a homegrown rebel outfit, the Uganda People’s Army, to fight the
NRM (Brett 1995, 146; Kandel 2014, 24). However, by 1993 the NRM had
defeated the insurgency and incorporated many of the rebels into the national
military. The area has also suffered from decades of cattle raiding led by the
Karamojong. Matthew Kandel notes that ‘virtually all’ residents of Teso believed
that the NRM contributed to and supported cattle raiding in order to destabilize
the region (Kandel 2014, 26).
In 2003, the LRA made a brief appearance in Soroti, spurring the formation of
‘Arrow Boy’ militias. These militias, staffed by local civilians who had formerly
fought the NRM as rebels, were described as ‘a rag-tag bunch of angry young
vigilantes with AK47s’ (IRIN News 2003). Armed by the national army, the Arrow
Boys were seen as integral to protecting Teso from the LRA. A UPDF soldier
recalled:
For us here in Teso, we had the Arrow Boys. These are the civilian population
who came to help the government forces to counter attack the rebel forces . . .
[because] they didn’t have enough manpower . . . There was even a time that they
ran short of guns, so many were willing to join. They really joined up and also
helped a lot. They did much work. They knew the location and the locality. They
knew who was a member of that village or what. They caused a big impact here.
After that insurgency when they drove off the LRA, some are still in the national
army. Others they [the NRM government] gave some small package to go back
and settle [at home]. (UPDF soldier, Soroti, 1 February 2018)
This period of conflict displaced an estimated 130,000 people in what was then
Soroti district (Soroti district has subsequently been split into multiple new
districts) (Kandel 2014, 28). While these instances of armed violence, property
destruction, and displacement were significant, they were more sporadic and less
lethal than in the north and northeast of the country.
Given Soroti’s comparative stability and generally pro-opposition leanings,
certain predictions follow. One would expect its citizens to be less fearful of the
government and for governance arrangements to be more organized and consoli-
dated than in Moroto and Gulu. As a result, citizens would have a clearer idea of
which authority should be able to help them in different scenarios. However, as in
Gulu, one would also expect fluid and changeable claims to central state jurisdic-
tion, as the regime at times intervenes to govern this opposition area and at other
⁹ Soroti has experienced periodic violence, including state violence during the early years of the
NRM’s rule, cattle raiding by the Karamojong in the 1980s and 1990s, and a brief period of conflict
when the LRA invaded and was pushed back largely by local militias in 2003. The northern parts of
Teso experienced more protracted armed conflict in relation to cattle raiding by the Karamojong
between 1979 and the mid-2000s.
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times recedes. The central government would thus remain in the background of
daily governing arrangements. This combination of a state apparatus running
parallel to plural public authorities would create regular opportunities for citizens
to bypass local public authorities. As a result, public authorities would be weak-
ened and undermined, even while remaining relatively coherent. Further, as an
opposition region with limited conflict-affectedness, one would expect both high
risks and high rewards for informants, resulting in limited and covert surveillance.
To some extent, my research supports these predictions. Arbitrary governance
in Soroti appears to be driven less by mistrust and fear, and more by a system that
allows the unpredictable and sudden collapse of local authority in the service of
the central state. Governance in Soroti resembles a contested assemblage of
authorities, structured by the state’s capacity for violent intervention and enforce-
ment. It thus shares dimensions of unpredictability and arbitrariness, more due to
one governing authority superseding another than to authorities denying their
power or simply being too fragmented to function effectively.
In Soroti, civilians asserted that the regime maintains superior access to vio-
lence that can, but often does not, protect the civilian population. Instances of
armed conflict between the government and locals were largely isolated to the
early years of the regime’s rule. Subsequent violence has taken the form of
policing, as well as protection from external threats or lack thereof. For example,
in the late 1980s the NRM disbanded local militias, and then failed to defend
civilians from the LRA and Karamojong cattle raiders. Disarming local militias
allowed the Karamojong raiders to plunder cattle across the region, a loss that
impoverished the region and is still felt by residents today. As in other areas of the
country, the gun is key to local imaginations of state authority. Several crime
preventers explained: ‘We [crime preventers] only use guns for parade—we can
sign out one for parade. They don’t allow us to use it yet, because we were not
given uniforms. You carry gun when you put on uniform. When you are a civilian
it’s not allowed’ (Former crime preventer coordinator, Soroti, 29 January 2018).
Another crime preventer elaborated that the government taught crime pre-
venters, and LDUs before them, how to use firearms. However, without access to
guns, this training does little more than make them aware of their vulnerability to
other armed actors.
[Do government trainings to use guns make you more secure?] Not even, no, no.
You have learned the gun, but you don’t have it. You are not secure. If thieves
come to realise it is you [who helped arrest them], after when they are released
from prison, they can come and take you. Though you know the gun, what can
you do? (Crime preventer, Soroti, 3 February 2018)
Verma, in her study of the NRM’s chaka mchaka programme, similarly finds that
government policies and programmes are designed to produce the perception that
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the ruling regime controls access to firearms. In Soroti, respondents explained that
under rare conditions, crime preventers could be armed. At the same time, they
expressed fear of gun-related violence: a crime preventer said that they dare not
report police corruption to higher-ups because ‘they will shoot you’ (Former crime
preventer coordinator, Soroti, 31 January 2018).
Several former crime preventers described personal experiences of state coer-
cion, recounting how they were ousted from their leadership positions. They
recalled that in late 2017, they were called to the Central Police Station in
Soroti, where they went frequently for work. They reported that upon arrival,
they were forcibly detained until they produced the government-issued motor-
cycles that they had received in December 2015. They were indignant because they
had believed these motorcycles were personal rewards from the president, gifted to
them for their hard work. One of the former crime preventers explained:
They called us like to come to a meeting . . . This man from the National [Crime
Preventer] Forum came. They went to talk with the district [crime preventer]
coordinator and the DPC. They made us stand in the line, they asked, ‘Where is
your motorcycle?’ They called the Field Force Unit [an elite government police
unit] around them. We said, ‘Are we criminal now?’ . . . [They said,] ‘If you don’t
have the motorcycle . . . [we will detain you]. If the motorcycle comes [to the
Central Police Station], you come out.’ The DPC then detained seven of us, two
FDC and five NRM. One person stayed detained inside [the police cell] for five
days until the motorcycle came.
(Former crime preventer coordinator, Soroti, 31 January 2018)
Those involved explained that they were detained as part of an internal dispute
within the Crime Preventer programme because their superiors were dissatisfied
with their performance. Rather than using rules internal to the Crime Preventer
programme to discipline or remove disobedient crime preventers, the higher-ups
leveraged the coercive power of the police to arrest them and forcibly repossess
gifted motorcycles. The respondent notes that even those supporting the NRM
were detained—even though they had believed that their loyalty to the regime
would offer protection at a local level, it did not. Those who had been detained
responded with formal written complaints addressed to the president and the IGP,
requesting monetary compensation and re-appointment to their original posi-
tions. These actions belied a belief in the procedural integrity of the system—that
they could lodge their complaint through formal written channels—as well as a
belief that these higher authorities would step in to enforce previously understood
rules of the game.
Respondents in Soroti described state actors exercising fluid jurisdictional
claims. For instance, an LC3 chairman discussed the ambiguous and contradictory
status of LDUs and other civilian militias, who are sometimes considered part of
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the state and other times placed outside the state’s jurisdiction. He added that, in
his opinion, this approach to LDUs is an intentional governance strategy to
‘manage the thinking and behaviour of the people’ and keep them invested in
the regime’s longevity:
[But why does the government make promises they cannot keep [to pay LDUs or
integrate them into the military]?] They have carelessly spoken like that for
purposes of appeasing them. But these people are not entitled to any pay, not
putting uniform, no such work plan . . . I know our president has always boasted
that those are reserve forces, but by name. He just does not want them to feel like
they have been set aside. Even those who retire from the army, he occasionally
boasts that they are reserve forces. Even himself! He sometimes puts on uniform.
That’s politics. The science of managing the thinking and behaviour of the
people. You are kept like you are part of the system and you are hopeful, and
therefore at the end of the day you will have no reason to fight and begin
demanding for your rights, even when you see that you are not getting them.
But because of such comments coming from the president or a local leader, you
tone down and feel that there is no need for you to cause disorder or disrupt the
way things are done. It’s just meant to appease the people.
(LC3 chairman, Soroti, 1 February 2018)
The LC3 chairman reflects on how jurisdictional fluidity can simultaneously
demobilize and engage citizens, keeping them ‘hopeful’ and ‘like part of the
system’.
Like other areas of Uganda, Soroti has a fragmented institutional environment
with multiple competing and overlapping authorities. Although local authorities
appear to have a comparatively clear idea of what they are supposed to do, they are
sometimes overruled. A journalist explained that institutional fragmentation is a
defining characteristic of Uganda’s governance system. He argued that the regime
formed numerous institutions to provide services to ordinary people, but a lack of
political will allowed corruption to subvert these efforts. He explained that
confusion resulting from overlapping institutions benefits those in power at the
expense of common people.
All these institutions have been created to cause confusion. There are policies
that are supposed to be followed, but when it comes to implementation there is
high level of corruption in all sectors, whether from LC1 all the way to the RDC’s
office. The community is now confused. This kind of confusion of a lot of—all
these institutions—all the same but handling things differently. If you have not
gone to school to know that the mistake is here, you will be the one to lose. So a
common man in the village will always end up losing.
(Journalist, Soroti, 4 February 2018)
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An LC3 chairman further elaborated how this process helps bolster the power of
the ruling regime:
[I’ve noticed there are many different and overlapping governance systems. In your
opinion, why is it like this in Uganda?] [Nods] ‘It’s unfortunate. You are right.
Actually, those structures, even when they are there the way they are, enforce-
ment and the way they relate . . . It is because government was very ambitious to
assert its authority and to control each and every thing. The government went—I
can say the president went ahead—to create so many of these hoping that is
the only way he can touch everybody. So much so that it works in their favour so
that they can stay longer. It was done in good faith thinking . . . [that] it can be
helpful . . . [but it creates] confusion. It is confusion and okay—I don’t know how
long they [the regime] will survive under that confusion, whether they will sustain it.
(LC3 chairman, Soroti, 1 February 2018)
Respondents widely shared such perspectives; many described institutional frag-
mentation as a strategy of divide and rule, intended to fragment power.
One crime preventer explained how fluid jurisdiction and institutional frag-
mentation create an environment with little accountability, where it is difficult for
citizens to make claims on any authority:
Like the [violence in] Kasese¹⁰ . . . everyone knows about it! He [Museveni] is the
one [who commanded it]. Even the Brigadier himself said, ‘I was commanded by
the president’, but after that, he denied [it again]. He still protected the com-
mander [so] that he [could do] his right job . . .Whenever anything happens on
the ground—everybody like the police, army, they will just tell you, ‘I am
commanded’, but when you follow that command, you will get maybe IGP, but
even IGP is commanded by another person. It is just a command. Now, when
you need a job, there is no way you refuse command. When you fail, you’ll be in
trouble. Most of the people are innocent, because they need a job. They protect
their job by hearing the command [and obfuscating its origin].
(Crime Preventer, Soroti, 3 February 2018)
He noted that though it is commonly accepted that commands come from the
highest authority (i.e. the president) there is rarely evidence for this. Obfuscation
and denials introduce uncertainty as to who is really responsible, thereby making
it difficult to hold anyone accountable.
¹⁰ Referring to government-backed violence that occurred in Kasese in November 2016 (Human
Rights Watch 2018), see note 4.
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Respondents in Soroti also discussed surveillance, with several respondents
expressing concern that I was a spy, whether for the US or the Ugandan govern-
ment. One journalist interjected mid-interview:
Are you aware, even me now with you here, I could be arrested anytime? The
government is so particular. They can come here [and ask] ‘Why are you talking
to a foreigner?’ Something like that. They may dig deep. That’s why I was asking,
‘Who are you? How does an American come here to look for local security in
Uganda?’. (Journalist, Soroti, 4 February 2018)
Noting that he ‘could be arrested anytime’, the respondent highlighted the poten-
tial presence of the state. Nonetheless, respondents were generally less suspicious
and more open, in particular about their political beliefs, than those I had inter-
viewed in Gulu. The greatest suspicion was expressed by an NRM-affiliated
elected official, who suspected me of spying not for the Ugandan government,
but for a foreign entity. These respondents perceived the possibility of surveil-
lance, but unlike in other areas, expressed as great a concern about foreign
intelligence operations as from their own government.
Respondents in Soroti described a type of unpredictable state intervention
similar to those depicted in other parts of the country. However, they expressed
less fear of the ruling regime and—in some cases—a perception of greater
proximity and trust than was expressed in either Gulu or Moroto. For instance,
the crime preventers who appealed directly to the IGP and the president made
evident their belief that the highest authorities in the country would be concerned
with their personal plight, and overrule the mid-tier authorities who had excluded
them from the programme without following proper procedural channels.¹¹ Local
authorities in Soroti appear comparatively more organized and consolidated than
in the other field sites, and unpredictability seems to emanate more from the
possibility of violent state intervention than competition among low-level
authorities.
3. Varieties of Arbitrary Governance
Each type of arbitrary governance causes citizens to self-police, though the
end is achieved through different combinations of the key mechanisms (as
depicted in Table 7.3). These findings help further develop nuances and complex-
ities of arbitrary governance and explain how, in each scenario, arbitrary
¹¹ The crime preventers had explained that they were arrested because the higher-ups were unable to
oust them through elections, the route through which local crime preventers in Soroti originally gained
their positions.
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governance works through slightly different channels to fragment civic organiza-
tion and limit claim making. The results can be summarized as four types of
arbitrary governance, listed in Table 7.4. These types reflect particular manifest-
ations of the key factors, and thus may not apply directly to other contexts outside
of Uganda. Instead, this typology shows how the framework of institutionalized
arbitrariness can be operationalized to analyse arbitrary governance across diverse
contexts.
3.1 Atomization (Gulu)
Atomization uses direct, material, and unpredictable violent intervention against
the individual’s body. Different authorities may have formally discrete jurisdic-
tions. However, these jurisdictions are regularly and continually destabilized as
other public authorities unpredictably and repeatedly redefine their own jurisdic-
tional claims. In such a context, it is difficult for citizens to develop expectations
about the role and responsibility of different authorities, resulting in atomized
members of society. These isolated subjects are physically vulnerable to state
violence and are therefore actively disciplined through direct interventions.
Unpredictability is regularized and impersonal in its implementation.
3.2 Contested Assemblage (Soroti)
In a contested assemblage, the second form of arbitrary governance, different
actors, broadly speaking, have their own generally accepted jurisdictions,
though these are often destabilized through competing claims, personalized
interests, forum shopping, or a host of other obscured explanations. This
approach to arbitrary governance in part resembles a security assemblage, in
which the jurisdictional claims of numerous actors create a low-level equilibria
(Abrahamsen and Williams 2010). However, in a contested assemblage, actors in
the assemblage regularly challenge and undermine each other, creating significant
uncertainty and making the state appear arbitrary. Violence recedes into the
background of this mode of arbitrary governance, as it is comparatively institu-
tionalized in the authority of each discrete actor in the assemblage.
Table 7.4 Types of arbitrary governance
Highly conflict-affected Less conflict-affected
Pro-opposition Atomization Contested assemblage
Pro-regime Violence at scale Discipline
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3.3 Violence at Scale (Moroto)
Violence at scale, the third form of arbitrary governance, uses unpredictable acts
of broad-based and group-level violence to destabilize jurisdictional claims and to
discipline subjects. While local authorities have clear notions of their own jurisdic-
tional claims, their claims are destabilized during violent campaigns against society as
a whole. State violence is comparatively organized and deployed according to public
policies, though these policies are ever changing. State violence appears both as a
potential threat but also as a potential enforcer of political order. Acts of violence at
scale allow for local-level order to prevail in the absenceof the state, but shape citizens’
subjectivities in relation to the possibility of violent state intervention.
3.4 Discipline (Mbarara)
In discipline, the fourth variety of arbitrary governance, the four oppositions of
institutionalized arbitrariness are comparatively more stable but, combined, are
still sufficiently fluid to produce an unpredictable and high-stakes relationship
between citizens and the regime. Citizens’ perceptions of state violence, and their
view of the regime as a source of protection, are largely shaped by second-hand
accounts of violence from other areas of the country. Because citizens have close
ties to and direct communication with elites in the government, they perceive the
ruling regime as well informed on local matters. Even small decisions seem
potentially high-stakes, because anything could be recategorized as an infraction
and punished. Because the regime makes arrests and sanctions ordinary citizens
based on inconsistent rules, citizens’ expectations for the use of violence remain
unstable and cause them to self-police.
4. Limitations and Implications
Each variety of arbitrary governance requires the unpredictable use of state
authority and violence to fragment local organization and forestall the formation
of reliable expectations that citizens might use to make claims on (state) author-
ities. Such an environment keeps claim making fluid, always open to
redefinition—and continually creates opportunities for those with more power
to retilt the playing field, overall to the advantage of the ruling cadre. Recognition
of arbitrary governance, in all its forms, helps explain how a regime lacking
regular presence across its territory can still maintain power across an ethnically
and regionally divided country.
Sub-national variation in arbitrary governance further offers insights about
questions of intentionality as well as several limitations of institutionalized
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arbitrariness as an explanatory framework. Rather than reflecting a system in
which arbitrariness is based purely on personalized rule, the fact that arbitrariness
is institutionalized suggests a governing structure that fosters uncertainty, limin-
ality, and political disorder. Was this structure intentionally designed to produce
unpredictability? Or does a weak and fragmented system just happen to produce
unpredictability, as many have theorized about fragile states (Acemoglu and
Robinson 2012; North et al. 2009)?
Though it may be impossible to conclusively determine that the state’s leaders
intentionally institutionalize arbitrariness, there are several elements to suggest
that, at the very least, the regime is aware of its unpredictability and sustains it to
maintain power. First, arbitrary governance is present across the country—showing
that it is not fully explained by conflict-affectedness or political relationship to the
ruling regime. Second, a preponderance of circumstantial evidence suggests that
arbitrary governance is used to destabilize elites and undermine their ability to
catalyse support from their constituencies, necessarily fragmenting local-level
organization in the process. Finally, the regime continues to sustain division and
competition in the security and governance sectors, despite the known high costs.
Several respondents, particularly elites who had formerly served in the regime
and worked with Museveni personally, articulated arbitrary governance as a
necessary product of ‘big-tent’ patrimonialism. This view sees the regime as
benevolent but trapped in a governing style that requires continually expanding
the patrimonial network to include an ever growing constituency. Fragmentation
helps divvy up resource streams to reach ever wider and more diverse coteries.
However, as has been illustrated, the system is not merely fragmented; it is also
organized to foster competition and cross-agency espionage. Such a ‘divide-and-
rule’ strategy aims not merely to distribute goods, but also to undermine trust
within constituencies.
Other respondents argued that the regime seeks to undermine elites—such as
military officers, government ministers, businessmen, and religious and cultural
leaders—and that local fragmentation is merely a side effect. In this view, what
I have described as arbitrary governance might be akin to what Bayart has
described as interlocking dynamics of divergence and reciprocal assimilation
that incorporate African elites into a dominant but fragmented ruling class,
‘defined, above all, as the sum of individual strategies’ (Bayart 1993, 178, citing
A. Morice). However, if elites are weakened by fragmenting their bases of power,
then fragmenting elites and fragmenting local organization are linked. Though
local fragmentation may not have been the regime’s initial goal, it has clear
benefits for the ruling regime and has become integral to the regime’s success.
As a former NRM government minister reflected:
What I know is that it is in the interest of government for people to remain poor
and disorganised so that they can be ruled and bought all the time. So that they
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may feel helpless and hopeless. They may owe everything to the government.
That is what I believe . . . Things are made on purpose, like divide and rule, so that
people are divided, not united. Because when you unite them—united we stand.
I think the evidence is the fact that they continue creating small, unviable
administrative areas. It’s evidence of divide and rule. The ethnicity is very glaring,
and nepotism is also a principle of divide and rule. And then, the poverty thing.
(Former NRM government minister, Kampala, 9 February 2018)
It is simply not possible to undermine the emergence of potential political
competitors by weakening their claims to local authority and undermining their
base without also disorganizing the citizens who comprise their base—these are
two sides of a single coin.
Some elites saw what I have described as a strategy of disorder as one of fear.
A formerly high-ranking NRM official and member of the security services who
had become an opposition leader reflected:
[F]or the regime to say, ‘Let’s create so many units [to cause confusion among the
population]’ . . . I am not so sure that they [the elites of the NRM regime] are even
that sophisticated to have been thinking in that sense or that way. I am not so
sure. I think their main contention was to create fear and then the people will
police themselves, because fear undermines people’s confidence and undermines
their capability to organise themselves. I think that’s what informed the actions
that they’ve been carrying out.
(Former high-ranking NRM official, Kampala, 26 January 2018)
Fear is woven into arbitrary governance. And yet, the effects of this regime among
ordinary citizens do not appear to be first and foremost a product of internalized
fear. Unlike the subjects described by Linda Green (1994) or Lisa Wedeen (1999),
whose self-policing takes the form of silence or performative support for trad-
itionally authoritarian regimes, this system is able to accommodate a compara-
tively critical and agentive population. Some Ugandans do speak critically of the
NRM government in public fora, join street protests, and declare their support for
the opposition. As the same respondent went on to explain, fostering divisions
and suspicion is also essential to this governing strategy:
You hear people expressing themselves in conferences, workshops, on radios. But
when it reaches a point of them getting organised . . . ! Even if they are agitated,
but they remain as individuals, they do not get organised and become cohesive to
a point where if they put their demands there is organisation behind those
demands. Even if you get one or two individuals, they [the government] will
crush that. If you are from the outside you think this might be a democratic
country. If they [the government] see a form of organisation behind expression
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of grievance, that’s what they fear most. They know any organised force will
impact on whatever they intend to fight against. That’s why they spend a lot of
time creating divisions and suspicion.
(Former high-ranking NRM official, Kampala, 26 January 2018)
The respondent notes that there are spaces and times in which citizens can express
discontent and criticize the regime. But the regime ensures that these spaces are
fragile and potentially fleeting, both by ‘creating divisions and suspicion’ and—
should that fail—using violence to ‘crush’ organized opposition. The resultant
picture reflects an unpredictable political environment, in which risks are
extremely difficult to calculate, thereby dampening organized collective action
while leaving open fragile spaces for dissent.
Finally, the highest levels of government continue to produce and sustain
fragmentation despite its high cost, suggesting that fragmentation or its effects
are valued. In 2017, an internal government report on the excess cost of duplica-
tive government ministries and agencies was leaked to the press. Museveni has
repeatedly called on parliament to streamline government agencies, for example in
September 2018, with the cabinet reporting that such merging would save the
government 1 trillion shillings per year (approximately 333 million US dollars per
year) (Bagala 2018b). When asked if the government would implement reforms, a
former opposition MP said she thought it was unlikely, reflecting: ‘The centre does
not want efficiency. The centre uses these fragments to achieve the political
survival aspect of it’ (Former opposition MP, Kampala, 7 February 2018).
A journalist in Mbarara noted that though the president has lamented such
inefficiencies, he continues to support them:
Even the president oftentimes has been quoted as talking of these agencies’
duplicating roles. But what has he done? Instead they have kept on increasing.
When you look at the districts, he says the districts are not viable, but he
continues dividing them into small, small units for the purposes of creating
new positions. But they also know that they are not viable. I mean, he’s the CEO
[chief executive officer]. How do you complain of an agency duplicating
roles and you cannot do anything about it? That’s my question. If you went
into the details and look at the executives of these agencies and where they come
from, then you would know that it’s a scheme.
(Journalist, Mbarara, 16 January 2018)
The former MP attributed fragmentation, and its resultant inefficiencies and
confusion, to a regime maintenance strategy:
But President Museveni, at least to those who have studied him, likes to—as the
people here locally say—be the only bull in the crawl. He would love to see an ISO
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that is fighting the police and the police fighting the ISO so that none of them
becomes a strong power centre.
(Former opposition MP, Kampala, 7 February 2018)
Reflecting further on whether arbitrary governance is an intentional strategy, a
former government minister argued that the extreme impoverishment of
Ugandans under Museveni’s sustained and relatively peaceful rule is evidence of
intention:
So for me, I came to learn later that there was a deliberate policy—not written
anywhere—to impoverish Ugandans, to make them poor, vulnerable, and des-
perate. To create a class of vulnerable, extremely poor, desperate people, who put
their hands [out], ‘Please help us, help us.’ Any little thing can help. In all the
previous governments, I’d never seen that—where people are turned into
beggars. (Former government minister, Kampala, 9 February 2018)
When further pressed, the respondent pointed to a preponderance of circumstan-
tial evidence, offering the recent example of how the regime used legally compliant
means to remove the presidential age limit.
We know very well that the reason they removed the age limit is because they
want him to stay in power, and even later on create a dynasty of them to stay.
Now, can I give you concrete evidence on that? Which evidence can I give you?
And yet I know it is true. Until he contests and I see that’s why he was doing it.
And they even raise it, ‘It is not for him,’ and yet it is.
(Former government minister, Kampala, 9 February 2018)
The respondent noted that these observations fell short of hard evidence, but
argued that this ambiguity only amplified the effectiveness of such an approach.
A former member of the NRM regime who held top posts in security and
administration explained:
He [Museveni] likes that confusion. That confusion helps him to gage society and
what is happening in the various sectors of the government in the state. He is
always on the top of it.
[But how can you know it is intentional?] I am a political scientist just like you.
You just observe and see how events unfold . . . Over time, observation . . . yes, and
how he uses—like, he will not take the official line of the director of CID
[Criminal Investigation Department]. He will rely more on these other groups,
whatever he wants. So certainly, you observe as a political analyst that this is one
tactic of his survival. Not everything is written, not everything is said.
(Former member of NRM regime, Kampala, 7 February 2018)
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These former top members of the NRM regime, who had worked closely with
Museveni over decades, similarly described Museveni as strategic and manipula-
tive, using a ruling style that cultivates division, fragmentation, and suspicion.
They differed in the extent to which they saw this as a purposeful attempt to
weaken civil society, but agreed that disorganizing elites was a clear goal. When
pressed for evidence, they returned to the over 30 years of governing decisions that
they argued reveal clear patterns of behaviour and governing priorities.
Like these elites, respondents across my field sites described the regime and
its governing style as unpredictable, supporting the notion that arbitrariness is
an element of central governance rather than a legacy of conflict or a reflection
of antagonism between the civilian population and the ruling regime. Central
government policies significantly contribute to institutional fragmentation;
thus, it is perhaps intuitive that it is common across Uganda. However, the
three additional factors of institutionalized arbitrariness were also present, to
varying degrees, in all four study locations. By fostering ambiguity between
exceptional and lawful violence, destabilizing jurisdictional authority, and cre-
ating uncertainty about the state’s presence and absence, the regime has insti-
tutionalized arbitrariness. The result is a productive unpredictability. Despite
the fragmented and seemingly tenuous nature of the regime, ordinary citizens
also perceive it as cohesive and powerful. They interpret the regime’s absences
and inconsistencies as intentional, rather than as evidence of fragility or
weakness.
Such variation in arbitrary governance is also helpful to identify sites of
resistance and limitations to what might otherwise appear to be a totalizing and
all-encompassing explanation for regime control. The variation illustrated in these
cases shows how unpredictability, distributed differently, might cause opposition
to take particular forms. For example, in conflict-affected Gulu and Moroto, crime
preventers attempted to make claims on state authorities by gathering in large
numbers at the district’s Central Police Station, reflecting the fragmented and
unpredictable nature of state institutions. In contrast, crime preventers in Soroti
wrote personal requests to the president and the IGP, attempting to use the
bureaucratic system to claim payments and promotions, reflecting their percep-
tion of comparatively stable jurisdictional claims.
Another wrinkle in this picture of state domination is how citizens manipulate
practices of state violence, for instance, when Karamojong responded to disarma-
ment campaigns by joining government militias to retrieve their weapons.
Arbitrary governance does not imply that any forms of protest or opposition are
impossible, nor that citizens cannot seek to manipulate a fluid and changing
governance environment for their own benefit. Instead, it explains certain limits
of collective action in Uganda, and how the regime has managed to project
authoritarian control and co-exist with surprisingly effective state institutions
that at times impose checks and balances. Citizens simply have fewer options
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for organizing and making political claims, and the spaces within which they can
do so—while present—are fragile (also see Abonga et al. 2019).
This chapter offers a systematic way to think about the politics of unpredict-
ability, its production, and some of its implications for civil society and collective
action. Neither conflict-affectedness nor opposition to the ruling regime fully
accounts for citizens’ experiences of arbitrary governance; instead, arbitrariness
is part of the regime’s approach to governance. The strongest version of this
argument sees the ruling regime as intentionally and consciously institutionalizing
arbitrary governance as a long-term end goal in itself. This extreme scenario
appears unlikely; however, a softer version seems hard to disregard. Such an
argument sees the government’s divide-and-rule tactics as necessarily producing
ambiguity in the relationship between citizens and state actors. This ambiguity
serves the interests of the regime by fragmenting citizen claim making. The ruling
regime is aware of both the ambiguity and its effects, such that unpredictability
has become integral to its success.
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8
Arbitrary Governance in Africa
and Beyond
This book began with the story of William Odera and his brother. The narrative
chronicled how an unaccountable act of state violence took the life of Odera’s
brother, and described Odera’s subsequent unfulfilled pursuit of justice. The case
demonstrates how unpredictable, violent state interventions, like those of the
police, can keep nascent public authorities, such as local vigilante groups, fragile
and fragmented. It also illustrates how the state outsources day-to-day security
and justice duties—responsibilities that go to the core of the state’s authority and
legitimacy—without meaningfully devolving power. Odera’s experience further
shows how arbitrary governance in the security sector can have spill-over effects
that shape the lives and political identities of ordinary citizens. Odera’s experience
is, of course, idiosyncratic. But in the context of this book, it offers a window into
how arbitrary regimes integrate unpredictability into the structure of the state, and
how institutionalized arbitrariness translates into the lived realities of ordinary
citizens who are simultaneously bound and abandoned by the state.
Arbitrary governance, as described in this book, recognizes the capricious and
patrimonial nature of personalized rule while recentring the relationship between
state violence and the state-building project. It helps explain how, across a country
like Uganda, vigilante groups and other local public authorities police their
communities, try criminals, mete out punishments, and collect revenue via taxes
or fee-for-service models—yet are largely unable to cement their own authority.
Instead, unpredictable state interventions and refusals to intervene render vigil-
antes and other local authorities fragile and fluid, causing them to occupy a
‘twilight’ space between the state and society (Lund 2006b). This story is not
just one of local-level competition in a complex or plural governing arrangement.
Close inspection reveals that the authority of nascent actors is largely determined
by the governing landscape produced by the most powerful violent actors. While
in theory the most powerful actor need not be the state, in practice the state’s
juridical claims to authority and access to military power mean that it almost
always is. Arbitrary governance thus reveals and helps explain contemporary
state-building projects in contexts that might otherwise be mischaracterized as
fragile, weak, or (neo)patrimonial.
This book has studied Museveni’s Uganda to offer insights into new forms of
authoritarianism observed around the world. Chapters 1 and 2 drew from diverse
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cases of authoritarian rule to build the theoretical framework for arbitrary
governance. This final chapter returns to questions of external validity and
theoretical utility in two sections. Section 1 discusses arbitrary governance in a
global context before applying it to regimes in three African countries where
scholars have observed similar phenomena: Ethiopia, Rwanda, and Zimbabwe.
I find that arbitrary governance characterizes all three regimes, but its precise
manifestation is shaped by particularities of the state apparatus, notably the
strength and independence of state institutions. This makes sense, because arbi-
trary governance explains how regimes can combine arbitrary power with state
institutions to sustainably project control over people, resources, and territory.
Though arbitrary states shape their own institutions over time, the historical
strength and independence of those institutions also shape how arbitrary govern-
ance manifests. Section 2 summarizes the key contributions of arbitrary governance
to the study of state formation and governance, including how it furthers studies of
modern authoritarianism, neopatrimonialism, and public authority.
1. Arbitrary Governance beyond Uganda
Political disorder has been documented worldwide; its temporal and spatial
distribution always shapes governance, whether it is internal or external to
strategies of control. For example, Laurent Gayer describes an ‘ordered disorder’
in Karachi, which he views as the social form of ‘a city subjected to the violent
confrontation of competing aspirants to sovereign power’ (Gayer 2014, 12–13).
Gayer’s ordered disorder is characterized by institutional fragmentation due to
ethnicized political parties; the ruling party’s use of violence characterized by
both the potential to run out of control and to restore order at short notice;
and repeated state intervention. Reflecting dynamics similar to those I have
described in this book, Gayer argues that ordered disorder rests on ‘[t]he inability
of any actor to totally dominate and establish a monopoly of violence and the
ability of . . . [the ruling party] to introduce a disequilibrium in interdependencies,
which makes it less dependent on others than others towards it’ (Gayer 2014, 13).
Similarly, Sarah Chayes recounts how, in Ben Ali’s Tunisia, the regime injected
uncertainty into people’s lives via the financial sector by routinely granting tax
waivers and sometimes revoking them retroactively. The threat of potential
prosecution was used to silence political dissent (Chayes 2015).
The modes of governance described herein also bear some resemblance to
literature that describes pockets of unpredictable rule in developed nations
where democracy is ‘backsliding’ in the face of rising populism (Norris and
Inglehart 2019). Such pockets of rule can occur both at very local and individual
levels and at the national or international policy level. For instance, in American
foreign policy, US President Donald Trump’s policies have been characterized as
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following a ‘doctrine of unpredictability’ to gain leverage for negotiation abroad,
sending contradictory messages to allies and enemies alike (Fuchs 2017). Also in
the US, instances of police arbitrarily deploying overwhelming and unaccountable
violence against African American citizens are well known, and include shootings
of unarmed citizens at routine traffic stops (Carbado 2017). Unpredictability also
characterizes certain domestic policies in the US: Immigration and Customs
Enforcement appears to apply regulations unpredictably and arbitrarily (Ryo
2019). In these pockets of rule, arbitrary intervention is spatially and temporally
distributed to discipline certain populations (the poor, racial minorities, and
immigrants), while allowing other parts of society to mobilize and participate in
civic organization. On the surface, these phenomena share characteristics with the
type of arbitrary governance that I have described. While I make no claim to the
external validity of arbitrary governance at this level, I propose that developed
countries are not exempt from these new and evolving strategies of authoritarian rule.
The situations of some countries, however, are more apparently proximate to
the mode of governance described in this book, and can be productively under-
stood through the four-part framework of institutionalized arbitrariness. Here,
I look at three regimes that have all been described as arbitrary: Ethiopia under the
Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF); Rwanda under the
Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF); and Zimbabwe under the Zimbabwe African
National Union (Patriotic Front) or ZANU(PF). These three regimes share
important similarities that facilitate comparison. Along with the NRM in
Uganda, they all share histories as ‘liberation’ movements,¹ in which strong and
disciplined party movements took over historically strong states (especially as
contrasted with the post-colonial contexts of many other African countries). They
thus have faced similar governance challenges, and have often worked from the
same general toolbox to overcome them (Fisher 2020). These cases therefore allow
me to thicken my description of arbitrary governance. Examining these regimes
through the lens of institutionalized arbitrariness draws attention to how they
work with and against the post-colonial state apparatus to project power.
Though these states have many important historical and structural similarities,
they also vary in key ways that allow me to further probe the validity of institu-
tionalized arbitrariness. The regimes in these states have taken different—and
historically contingent—institutional approaches to managing ethnic and regional
interests across territories and populations of vastly different sizes.² These
¹ Here, I use ‘liberation’ to refer to the ideology and narratives of these movements, not as a
normative assessment of their goals or achievements (see also Fisher 2020, 20–4).
² Ethiopia is nearly 40 times the size of Rwanda, with a population density one-fifth as large. The
World Bank estimated population density in each country as follows: Zimbabwe with 37 people per
square kilometre; Ethiopia, 109 citizens per square kilometre; Uganda, 213; and 498 in Rwanda (World
Bank 2018). Different population densities may change the state’s ability to reach ordinary citizens, and
the relative costs of doing so (Herbst 2014). The presence of arbitrary governance in these different
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variations continue to shape how arbitrary governance works today. For example,
Ethiopia adopted an ethnic federal system which explicitly incorporates ethnic
representation in the national government. By contrast, the regimes in Uganda,
Rwanda, and Zimbabwe have sought to sublimate ethnicity to regime-oriented
nationalisms. Moreover, these states have different capacities for surveillance and
data analysis. While Uganda and Zimbabwe rely primarily, though not exclu-
sively, on ‘low-tech’ surveillance, Ethiopia and Rwanda have demonstrated greater
competence at high-tech surveillance and data analysis, which allows them to
target repression more accurately and contributes to the general public’s percep-
tion of each regime as pervasive.
These cases are helpful to juxtapose to Uganda not only because of their
institutional and historical commonalities, but also because of their differences
in the organization of surveillance and violence. For example, though the
Zimbabwean state is arbitrary and unpredictable, it also has an extremely frag-
mented state apparatus, such that the image of a consolidated state is more fleeting
than in the Ethiopian, Rwandan, and Ugandan cases. The ZANU(PF) regime has
struggled to maintain its fragile hold on power. In contrast, Rwanda is an
increasingly consolidated state, where the regime maintains tight control over
political activities. Arbitrary governance can thus be found in states of varying
sizes and populations, with different ethnic settlements and institutional capaci-
ties. These cases illustrate the utility of institutionalized arbitrariness for analysing
modern strategies of authoritarianism, while also pointing to its limitations.
1.1 Ethiopia’s EPRDF Regime
The EPRDF held power in Ethiopia from 1991 until 2019. The EPRDF—a
coalition of four political parties—grew from a regional armed group, the Tigray
People’s Liberation Front. It seized the country after 17 years of insurgency against
the Derg, the Marxist-Leninist military junta that had ruled Ethiopia since 1974.
Over its nearly three decades in power, the EPRDF was characterized by various
relationships between party, state, and society.³ After coming to power, the new
contexts suggests that it is useful to project power across both densely and more sparsely populated
territories.
³ Sarah Vaughan (2011) helpfully documents four phases: first, in the 1980s during its fight against
the Derg, the Tigray People’s Liberation Front united party, state, and society under a Leninist
vanguard. Second, when it came to power in 1991, the regime formally divided party and state
structures. These parallel systems led to a split within the party, leading to the third phase (2001–5),
the ascendance of Meles Zenawi. Meles implemented bureaucratic decentralization in the name of the
developmental state, weakening party structures. Vaughan posits that this made new space for
competition in the 2005 elections. In the fourth phase, from 2005, the ruling party rebuilt itself as
distinct from the state, in part to dominate the space for political contestation after the 2005 election
revealed support for opposition parties, particularly in urban centres, that the regime was unwilling to
tolerate. In 2012, Meles died, and in 2019 the EPRDF was dissolved (see note 5).
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ruling coalition established the party as formally independent from the state,
eventually leading to an internal split that allowed Meles Zenawi to emerge as a
central political figure in 2001. During this post-2001 period, Meles subsumed the
party under his vision of a developmental state, further bolstering links between
the centre and the grass roots through renewed decentralization, ‘capacity-
building’ initiatives that advanced ‘political education’, and programmes for
rural and economic development (Vaughan 2011).
In service of its nation-building project, Ethiopia’s EPRDF has been described
as using surveillance and unpredictable violence to disrupt political organization
and cause ordinary citizens to self-police, both in its urban capital and in more
remote rural areas. Marco di Nunzio argues that, in its capital city, Addis Ababa,
the regime’s power was founded on ‘the ability to remake and remark the “red
line” ’ (Di Nunzio 2014, 430, emphasis added). This ‘red line’ separated political
actions that would be punished from those that would not; uncertainty about
where the red line would be drawn inhibited political organization and caused
citizens to self-police. The EPRDF has also been described as using strategic
exception and memories of overwhelming state violence to govern its peripheries.
For example, Tobias Hagmann and Benedikt Korf (2012) demonstrate how succes-
sive regimes have conflated law and lawlessness in border regions to generate a
perpetual state of exception. This approach appears to have been built up over the
years, as the EPRDF sought first to systematically mobilize the grass roots and then
to use overwhelming and unaccountable violence to suppress the remaining oppos-
ition. While Ethiopia under the EPRDF shares important similarities with Uganda
under the NRM, the EPRDF’s early decision to integrate ethnicity into its governing
structure has produced a particular kind of institutional fragmentation that has left
clearly defined fault lines for potential political organization.
The EPRDF espoused a three-pronged nation-building philosophy. Ethnic
federalism established Ethiopia as a collective of ethnically defined states; revolu-
tionary democracy stressed a direct link between the leadership and the masses;
and the developmental state—key to Meles’s post-2001 agenda—reframed dem-
ocracy around developmentalism rather than representation (Gagliardone 2014;
also see Fisher 2020, 221). These ideals were reflected in government policies, such
as Ethiopia’s early adoption and adaptation of internet communication technolo-
gies includingWoredenet and Schoolnet. Intranet-like systems allowed party elites
to extend government services and communicate directly with ordinary people.
For example, through Schoolnet the regime provided pre-recorded lessons,
including curricula on EPRDF’s founding principles. These same systems were
also used to deliver political education to teachers and other government officials
(Gagliardone 2014). To respect principles of equality mandated by ethnic feder-
alism, these technologies were implemented country-wide; the military installed
generators in remote locales that were otherwise off-grid, giving the EPRDF direct
lines of communication with the grass roots.
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The EPRDF was relatively successful in developing links to ordinary people.
However, the regime still faced political opposition, the full extent of which
became clear during Ethiopia’s 2005 elections. The elections revealed that the
political opposition had gained a foothold, particularly in Addis and other urban
centres.⁴ The regime announced victory while vote counting was still under way
and forcibly suppressed the resulting demonstrations. The state’s security organs,
led by party loyalists, played a crucial role in ‘defending public order as defined by
the ruling power against opposition supporters’—which Hagmann and Abbink
have likened to the time of the Derg and the Imperial government (Hagmann and
Abbink 2011, 585). In addition to the threat of coercion, the EPRDF regime
sought to limit civil society by implementing restrictive legislation such as the
Anti-Terrorism Proclamation and the Charities and Societies Proclamation. The
government carried out ‘re-ideologisation campaigns’, formally called ‘capacity-
building seminars’, which were supported by donor basket funding. The regime
also employed alarmist language to convince the public that ‘without the EPRDF
in power, Ethiopia would turn to chaos’ (Tronvoll 2010, 124).⁵ The Ethiopian state
used such tactics to extend control across the country, monopolize political
representation and the public sphere, and ‘capture virtually all public institutions
in Ethiopia’ (Hagmann and Abbink 2011, 585). As a result, citizens fell into line,
publicly enacting support for the regime. The EPRDF left little space for citizens to
be apathetic, instead framing politics as a high-stakes battle between the revolu-
tionary democracy of the EPRDF and its opponents (Di Nunzio 2014; Tronvoll
2010; Vaughan 2011).
Ethiopia under the EPRDF exhibits characteristics of arbitrary governance—
relying on surveillance, the unpredictable deployment of violence, and fluid
jurisdictional claims to produce the perception of a pervasive and powerful state
apparatus. However, the nature of its institutional fragmentation highlights an
important distinction. In the Ethiopian case, rather than subverting ethnic divi-
sions, the state incorporated them into its structure through ethnic federalism.
This move has fostered ethnicity as a structural organizing principle and a basis
for political mobilization, conflict, and claim making, for example around employ-
ment, voting, and access to land (Abbink 2011). Ethiopia thus retains a built-in
structure for ethnically organized politics that the regime did not fully control, and
instead managed via suppression and concessions. In contrast, in Rwanda and
Uganda, ethnicity has been suppressed and fragmented in favour of a unitary
⁴ In the 2005 elections, the two main opposition parties made great gains, winning the seats in
virtually all urban areas, for a total of 174 parliamentary seats as compared with the 12 held previously
(Abbink 2006).
⁵ After the death of Meles in 2012, and the appointment of Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed in 2018, the
EPRDF was dissolved and replaced by the new Prosperity Party, framed as a ‘rebranding’ to polish the
EPRDF’s ‘tarnished image’ (Yibeltal 2019). Abiy has suggested that political appointments should be
based on merit rather than ethnic identity, though how the new party will achieve this remains to be
seen as of this writing (also see Fisher and Gebrewahd 2019).
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nationalism—‘Rwandicity’ in Rwanda and the Movement in Uganda—that limits
political organization along ethnic lines.
1.2 Rwanda’s RPF Regime
Rwanda under the RPF has been described as a regime that governs through
‘productive liminality’, using surveillance and unpredictable violence to discipline
its population at an individual level (Beresford et al. 2018). As such, scholars have
argued that the country is better understood, not as in transition to a known
regime type, but rather as inhabiting and exploiting ‘the ambiguous spaces betwixt
and between authoritarianism and democracy’ (Beresford et al. 2018, 1233). The
military is at the centre of Rwanda’s politics and development, with former
military leadership making up the economic and political elite. The regime and
the state apparatus are highly intertwined (Jowell 2014).
The state’s ability to reach deep into the countryside is multicausal. In part, it
stems from the years immediately after the 1994 genocide, when the new govern-
ment took over an intricate administrative structure that had been weakened but
not destroyed by the conflict. The RPF has further developed a complex grass-
roots system of intelligence gathering and resource distribution that links the
central state apparatus to individual households and Rwandans, blurring the lines
between the ruling party and the state (Purdeková 2011, 480). Bert Ingelaere has
documented a plethora of authority figures and an ‘elevated awareness of [state]
authority throughout society’ (Ingelaere 2014, 220), which he suggests results
from a significant degree of state reach. The RPF has also used public memor-
ialization of the genocide, including graphic displays of corpses and reinternment,
to shock the public and to justify ‘any actions’ needed to maintain security, much
like how the NRM regime has used commemoration of casualties of its Bush War
to bolster its legitimacy (Longman 2017, 5). The effects of these tactics may be
further amplified because Rwanda is a small and very densely populated country.
This system produces an ‘omnipresence of central power, not only at the local
level but also in the consciousness of Rwandans’ (Ingelaere 2014, 220). A massive
public administration has the additional effect of keeping ordinary people busy
with a variety of often duplicative or irrelevant activities in order to prevent any
opening for opposition efforts (Purdeková 2011, 483).
As in the Ethiopian case, scholars have argued that there is no middle ground
for civil society in Rwanda—instead, opposition to the regime is framed as an
existential threat to the state itself. ‘[S]ecurity forces harass, arrest, and even kill
those who threaten to destabilise RPF control’ (Beresford et al. 2018, 1242). The
RPF targets not only political opponents and journalists, but also ordinary people.
This targeting has been described as increasingly random (Beresford et al. 2018,
1243). Susan Thomson and Rosemary Nagy write about ‘a climate of fear and
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insecurity in [ordinary citizens’] everyday lives’ in a context where the state firmly
holds political power (Thomson and Nagy 2011, 13). In the post-genocide years,
as a part of truth and reconciliation processes, Thomson and Nagy document
arbitrary sanctions placed on ordinary citizens. For example, those on trial in
gacaca courts—which were established to try those who had committed crimes
during the genocide—might admit to perpetrating crimes in the hope of receiving
a reduced sentence, only to be sent to prison for life for not telling ‘the whole
truth’. Participants in gacaca, while expected to play a part, could nonetheless be
punished for speaking out of turn. Those who gave testimony as survivors but did
not play their role by forgiving perpetrators could lose access to community
services including health care (Thomson and Nagy 2011, 26).
Like Uganda’s NRM, the RPF has used arbitrary violence and surveillance to
govern citizens at an individual level, fragmenting civil society and familial
networks in favour of the regime as family (Purdeková 2011, 482). Through a
more sophisticated technical ability to surveil and process intelligence data, the
Rwandan state can target potential opposition more effectively than the NRM, but
it still deploys rules and punishments unpredictably. Thus, while similar to the
Ugandan case, Rwanda’s RPF may enact a more hardened and durable form of
arbitrary governance, reinforced by citizens’ perceptions of its surveillance tech-
niques as accurate and effective.
1.3 Zimbabwe’s ZANU(PF) Regime
The case of Zimbabwe under the ZANU(PF) exhibits many key characteristics of
arbitrary governance. However, the pervasive fragmentation of the state, and mili-
tary’s key role in stabilizing the regime,means that the image of a consolidated state is
elusive at times. As elaborated by Jocelyn Alexander, studies on Zimbabwe focus
on the political productivity of disorder and uncertainty and explore the bur-
geoning networks of power beyond, within and on the margins of bureaucratic
state institutions . . . These studies alert us to the complexities of modes of
governance that combine the violent, technical and narrative, and that invoke
different registers (arbitrary; bureaucratic) at one and the same time.
(Alexander 2013, 808–9)
Personalizing state institutions and ‘blurring lines between state and party as well
as public and private’ allowed the regime to exercise and retain power (Alexander
2013, 808). This arbitrariness is well illustrated in the work of Joost Fontein, who
examines the Zimbabwean government’s use of unpredictable violence through a
study of a large-scale campaign to remove illegal housing and commercial build-
ings. Colloquially called tsunami, Operation Murambatsvina/Restore Order began
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in 2005 and resulted in massive displacement across the country. Fontein notes
the tensions between two competing narratives: the government’s story of reas-
serting order and cleaning up urban spaces, and international NGOs’ account of
how the government rejected lawful violence in favour of a ‘demonstration of
“state power” deployed on a whim’ (Fontein 2009, 372). Fontein argues:
it is precisely in the ambiguity and uncertainty generated by this tension, between
the spectacle of [the regime’s] ability to deploy ‘state power’ as it chooses (that is,
arbitrarily), and the resonances of official appeals to the reassertion of formal,
bureaucratic planning and ‘governance’, that the political advantages of this
operation for the ruling party become apparent. (Fontein 2009, 372)
Uncertainty about when the police and state officials would arrive and the severity
of intervention they might inflict even led residents to dismantle their own homes
in anticipation of the tsunami. Moreover, competing narratives resulted in a
barrage of conflicting rumours, which in turn contributed to uncertainty about
the actual purpose of the campaign. Fontein writes:
Like the father who beats his child, the brute force of the operation was ‘arbitrary’
not so much because it did or did not conform to the plethora of different logics
and motivations ascribed by diverging rumours—there were too many contra-
dictory explanations circulating for such an argument to work. Rather, it was
‘arbitrary’ exactly because its unexpected suddenness and brutality was experi-
enced regardless of whether its motives would ever be properly understood.
(Fontein 2009, 372)
Thus, Fontein argues, Operation Restore Order was experienced as the ultimate
expression of sovereignty. Fontein’s analysis shows how Zimbabwe’s ruling
regime used unpredictable and potentially harsh intervention to induce the
population to self-discipline, such that ordinary citizens sought to anticipate
state actors’ intentions and deliver the desired results before violent enforcement
could take place.
However, next to the regimes in Ethiopia, Rwanda, and Uganda, state institu-
tions in Zimbabwe appear comparatively weak and the regime depends heavily on
the support of the military. Though the Zimbabwean state was comparatively
consolidated at independence in 1980, the ruling party—ZANU(PF)—worked to
undermine this state, centralizing power under the executive and establishing a de
facto one-party state. Decentralization, implemented in the context of structural
adjustment and austerity, weakened the local state apparatus. ZANU(PF) then
established ad hoc bodies and procedures to circumvent the local state, further
marginalizing it, strengthening the party, and perpetuating centralized control
(McGregor 2002, 12).
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While weakening the state’s bureaucratic apparatus, the military has taken on
an increasingly central role, such that some now describe the military as ‘the core
element of the state–party–military alliance that constitutes the regime’ (Moyo
2016, 351). The military dominates Zimbabwe’s political economy, with retired
and active military officers holding positions in electoral bodies, parliament, the
judiciary, the bureaucracy, and state enterprises and parastatals (Moyo 2016).
Electoral violence led by state security forces has factored into Zimbabwe’s
elections since independence, taking on a particularly central role post-2002
(Cheeseman and Tendi 2010; Dorman 2005). The role of the military in national
politics was particularly acute in 2017, when a ‘military-assisted transition’
replaced President Robert Mugabe with his former vice president, Emmerson
Mnangagwa. Civilians reported ‘subtle violence’ in the 2018 elections, resulting
from rumours that the regime would use biometric data and surveillance to track
votes, combined with reminders of the wave of intense violence following a strong
turnout for the opposition in the 2008 elections (Beardsworth et al. 2019, 587).
The military’s support is key to the party’s continued hold on power. Though
citizens experience the state as arbitrary—because of its unpredictable use of
violence, changing jurisdictional claims, and (low-tech) surveillance—the state
apparatus itself is comparatively weak and contested, threatening the image of a
consolidated state.
* * *
The cases of Ethiopia, Rwanda, and Zimbabwe in many ways resemble what
I have described as institutionalized arbitrariness in Uganda. In Ethiopia, the
regime pursued a model of a direct ‘coalition with the people’ (Vaughan 2011,
634) and ‘fear of reprisal’ has limited collective action (Di Nunzio 2014, 429). In
Rwanda, ‘Suspicion, distrust . . . fear and the resultant decreased dissent all assure
that the state is better able to gather and disperse, to stage and broadcast, to extract
resources and attempt its desired transformations’ (Purdeková 2011, 494). In
Zimbabwe, citizens feel abandoned and tired, cynical, and incredulous when it
comes to their engagements with the state (Chigudu 2019). These regimes are
characterized by fluidity between law and lawlessness and by the state’s ability to
constantly redefine its jurisdiction, using threats and violence to enforce changing
edicts (Beresford et al. 2018; Di Nunzio 2014; Fontein 2009; Hagmann and Korf
2012). Scholars further show how ordinary citizens attempt to negotiate the
resulting systems of uncertainty: they try to rationalize the state’s unpredictable
interventions and non-interventions, they become frightened and disorganized,
and—in many cases—they self-police. In the cases of Ethiopia, Rwanda, Uganda,
and urban Zimbabwe, citizens do some of the state’s work in its absence and
contribute to the production of its authority.
The variations in how these regimes use surveillance, violence, institutional
fragmentation, and unpredictable intervention can help disentangle why arbitrary
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governance works differently in each case. Aspects of Zimbabwe under the ZANU
(PF) reflect a fragile state, lacking a pronounced state-building agenda. While
Zimbabwe exhibits certain characteristics of arbitrary governance—such as blur-
ring the lines between exceptional and lawful violence and keeping the state’s
jurisdictional claims fluid—the state is highly contested and fragmented. Instead
of occupying state institutions, ZANU(PF) has sought to undermine them, treat-
ing state institutions outside the military as potential obstacles to be overcome
rather than tools to co-opt. The military remains powerful and somewhat autono-
mous from the regime: though it has supported ZANU(PF), it remains a potential
alternative locus of power that must be appeased.
Ethiopia under the EPRDF had comparatively strong state apparatus and
surveillance capabilities. At the same time, the federal state integrated ethnic
fault lines into the public sphere. Ethnic tensions thus remained relatively easy
to mobilize, potentially threatening future state cohesion. Finally, the regime in
Rwanda seems to have hardened into a more durable authoritarianism, thanks to a
comparatively effective surveillance apparatus sustained by both low- and high-
tech tools. As elites gain confidence in the regime’s ability to dominate citizens’
political lives, political operations may become increasingly predictable. These
comparisons also put Uganda’s NRM into perspective as a less durable regime
than those of the EPRDF in Ethiopia and RPF in Rwanda. The authority of the
NRM has been closely linked to the identity of Museveni, making it difficult to
disentangle the regime’s authority from the personal authority of the president.
However, it is nonetheless apparent that the NRM itself has come to occupy the
state’s institutions, aligning the regime’s interests with a strengthening of the state.
Arbitrary governance also reveals variation in terms of temporal and geo-
graphic distributions of unpredictability. For example, in the Ethiopian case, di
Nunzio’s ‘red line’ appears in relation to time-bound elections, while in
Zimbabwe, the regime’s arbitrary interventions were most pronounced within
the geographic confines of the urban capital, where it had greater capacity. Such
variations may depend on the regime’s capacity and strategic interests. These
variations, like those found within Uganda, underscore the utility of applying the
framework of institutionalized arbitrariness across different contexts, and further
highlights different varieties of arbitrary governance.
2. Conclusion: Arbitrary States and Social Control
In their 1984 study of personal rule in sub-Saharan post-colonial African states,
Robert Jackson and Carl Rosberg juxtapose the ruler’s arbitrariness with the
institutionalized rule of bureaucratic states. They argue that in sub-Saharan
Africa, formal political institutions are abstract: leaders are not bound by them
and citizens do not abide by them. Instead, people act in accordance with personal
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obligations to family, friends, allies, clansmen, and tribesmen. In this view, the
arbitrary nature of African states can be attributed to colonial intervention, when
the domestic bases of sovereign power—whether founded in coercion or
compliance—were left distinct and disconnected from the newly implemented
colonial state.⁶ This understanding of African states as personalist has influenced
thinking on patrimonial and neopatrimonial rule, and emphasized elite capture of
weak or hollow state institutions. Jackson and Rosberg offer several metaphors for
this kind of personal rule, one of which is navigation. In Jackson and Rosberg’s
telling, a ruler’s duty is to guide the government toward some (typically develop-
mental) goal but also to keep it ‘afloat, steady, and on an even keel’ (Jackson and
Rosberg 1984, 428). The authors argue that in sub-Saharan African countries,
rulers are not steering. Instead, they are trying to keep afloat ‘in a political world of
great uncertainty and often turbulence’ (Jackson and Rosberg 1984, 429). Rulers
are merely surviving, unable to control where their ship is headed or to progress in
any particular direction.
In contrast to this analysis, a theory of arbitrary governance sees political
disorder as institutionalized in order to achieve regime stability and project
authoritarian power. Regimes characterized by institutionalized arbitrariness are
embarking on state-building projects that seek to control individual political
action. Rather than simply staying afloat, these rulers are progressively developing
resilient systems of rule to dominate society and project control across territory.
This type of regime disrupts collective action to stave off two of the main
challenges that modern authoritarian regimes face: insurgency (which relies on
the organization of rebels) and electoral defeat (which relies on the organization of
voters). To achieve this, such regimes fragment but do not necessarily destroy
alternative sites of power. The regime sits like an umbrella over a host of other
competing public authorities. The explanatory value of institutionalized arbitrari-
ness does not derive from the unpredictable behaviour of any given authority—
although it recognizes that individuals may behave erratically. Instead, its value is
in showing how regimes can destabilize public spaces so that it is unclear which
authority will exercise control over a given space, time, event, or individual. As a
result, it becomes difficult to predict which rules will be applied in any given
situation.
Four factors produce institutionalized arbitrariness: (1) the perception of over-
whelming and unaccountable violence; (2) fluid state jurisdiction; (3) potential
state presence; and (4) non-hierarchical and fragmented governing institutions.
These factors emerge from four oppositions that are stochastically collapsed and
reinstated to produce political uncertainty: (1) the use of lawful versus exceptional
⁶ Jackson and Rosberg attribute the weakness of post-colonial African states to legacies of colonial
governance and indirect rule, paired with the arbitrary nature of states’ borders, which were drawn
without consideration of pre-existing political or social organizations (Jackson and Rosberg 1984, 437).
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violence; (2) the state’s defined jurisdictional claim versus lack thereof; (3) state
presence versus absence; and (4) state fragmentation versus state consolidation.
Elements of these oppositions appear in scholarship on state formation and
consolidation, as discussed in Chapter 2. However, much of this literature assumes
that these oppositions gradually and progressively stabilize. Punctuated equilibria
and crisis junctures might change the relationship between the poles of each
opposition, but not the underlying notion that they have a stabilizing tendency.
This assumption is based on belief in two broadly accepted, mutually reinforcing
processes. First, public authorities steadily solidify their jurisdictional claims to
match their relative control over violence; and second, citizens develop expect-
ations for the behaviour of public authorities based on repeated interactions
(cf Tilly 1992).
In contrast, institutionalized arbitrariness reflects a situation in which the four
oppositions remain unstable, their poles sometimes being reinforced as rigidly
distinct, and at other times being collapsed. Unpredictable state interventions in
local affairs maintain this instability by blocking the two processes identified
above. First, such interventions stop the process whereby a public authority’s
jurisdictional claims come to match its relative control over violence. Instead,
when the state unpredictably intervenes and deploys overwhelming force, the
concerned public authority must contend with state violence in addition to
whichever other local authorities it competes with on a daily basis. In these
moments, public authorities’ comparative control of violence is reconfigured
and their jurisdictional claims are reshaped in response to the state. Second,
such state interventions prevent citizens from developing expectations for the
behaviour of public authorities because jurisdictional claims remain fluid. It is
thus unclear what authority will apply which rules at what time. The degree of
instability in each factor may of course vary, as illustrated in Chapter 7 and earlier
in this chapter—but, importantly, in systems of institutionalized arbitrariness, all
four remain unstable. The power of arbitrary governance is found in these
instabilities, and the productive tensions they produce.
Institutionalized arbitrariness reflects a state-building project that is not about
establishing a bureaucratic and impersonal state apparatus, but instead about
projecting the regime’s power across territory and seeking to embed the regime
not just in the state but also in society. By institutionalizing arbitrariness, the
regime can maintain itself as the most important public authority, structuring
other actors’ horizons of possibility and landscape for manoeuvring. Arbitrary
governance relies on arrhythmic assertions and denials of the regime’s authority
via the state apparatus. These destabilize other putative authorities and render
them fragile, allowing the regime to create an environment favourable to its
survival without requiring it to either fully incorporate or eliminate alternative
sites of power. The sustained presence of multiple public authorities, in what is
often described as a plural governance arrangement, means that the regime can
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outsource day-to-day services—including the security, justice, and governance
tasks associated with the very soul of the state—without sacrificing control.
2.1 Theoretical Contributions
Institutionalized arbitrariness contributes to literatures on state formation, state-
craft, and governance. Theories on the formation and consolidation of modern
bureaucratic states rest on a basic scenario: an iterative contest for resources over a
large geographical area, between those who control violence and the ‘rest’, creates
the state as a (by)product—a bureaucratic behemoth used to manage issues like
taxation and services (Tilly 1992). When studying non-western cases, scholars
frequently home in on obstacles that derailed this teleology, including the inter-
national political environment (Jackson and Rosberg 1982), or the demands of
global markets (Amsden 2003; Bates 2008; Wade 2004); and domestic hurdles,
resulting for instance from legacies of the slave trade (Nunn 2008), colonial border
drawing (Herbst 2014), and colonial state institutions (Acemoglu and Robinson
2012; Mamdani 1996).
For these scholars, state formation is fundamentally a process of vesting
violence in the state’s institutions. As a result, the state’s jurisdiction, and the
distinction between lawful and exceptional violence, become stabilized (see also
North et al. 2009). Where states take a different form, these scholars argue that—
whatever the reason—the state has been unable to institutionalize violence. In the
case of patrimonial regimes, for example, access to resources is determined using a
personalized rather than institutionalized logic.
By contrast, institutionalized arbitrariness suggests that states can sustain a
form of modern authoritarianism in which the divisions between public and
private spheres, and lawful and exceptional violence, remain fluid—and yet the
state has successfully institutionalized violence. The case of Uganda shows that
governance does not require the state to have a stable jurisdiction. In fact, when
paired with sufficient access to violence, fluid and changeable jurisdictional claims
can facilitate the state’s control of society.
Institutionalized arbitrariness also contributes to literature on statecraft and
governance. This scholarship focuses on certain arrangements of rule—for
example, direct or indirect, and centralized or decentralized. Institutionalized
arbitrariness provides a new way to understand a mode of governance is neither
direct nor indirect, centralized nor decentralized. Unlike in models of direct rule,
the regime does not attempt to monopolize control over violence. Arbitrary
governance thus offers an alternative to rational-choice models such as that
offered by Stathis Kalyvas, which links territorial control and information to the
decisions of individuals to collaborate, collude, or resist the ruler (Kalyvas 2006).
Institutionalized arbitrariness instead describes how a state that is relatively
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deficient in conventional measures of control is able to mobilize an ideational
aspect of power to dominate individuals. The regime does not eliminate alterna-
tive sources of power. Instead, it intervenes in society stochastically, continually
and constantly destabilizing this complex institutional environment. As a result,
alternative authorities are rendered fragile, their claims to power continually
thrown off-balance by the changing institutional landscape.
Unlike in models of indirect rule, institutionalized arbitrariness allows the
ruling regime to foreclose the emergence of alternative authorities that might
govern autonomously. Regimes of institutionalized arbitrariness seek to engage
every citizen, using the party as its state-building vehicle. Arbitrary governance
thus averts challenges to central state power associated with principal-agent
problems, and bolsters the comparative power of the regime. Handicapping
alternative authorities also contributes to a fragile state–society relationship,
limiting the ability of citizens to organize and make collective claims on the
state. Society is instead fragmented and atomized, such that claim making occurs
more or less on an individual basis. Regimes that employ institutionalized arbi-
trariness occupy an unstable position between direct and decentralized rule,
maintaining just enough consolidated control to retain power, without expending
the resources typically associated with direct rule. Institutionalized arbitrariness
allows just enough hearing of grievances, just enough threat of state violence, and
just enough destabilization of expectations to prevent political or social organiza-
tion needed to challenge the central state. In turn, this maintains the regime’s
position as the most powerful of public authorities.
Institutionalized arbitrariness yields insights for our understanding of modern
authoritarian rule. The possibility of an exceedingly burdensome cost—be it time,
money, or physical injury—makes civilians ever aware of the possibility that the
state will intervene. And yet state interventions are haphazard, non-uniform, and
unpredictable. In Uganda, people, their organization, and their activities can be
defined post hoc as illegal or illegitimate by invoking broad and undefined rules,
such as those against ‘being idle’, ‘corrupt’, or ‘disrespectful’. Continually redefin-
ing these boundaries enables a mode of governance in which state actors can shape
civilian attempts to claim legitimacy or call for accountability to suit their own
interests. As a mode of governance, institutionalized arbitrariness is relatively
inexpensive—it limits public claims without requiring a concomitant increase in
the state’s human or technical capacity. Moreover, it helps explain why there is a
weak state–society compact. It is unrealistic to ask civilians to ‘hold the state
accountable’ (Orvis 2001, 28) under conditions of potential violence, and unstable
and constantly changing jurisdictional claims. Harsh and seemingly arbitrary inter-
ventions function as a low-cost mode of governance for the regime, fragmenting
resistance without requiring ongoing physical presence in outlying territories.
My findings also contribute to an understanding of neopatrimonialism. In a
conventional reading of neopatrimonialism, representatives of the state and
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ordinary citizens are mutually engaged in ways that challenge the western ideal of
a state–society contract. Nonetheless, neopatrimonialism retains a clear institu-
tionalization of violence that allows for the mixing of public and private spheres.
While such systems may appear unpredictable and disorderly from the outside,
they are internally legible. Rather than disorderly or unpredictable, they might
better be described as differently ordered (as critiqued in Tapscott 2017b).
However, as I have argued, focusing on this different order still fails to account
for the possibility that disorder and arbitrary violence might not just be the means,
but also the ends, of governing. In other words, the state might use disorder and
arbitrary violence to achieve domination. In contrast, institutionalized arbitrari-
ness contends that citizens do not experience interactions with state agents as part
of an increasingly predictable and voluntary exchange. Instead, ‘the state’ can be
unpredictably present and absent, at times intervening in matters and disputes to
determine an outcome, at other times abjuring responsibility and refusing to
enforce decisions. The state’s stochastic assertions and withdrawals, backed by
threat of force, continually redefine the state’s role—whether and when it has the
responsibility and authority to intervene.
Finally, the findings set forth in this book contribute to scholarship on public
authority, which seeks to reframe studies of governance away from a state/non-
state dichotomy and instead focus on how authority is produced in the day to day
(Raeymaekers et al. 2008). My findings show that the state can shape the space
within which other public authorities operate. In such contexts, the state’s poten-
tial interventions, backed by threat of meaningful force, render public authorities
fragile. Fragmenting and undermining entrepreneurial public authorities is a low-
cost way for the ruling regime to retain its power as the most important of
authorities even in a complex, plural institutional environment.
2.2 Implications and Extensions
The implications of arbitrary governance are significant. First, the findings suggest
that some ‘fragile’ states may be stronger than they appear. Arbitrary states
succeed at governance far more efficiently than a traditional welfare state in
terms of return on investment. Second, institutional multiplicity cannot be inter-
preted independently of the state, but rather must be understood in relation to the
state’s capacity for violence. While ordinary citizens may compete for resources
and power in a plural institutional environment, their battleground is structured
by a larger power game between the ruling regime and the polity at large.
These findings define new questions. Promising directions for future research
include comparative analyses of how unpredictability contributes to governance
strategies in other regimes in order to pinpoint how uncertainty and disorder are
distributed over time, space, and people. Relatedly, learning how people resist
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unpredictability would offer critical insights for questions about the ‘the art of not
being governed’ which suggest that illegibility allows citizens to evade taxes and
other costly interactions with the state (Scott 2009). The study could similarly be
expanded to examine how uncertainty affects people in the higher echelons of
such regimes, relating this question to, for example, Alex de Waal’s ‘political
marketplace’ where loyalties are bought and sold to the highest bidder and rulers
run the country like a firm (deWaal 2015). Examining how these theories relate in
practice may illuminate new approaches to authoritarian rule.
Another key question is how international assistance shapes arbitrary
governance. This book notes some avenues through which foreign aid, in
particular military and development assistance, enables arbitrary governance
(see Chapter 3). Further exploration of the role of private security companies
and the securitization of global governance could provide important insights
into how arbitrary governance works today and how it may work in the future—
in particular as global conglomerates increasingly impinge on national sover-
eignty, and the state becomes increasingly deterritorialized and denationalized
(Abrahamsen and Williams 2010; Sassen 1996; 2000). Such a study could help
situate arbitrary governance in an age of globalization—whether as a strategy
derived from the nation-state that modern authoritarians use to cling to power,
or as a natural result of the marginalization of the state in favour of global and
networked modes of extraction and governance.
The ‘data revolution’ and advances in technology offer other fertile topics for
research with potentially substantial insights into the future of arbitrary govern-
ance. Technological changes stand to fundamentally reconfigure the relationship
between citizen and state, client and patron. New technologies are reshaping the
political playing field in numerous areas, from electoral manipulation to surveil-
lance and population management. Scholars have shown how digital technologies
can impact election results—directly, for example through computer hacking to
adjust the vote count (Amoah 2019), and indirectly, for example by drawing
attention away from more traditional strategies of safeguarding elections and
creating new opportunities for corruption and election rigging (Cheeseman et al.
2018). Governments have also exercised their ability to shut down the internet
during elections or social unrest, limiting the political opposition’s ability to
organize and mobilize constituents and to document regime malfeasance
(Khisa 2019).
Relatedly, improved technology offers incumbents new ways to surveil their
populace. Scholars have documented how African countries are developing
expansive databases on their citizenry that gather electronic bio-data from numer-
ous sources, collecting a person’s name, national ID number, address, photograph,
and fingerprints, and merging this information with health and other personal
records. Such bio-data is now required to register for and use a SIM card across
African countries, allowing governments to trace mobile data, call records, and
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communications content to specific individuals. These practices have been docu-
mented in Ethiopia, Nigeria, South Africa, Kenya, Zimbabwe, Zambia, Malawi,
and Uganda. A host of foreign countries including Korea in Uganda; China in
Zambia, Ethiopia, and Zimbabwe; and Israel in Nigeria have aided African states
in procuring and deploying these technologies (Donovan and Martin 2014). Such
technologies facilitate surveillance and in some cases have been shown to corres-
pond with more targeted repression (Gohdes 2020). Technology will shape the
relationship between citizens and the state, likely creating more direct and per-
sonal connections between ruler and ruled even in the absence of material
intervention. As regimes like Uganda’s NRM continue to adopt and implement
new technologies, what I have described as institutionalized arbitrariness may
consolidate to more closely resemble the Ethiopian or Rwandan regimes, where
surveillance allows for increasingly targeted repression and an ever increasing
perception of state presence.
Arbitrary governance shows how unpredictability can be embedded in institu-
tionalized systems of rule, producing a type of modern authoritarianism that
survives by destabilizing alternatives to its rule and projecting the possibility of
its intervention in the daily lives of ordinary citizens. Contrary to many of the
scholarly assumptions on state formation and consolidation, Uganda under the
NRM shows that contemporary regimes can produce an unfamiliar match
between violence and governing institutions that facilitates the efficient extension
and maintenance of control across territory. Violence and institutional form are
linked in an unstable and constantly reconfigurable way; they can be opportun-
istically decoupled and recoupled according to a wider strategy of rule. An
increasingly fluid and labile relationship between violence and institutions may
reflect worldwide shifts in governance, by which democratic institutions are
increasingly weakened and usurped by hybrid forms of authority that manipulate
the relationship between the rule of law and arbitrary violence. Such strategies
bode ill for many goals of international development and global security, as rulers
retool democratic institutions to serve authoritarian ends.
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